Whether the ongoing Doha talks to end the war in Gaza succeed or fail, the spectre of military strikes between Israel, Iran and their proxies remains a possibility. This is because turning verbal agreements into written commitments is neither an easy nor a swift process.
Side agreements may already account for the need for controlled retaliatory military operations while de-escalation guarantees are being formulated and documented. These skirmishes may take a new form, but they won’t necessarily escalate into a full-scale war if the negotiations in Doha succeed.
However, if those talks collapse – which may or may not happen by the time of publication – the threat of war will increase.
Yet even then, the conflict will probably neither be prolonged nor extensive, no matter how severe the retaliatory strikes are. Instead, this may serve as a prelude to major deals after the destruction, with Lebanon, in particular, standing on the brink.
So what compromises could emerge in Doha? And what will the military landscape look like if the ceasefire negotiations on Gaza fail?
The US Department of Defence is bolstering its military footprint in the Middle East. Its message to all stakeholders is clear: America will not flee from a war in the region. Instead, it will intervene alongside Israel if Iran initiates an all-out conflict, or if matters spiral out of control due to a decision or miscalculation by Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or any of the Iran-backed factions in Iraq.
The Iraqi government has clearly understood this message and, through Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, postponed the announcement of an end to the US-led international coalition’s mission in the country due to recent regional developments. During a joint news conference in Ankara with his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, Mr Hussein said Baghdad opposes any wars in the region.
Essentially, Iraq has joined Egypt and Jordan in adopting a neutral stance on the war in Gaza, limiting its support to Palestinian civilians and advocating for a ceasefire in the enclave. Only Lebanon has acquiesced to Hezbollah and Iran’s appropriation of its sovereign decision-making, linking its fate to the Gaza war.
In other words, the support front for Hamas in Gaza isn’t led by Israel’s neighbouring states but by the Tehran-led “resistance axis”.
The US administration under President Joe Biden says it is doing everything possible to reach a ceasefire in Gaza and secure guarantees for all the stakeholders. It does not want to entangle Washington in a war against Iran and its proxies, a situation Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and public sentiment inside Israel might be inclined to push it towards.
Despite the Biden administration’s frustrations with the Netanyahu government, US military aid to Israel continues – which, rather than ceasing, is only likely to increase. Washington expects the Middle East’s leaders to understand its strategic alliance with Israel and what it requires.
But the Biden team has adopted short-term pragmatism by pushing the region’s stakeholders towards tactical agreements regarding Gaza, such as an exchange of captives and prisoners, rather than towards longstanding political solutions, including the creation of a Palestinian state and a comprehensive settlement.
It also understands Iran’s central role in Hamas’s decision-making because the latter controls the support front and the potential expansion of the war. Therefore, it is engaging in negotiations with Tehran through third parties, using the following premise: facilitate the Doha negotiations, and we will open a new chapter in US-Iran relations.
The Biden team also recognises the need to save face for Iran, Hezbollah and Israel by allowing for agreed-upon military strikes that are limited and symbolic.
The real danger lies in Israel continuing to target senior figures in Hezbollah or Hamas, which could escalate the shadow war and disrupt the rules of engagement that govern military operations. If either Israel or Hezbollah breaks these rules, a serious war could bring devastation to Lebanon. For the US won’t restrain Israel if Hezbollah decides not to follow the rules of engagement.
Meanwhile, secret talks with Tehran, also involving key Arab powers, aim to achieve the major deal that the Biden administration has sought for months.
Such a deal would leave a significant mark on Mr Biden’s legacy and give Vice President Kamala Harris’s presidential campaign against Donald Trump a lift. Even if Washington only contains rather than resolves the Gaza war, this would be considered a half-success that ultimately benefits the governing Democratic Party.
There has been a measure of pragmatism in the Doha talks. For example, Yahya Sinwar’s leadership of Hamas hasn’t deterred Washington from proceeding with the negotiations. Instead, it views Mr Sinwar’s power and decision-making as centralised – and, therefore, currently useful.
The containment principle adopted by the Biden administration may be necessary as a pragmatic step towards achieving a ceasefire, prisoner exchange and a technical, non-political agreement to extinguish the fire and halt the attrition. If the Netanyahu government secures the release of Israeli hostages, it could help the Prime Minister in a future election in Israel and possibly insulate him from trials in his own country. However, it also means that he will have to eat his words and accept Mr Sinwar’s leadership in Gaza.
Meanwhile, the Biden team is working on a deal that could lead Saudi Arabia to normalise relations with Israel. The problem is that the US lacks the clear strategy needed to force Israel to accept a two-state solution. And even if it is achieved, the grand deal will not succeed as long as the US is prepared to appease Iran by legitimising its proxies at the expense of sovereignty in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria.
During Barack Obama’s presidency, Arab countries were excluded from American negotiations with Tehran under the pretext that these talks were strictly aimed at tackling the latter’s nuclear weapons programme. In reality, Iran imposed political conditions, chief among them being to preserve its regional role through its proxies and affiliated militias.
This time, however, the Arab powers have little interest in agreeing to secret US-Iran deals if they ultimately serve to undermine sovereignty in the Arab world.
