A US-brokered ceasefire last Thursday was thought to have brought an end to the most intense violence the southern Syrian province of Sweida has experienced in decades.
What began on July 13 as a localised dispute between Druze and Bedouin groups quickly escalated into a full-scale military confrontation between Druze fighters and transitional government-aligned forces. In just four days, the clashes claimed at least 516 lives and displaced many more, shaking the foundations of Syria’s already fragile transition.
With the fighting having subsided briefly, only for it to resume over the weekend before ending on Sunday, the cessation of hostilities is, at best, tenuous. It should certainly not be mistaken for a return to normality. Early signs indicate that the ceasefire largely restores the pre-conflict status quo, with local Druze factions resuming de facto control over Sweida.
Halting the violence is a welcome step, but it does not amount to a resolution. Unless the deeper drivers of the conflict – including political exclusion and contested authority – are meaningfully addressed, the truce risks becoming little more than a brief pause before the next eruption.
Sweida’s violence began with the abduction of a Druze trader by individuals reportedly linked to Bedouin tribes in the region. In retaliation, a wave of reciprocal abductions broke out, eventually devolving into broader intercommunal violence. Such incidents are not unprecedented in southern Syria, where mistrust and unresolved grievances run deep. What set this episode apart was the decision of the country’s transitional authorities to intervene militarily.
Damascus presented the deployment of security forces as a step to restore order. But people in Sweida, at least those who actively resisted, viewed it as a power grab. This reaction stems from long-standing disputes between local leaders and the transitional government – particularly over governance, security arrangements and the identity of the future Syrian state.
Sweida’s notables have consistently advocated for decentralised governance and locally managed security structures tailored to the community’s needs. In contrast, Damascus remains committed to a rigid, top-down model. On broader questions of identity and political inclusion, Sweida’s calls for a secular and pluralistic system have largely been ignored.
These unresolved differences, compounded by repeated failures in negotiation, help explain why Damascus’s intervention was viewed not as a stabilising measure, but as an attempt to reassert central authority by force.
In the wake of this intervention, hostilities broke out between government forces and fighters loyal to Sheikh Hikmat Al Hijri, the most prominent Druze religious authority. Both sides traded blame: Damascus accused Mr Al Hijri’s men of attacking its personnel, while Mr Al Hijri accused the state of breaching prior commitments and committing serious abuses.
Reports soon surfaced about widespread abuses by government-aligned forces, including degrading treatment of detainees and extrajudicial killings. These images triggered widespread public outrage and galvanised local resistance. Mediation attempts broke down, largely due to Mr Al Hijri’s refusal to concede or compromise.
The situation took a sharp turn when Israel launched air strikes on government forces and key facilities, including the Ministry of Defence, in response to the clashes in Sweida. Fearing broader regional escalation, the US stepped in to contain the crisis. A ceasefire was eventually announced by interim President Ahmad Al Shara, who described it as a necessary measure to prevent a deeper catastrophe.
While the details of the agreement remain sparse, early indications suggest it largely reinstates the pre-conflict arrangement: local forces retain de facto control over key areas of Sweida, and Damascus withdraws its military units from the city.
Though the ceasefire is a welcome step towards halting the violence, the fact that it was violated almost immediately means it merely freezes a crisis that continues to smoulder beneath the surface. There is no sign that the agreement addresses the structural causes of the conflict, nor the far-reaching ripple effects it has triggered. A return to the previous status quo is not just insufficient – it is dangerous. The events of the past week have profoundly altered Syria’s political and social landscape, leaving deep wounds and a toxic environment.
Anti-Druze inflammatory rhetoric seized on Israel’s strikes to depict the Druze community as collaborators or separatists, reinforcing sectarian narratives and fuelling calls for collective punishment. The result has been a disturbing surge in incitement against the Druze minority, including calls to boycott Druze-owned businesses and expel Druze students from university dormitories. Meanwhile, many Druze – particularly those aligned with Mr Al Hijri – have grown increasingly distrustful of the state and its institutions, further eroding the transitional government’s legitimacy.
What was once latent sectarian tension has now become overt and volatile, fuelled by a surge in hate speech from all sides. This is precisely what makes the current ceasefire so fragile. A return to the previous arrangement is not a return to calm – it is a reversion to a simmering crisis that could explode at any moment.
The ceasefire may have paused the shooting, but only a genuinely inclusive and pluralistic political transition can stop the bleeding and set Syria on a path towards national healing. Unless the country’s leadership moves quickly to address the root causes of the violence in Sweida, the current silence will be short-lived.
Preventing a return to widespread conflict remains possible, but the window for doing so in a sustainable and inclusive manner is closing fast.
Dr Haid Haid is a senior non-resident fellow at the Arab Reform Initiative. He is also a consulting research fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme
