Iran's history points to the direction the country could take

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  US President Jimmy Carter toasts Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran during a New Year's Eve dinner at Niavaran Palace in Tehran in 1977. AP

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  An armed escort surrounds Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's car at Tehran airport on February 1979, as he returns to Iran from exile. AP

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  People jostle to see Khomeini, who blessed the crowd, in a schoolyard in Tehran on February 4, 1979. AP

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  President Carter prepares to make a national television address from the White House, on April 25, 1980, about the failed US mission to rescue hostages held in Iran. AP

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  The entrance to the US Embassy in Tehran where 63 people were held hostage, in 1980. Graffiti on the wall urges minority communities in America to start a 'revolution against US discrimination'. AP

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  Remains of a burned-out American helicopter in the eastern desert region of Iran, in April 1980, after the failed attempt to free the US Embassy hostages. AP

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  Iran's President Hassan Rouhani, right, shakes hands with Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in July 2015, before talks in Tehran on Iran's nuclear programme. AP

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  A rally in front of the former US Embassy in Tehran in 2015 marks the 36th anniversary of the seizure of the embassy by militant Iranian students. AP

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  President Rouhani attends an event to mark National Nuclear Day in Tehran on April 9, 2018. AP

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  The coffins of Iranian Quds Force general Qassem Suleimani and others who were killed by a US drone strike are carried on a lorry during their funeral procession in Kerman, Iran, in January 2020. AP

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  Demonstrators walk over Israeli and US flags at a rally commemorating Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, in Tehran in February 2024. AP

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  Iranian demonstrators hold up posters of Qassem Suleimani and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli air strike in Beirut in September 2024, at a rally outside the former US Embassy in Tehran, in November 2024. AP

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  Demonstrators protest outside the White House in Washington on June 22, 2025, following US military strikes on Iran. AP

Israel’s attacks on Iran last week sent the two countries to war, marking a turning point in each of their histories.

It is Iran’s first major war since 1988, when its eight-year-long conflict with Iraq came to an end. Israel’s shock-and-awe campaign has targeted not just Iran’s nuclear programme, the main casus belli, but also the political and military leadership of the Islamic Republic. Israeli and American leaders, meanwhile, have engaged in doublespeak on the question of whether they seek regime change.

Regardless of their war aims, the possibility of a seismic political shift has been starkly posed in Iran. This is particular so because of the many years of economic hardship and social upheaval that have exerted tremendous pressures on the current establishment. Many are now wondering about the political consequences of the war for the Islamic Republic and the rule of its 86-year-old leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

In trying to understand the present moment, historians inevitably turn to the past. Iran’s centuries-long history provides many examples of upheavals and regime change. Which historical moments are most suitable to give us a sense of where the country is at today?

Demonstrators wave Iranian flags during a protest against Israeli attacks on Iran, on Friday, in Tehran. Getty

One inescapable point of comparison is the 1979 revolution, which replaced Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – known more widely then as the Shah of Iran – with the current establishment. But as the Islamic Republic faces one of the biggest challenges in its 46-year history, what is the likelihood that Iranians will once again rise up for the reasons noted above?

Any comparison between 2025 and 1979 quickly shows why a similar revolution is much less likely to happen today.

In 1979, the Shah’s opponents had an overarching leader to rally behind. Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini pulled together a diverse coalition of nationalists, Marxists and Islamists to support him as an alternative. Although he was a dyed-in-wool Islamist, Khomeini was careful not to dispel other groups, particularly in the early days.

Any comparison between 2025 and 1979 quickly shows why a radical change in the country’s power structure is much less likely today

He had in his team more veterans from within Iran’s nationalist movement than fellow clerics. Khomeini also used the broad network of mosques inside the country to organise. Other opposition groups also had extensive and disciplined networks across Iran.

By contrast, the opponents of the Islamic Republic today are bitterly divided, lack networks inside the country and don’t have any credible organisations either inside or abroad.

Reza Pahlavi, the 64-year-old son of the Shah who is currently living in exile, has attempted to pitch himself as the singular leader of the opposition. But he lacks broad-based support or organisation, without either of which it is impossible to stage an uprising that seriously challenges the Islamic Republic. Even a spontaneous movement – such as the ones in 2017-19 and 2022-23 – is unlikely to go far without organised leadership.

Rather than change being imposed from the outside, it is much likelier to happen from within the establishment.

Again, Iranian history has a number of examples of military figures taking up the reins of their country during moments of acute crises. The best-known example in modern times is the one mounted by Mr Pahlavi’s eponymous grandfather – and the father of the deposed Shah – who rose from a lowly military position to lead a British-backed coup in 1921.

Reza Pahlavi appointed himself prime minister and, after considering the idea of establishing a republic, abolished the Qajar dynasty in 1925 and created a new monarchical dynasty. The Qajars, who had run Iran since the late 1700s, had become enfeebled by the early 20th century creating the conditions necessary for change.

It is conceivable that figures from inside the Islamic Republic's establishment will similarly rise to assume power. It is also possible that instead of a typical military coup, a broadly representative committee consisting of politicians and military figures takes over.

Iran also experienced regime change in 1941 and 1953, both of which took place with extensive support from foreign powers. In 1941, the Soviet Union and Britain invaded the country during the Second World War before deposing Reza Pahlavi and replacing him with his son, the Shah. Twelve years later, the CIA and MI6 helped bring down the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and reinstated the Shah, who had been reduced to a mere figurehead, as the country's ruler.

It’s worth pointing out that, while the British aided Reza Pahlavi during the 1921 coup, the support had been limited and the operation very much led from within. By contrast, the 1953 coup was planned and carried out by Washington and London, albeit with local support from Iran’s armed forces.

It’s extremely unlikely that the US and its allies can carry out a similar operation today, since they lack the level of political penetration the West had in 1953. The US remains the only foreign power capable of mounting a ground invasion of Iran, but the American public has little appetite for such an intervention – particularly after the misguided invasion and occupation of Iraq two decades earlier.

While it is possible for some to imagine the US and Israel deposing Mr Khamenei, this scenario also remains unlikely. For without boots on the ground, any transition process will be chaotic, unwieldy and perhaps even met with resistance from several quarters. There is also little guarantee that a more friendly government will emerge from this process.

By comparing the current moment to what happened in 1921, 1941, 1953 and 1979, we can conclude that, if there was to be a change, something akin to the 1921 coup is perhaps the most relevant model. A primarily Iranian-led power usurpation is more likely than a popular revolution (1979), a foreign-organised coup (1953) or change as a consequence of foreign occupation (1941).

It remains to be seen whether there are elements inside Iran's armed forces or political establishment who would make such an ambitious dash for power, given all the risks that it will involve.

It certainly appears that the Islamic Republic is on the cusp of change, given the many pressures emanating from within and beyond Iran’s boundaries today. Time will tell what that change actually entails.