After weeks of intense and destabilising protests across Iran, marked by sweeping internet and communications blackouts, a severe security crackdown, and reports of unprecedented deaths and repression, US President Donald Trump has kept Tehran and the wider region on tenterhooks by repeatedly threatening military strikes should the violence escalate further.
The demonstrations in Iran should not be seen as routine or normal outbursts of public frustration. Rather, they have been among the most serious challenges the Islamic Republic has faced in years, spreading across cities, drawing in diverse social groups and prompting a level of state violence that has underscored how threatened the leadership feels. By warning Iran’s leaders against killing demonstrators or resorting to executions, Mr Trump made clear that internal repression is no longer insulated from external consequences.
Even though the White House pulled back from military action on Wednesday night, the threat of force is still very much on the table. This reinforces Mr Trump’s approach of keeping the possibility of escalation alive while preserving the element of surprise and his ability to act when and how he chooses. While the protests have since waned under the weight of repression, many inside and outside Iran now see sustained external pressure, particularly from the US, as essential to preventing the regime from simply closing ranks and reverting to business as usual.
Mr Trump’s warnings are landing at a moment when Iran finds itself strategically exposed in ways not seen for years. Sustained Israeli strikes against its so-called axis of resistance since October 7, 2023, and the war between Israel and Iran which also saw US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities last summer have degraded Iran’s deterrence and exposed the limits of its defence capabilities.
The protests add another layer of vulnerability, compounding regional losses with domestic political and economic strain and creating an opening that Washington is now seeking to exploit. Understanding Mr Trump’s strategy towards Iran, therefore, requires moving beyond episodic statements or tactical deployments and instead examining how the administration is attempting to convert accumulated Iranian weakness into a durable strategic shift that benefits the US.
In his second term, Mr Trump’s policy towards Iran blends strategic thinking with his instinctive belief in pressure and unpredictability. Rather than being improvised or ideological, this approach draws on the core principles articulated in the administration’s National Security Strategy, including strategic competition, deterrence through strength and the rejection of restraint for its own sake. The objective is not regime change in the classical sense, but strategic submission, compelling Iran’s leadership to accept permanent constraints on its nuclear ambitions, a narrowed regional role and the reality that the US is prepared to escalate abruptly if its red lines are crossed.
Crucially, Iran’s future trajectory – whether it experiences renewed cycles of protest met by repression, a period of regime adjustment, or a more dramatic rupture in the form of collapse – has become increasingly contingent on how the US chooses to apply or withhold pressure in the months ahead.
One of the most consequential shifts has been the explicit effort to tie Iran’s internal repression to external consequences. Since the protests began, Mr Trump has repeatedly warned Tehran that mass killings or executions would provoke consequences, including the possible use of force. These threats signal that domestic repression now carries international costs, particularly at a moment when the regime is already overstretched by regional losses and economic pressure. In doing so, Washington has deliberately blurred the boundary that Iran has long relied upon between internal coercion and external accountability.
Iran’s nuclear programme has remained a central pillar of Mr Trump’s strategic calculus. On June 22 of last year, in Operation Midnight Hammer, the US carried out direct strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, marking a decisive escalation in Washington’s effort to deny Tehran any viable path towards nuclear breakout. Mr Trump subsequently declared that Iran’s nuclear programme had been effectively buried, reflecting the administration’s belief that sustained pressure – combined with Israeli military action during the June war, covert operations and cyber disruption – has pushed Tehran into a strategically constrained position.
Economic pressure, long a cornerstone of Mr Trump’s Iran policy, has taken on a broader and more punitive form. Beyond maximum pressure sanctions imposed since the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement by Mr Trump himself in 2018, the administration has proposed a 25 per cent tariff on any country or company conducting business with Tehran, signalling a shift from financial pressure to trade punishment. By threatening access to the US market, Washington is seeking to deter third parties from acting as economic lifelines for Iran and to impose cumulative costs that compound both regional losses and domestic economic strain.
Military signalling also remains central. There are now reports that a US aircraft carrier strike group, the USS Lincoln, is on its way to the region, even as the timing, scope and intent of any further military actions remain ambiguous. Mr Trump’s approach is shaped by his belief that Iran has repeatedly misjudged American resolve, from its assumption in 2018 that Washington would not abandon the nuclear deal, to its miscalculation in 2020 when the US killed Qassem Suleimani and again during the war last summer. So the current US force posture adjustments are designed to prevent Tehran from concluding that the situation has stabilised.
Yet even as pressure intensifies, Mr Trump has been careful to leave the door open to a negotiated outcome. His references to wanting an agreement and to “making Iran great again” are transactional signals aimed at the leadership rather than Iranian society. In this framing, economic relief and reintegration remain possible, but only after Iran accepts permanent and verifiable constraints on its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes alongside shifts in its regional behaviour.
The remaining question is whether Tehran has fully absorbed this reality after repeated warnings and shocks. If it has, Iran is more likely to respond through adjustment most notably by exercising greater restraint at home and across the region. If it has not, further miscalculation is on the horizon. Mr Trump’s strategy is therefore less about engineering internal change in Iran than about forcing its leadership to confront the limits of resistance, with significant implications for regime durability and the future trajectory of US–Iran relations.
