Fifty years ago this Saturday, Turkish forces entered northern Cyprus to head off an Athens-backed coup on the island. The US and a few of its western allies soon blocked arms sales to Turkey, seeking to curb Turkey’s actions.
The embargoes backfired over the long run, setting Ankara on a path to developing one of the world’s more robust defence industries. Unable to acquire the weapons and equipment needed to defend itself despite being a key Nato member, Turkey vowed to become self-sufficient and embraced domestic development.
The US lifted its ban in 1978, but Turkey’s efforts accelerated in the 1980s due to a military coup and insurgency from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the country’s south-east. Domestic Turkish defence startups were encouraged to link up with foreign firms to gain know-how, financing and technology transfer.
In 1983, Ankara signed a deal with two American firms to co-produce US F-16 fighter jets in Turkey – an early major boost to Turkish prestige. The 1987 creation of the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation financed the development of the core of Turkey’s defence industry, Aselsan, Havelsan, Tusas, Aspilsan and Roketsan.
Turkey, which had been founded by a revered military leader, began to emerge as a defence and industrial manufacturer earlier than most other states on a similar development timeline. Despite a slowdown in the 1990s, thanks to new arms embargoes from Switzerland, Norway and Germany, and a partial US embargo, by the time the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey was poised for a major leap.
Led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is now President, the AKP called for an era of “indigenous solutions” and significantly increased research and development during a period of economic growth. From 2007 to 2017, Ankara’s R&D defence spending tripled to $1.2 billion.
The results have been plain to see: the Altay main battle tank in 2008; the country’s first attack helicopter, the T129, in 2014; an array of new missiles, torpedoes and sensory equipment; the Barbaros frigate in 2018. The list goes on and on, with the biggest solution of all being the Bayraktar TB-2 drone, released by Baykar in 2011.
Turkey used the drone successfully against Kurdish militants in Syria and Iraq in 2018. The next year the TB-2 made an impact in Libya’s civil war. In 2020, Azerbaijan used it to defeat Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2021, after signing a deal to produce TB-2s domestically, Ukraine’s military began using the drone against Russian forces.
Turkey’s top unmanned assault vehicle has since gained considerable international prestige, taking its defence industry along for the ride. The Bayraktar now has near-mythic status in Ukraine, where a police dog, a lemur in Kyiv, a crepe in Lviv and a catchy war song have been given its name. More than 30 countries have bought TB-2s, which has been praised by global heavyweights like political scientist Francis Fukuyama and called the “drone that changed the nature of warfare” by The New Yorker.
Yet Ankara has gone right on releasing new indigenous solutions. These include the country’s first amphibious assault ship and unmanned fighter jet, the Red Apple, a new wave of naval corvettes and frigates, and a series of higher-flying drones. In February, Turkey successfully tested its advanced fighter jet, the Kaan, joining the US, Russia and China as the only states to fly domestically designed 5th-generation aircraft.
Turkey has fallen a little short of its goal of total self-sufficiency, as most of its defence products, including the Kaan, have been based on foreign models or designed and produced with considerable foreign assistance. Top Turkish firms remain reliant on outside components and expertise, importing from Ukraine, South Korea, Russia, the US, the UK and beyond.
Yet Nato’s second-largest military now has the domestic backing to stand tall, with its defence industry accruing considerable respect at home and abroad. Turkey’s defence exports have nearly tripled over the past decade, from $1.9 billion in 2014 to $5.5 billion last year. The world’s 19th-largest economy now ranks just outside the top 10 global defence exporters, coming in at number 11.
Selcuk Bayraktar, creator of the TB-2 and the President’s son-in-law, has become a domestic hero and is widely seen as a leading candidate to succeed Mr Erdogan. It was a Bayraktar Akinci drone that found recently deceased Iranian president Ibrahim Raisi’s downed helicopter in the Iranian mountains in May, after which the drone operator proudly traced the shape of the Turkish flag. And despite Turkey’s close co-operation with non-western actors like Russia (the purchase of S-400 missile systems in 2019) and China (new plans for a $1 billion automotive plant), a robust and confident Turkish defence industry strengthens the western defence architecture.
That is not only because Turkey is a Nato member, but also because Turkish defence manufacturing developed largely within the western industrial defence ecosystem. Two cases in point: in March, with Ukraine facing battlefield shortages, the US turned to Turkey to boost ammunitions supplies; and just last month Turkey joined the Russia-facing, German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, prompting military observers to suggest Turkish missile defence platforms may soon be strengthening Europe’s defence infrastructure.
As for Cyprus, despite countless rounds of talks over the past half-century, the island remains tensely divided between the EU-member Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognised only by Ankara. As Turkish, Cypriot and Greek leaders gather on the island this weekend to mark 50 years since the division, some will surely express hope for a resolution in the years to come.
It's probably unwelcome news for southern Cypriots, but Turkey is undeniably better placed today than in 1974 to defend its interests and positions in Cyprus. This helps explain why Ankara has in recent years shifted away from the the island's probable resolution, reunification within a bizonal federation, and begun advocating for two separate states.
Whether or not it is a wise move, time will tell. But there's little question it can be traced back to the initial western response to Turkey’s arrival on the island.
