Is there sufficient international pressure to force Sudan's factions to end the war?

Sudanese refugee women from Darfur at the Touloum refugee camp in eastern Chad. Reuters

Urgency around the divisions in Sudan has ebbed and surged for decades across the US and Europe. It is now re-emerging. Driven by the atrocities in El Fasher last month, the country’s civil war is now firmly at the forefront of international concern.

Battles between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces – which hold the key to the country’s fate – are being followed closely, from the White House to the European Parliament and foreign ministries around the world.

The most significant element is a consensus around the demands for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire issued by the Quad mediators, which include the US plus Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. El Fasher fell after 500 days of fighting, and its loss means that the Sudanese army no longer holds a stronghold in the country’s west.

If we can call this a new phase, then I think there are four important tests for how it plays out.

The first question mark for the heightened interest in Sudan is a proper recognition of the Arab political traditions that will be key to a long-term resolution of the conflict. As the composition of the Quad shows, there is a close cultural and diplomatic sympathy between Sudan’s national political make-up and the rest of the Arab world. After all, post-colonial Sudan joined the Arab League in 1956.

Yet many ministries – including the British Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office – put their Sudan diplomats into the Africa section of their structures. This creates false walls between the delegations and interests of the Sudanese as well as the Middle East and North Africa teams in ways that inhibits responsive diplomacy. I experienced this myself just last week when a senior British figure dealing with the region conceded that it takes a day or two for developments to filter through these administratively separate channels.

Dr Anwar Gargash welcomes Trump's pledge to end Sudan war

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The second test lies around the wider approach to Sudan by western leaders. There is a folk memory of the long series of events that led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. For decades, that declaration had been a cause celebre in countries like the UK and the US. No serious public debate questions that outcome now, but the fact that Sudan’s humanitarian concerns are being decided internationally sets some precedent for what happens now.

UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper has sought to bring some wider themes within the Sudan conflict to public recognition. She has strongly highlighted the country’s situation for the plight of women in conflict. Events later this week will see Ms Cooper seek to highlight how much suffering is being inflicted on Sudanese women. It is a chilling theme that rightly captures people’s fears and aversions.

The third dynamic that the situation brings to public attention is the fragility across the Horn of Africa nations and their neighbours. Unsettled tensions are stalking Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia in ways that could lead to a fusion of conflicts and subsequent hardship throughout a whole swathe of territory.

Memories like that of Live Aid, a benefit concert held in the UK and the US in 1985 to raise funds for famine relief in Ethiopia, thankfully resurface whenever situations in the broader region are at their worst. However, even as conditions in Sudan are likely to deteriorate even further, the EU has cut foreign aid and cannot be the assistance superpower it was in the 1990s. Into the gap is an ever-greater need for public attention and subsequent donations.

Few can doubt that the intensity of attention being given to Sudan is rising globally

With the uncertainty and instability of Yemen already troubling the Red Sea, the need to be mindful of the linkages and spill-over across the region is obvious. With well-established international migration routes from the Horn of Africa to the North African coast already swelling with new numbers, the blowback will reach far beyond the continent.

The fourth test for diplomats is how they view Sudan’s civil war to be resolvable. The three pillars of the Quad’s call for a cessation of hostilities in September include a ceasefire; immediate access to all areas for humanitarian aid; and negotiations for the establishment of a civilian government. (The army overthrew the civilian-led government in 2022, triggering the civil war that is now in its third year.)

The RSF has said it would accept the plan, but its battlefield killings have horrified the world. The SAF leader, Gen Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, has rejected a ceasefire and vowed to continue with the bloodshed. Gen Burhan and his base of Islamist extremist supporters are dedicated to fighting on for internal domination – a factor that would perpetuate the country’s internal division. The social media and propaganda output from the SAF’s stronghold in Port Sudan is unrelenting in the face of calls for a ceasefire.

That is the challenge for diplomats and western leaders – including, since last month, US President Donald Trump – who are now engaged in finding a settlement. The focus has shifted from expressing outrage to seeking the rapid imposition of a ceasefire plan, and few can doubt that the intensity of attention being given to Sudan is rising globally.

Indeed, the sincerity of the diplomats and officials seeking a ceasefire from outside matches this wave of sympathy. It is to be hoped that the leaders of the Sudanese civil war can jointly recognise the country’s needs over their respective supporters’ interests.