Raghida Dergham is the founder and executive chairwoman of the Beirut Institute, and a columnist for The National
April 21, 2024
It appears that the recent escalation between Iran and Israel won’t lead to an all-out war that could threaten regional stability, at least for now. This much is clear after the Iranian regime’s measured reaction to Israel’s limited strike on a military base in Isfahan on Friday.
The de-escalatory path currently being taken by the two adversaries gives the impression of a tacit understanding between them. Even though they conducted direct strikes against each other during the past week, their battlegrounds will continue to be outside their respective territories.
China and Russia have publicly taken stands to push Iran to settle for a limited retaliation, affirming their opposition to a regional war. Beijing is especially wary of a full-blown conflict, given its military and strategic relations with Tehran, and its ties with Israel in the high-tech sector.
Remarkably, the latest conflict seems to have been telegraphed and co-ordinated through the administration of US President Joe Biden. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian said that Tehran informed Washington before and after its missile and drone strikes inside Israel more than a week ago. “We made it very clear in these conversations, we told the Israelis that Iran does not want escalation,” Mr Amirabdollahian said.
So what happens next? Who benefits from the latest confrontation? And who pays the price?
The winners are primarily Iran and Israel themselves. The losers are ordinary Palestinians in Gaza, where Israel’s war has killed more than 34,000 people over the past six months. Moreover, the Israeli war cabinet intends to invade Rafah, with its stated aim to eliminate Hamas’s infrastructure with implicit western approval, while issuing Gazans only promises of humanitarian relief.
Israel's air defence system intercepts projectiles amid an attack by Iran, as seen from Ramallah in the occupied West Bank. Screengrab from AFPTV / AFP
Missiles fired from Iran towards Israel are intercepted over the northern part of the country. AFP
Explosions light up the sky in Hebron in the Palestinian territories during the attack. Screengrab from AFPTV / AFP
Explosions occur over Hebron. Screengrab from AFPTV / AFP
Explosions light up the skies over Jerusalem during the attack. Screengrab from AFPTV / AFP
Explosions occur over Jerusalem. Screengrab from AFPTV / AFP
Israel's Iron Dome air defence system moves to intercept missiles fired from Iran. AP
Iranian demonstrators chant slogans during an anti-Israel gathering in Tehran. AP
People in Tehran appear to celebrate in the street after the attack on Israel. Wana (West Asia News Agency) / Reuters
Iranians appear to celebrate in the street after the attack. Wana (West Asia News Agency) / Reuters
A man kisses a mock rocket during an anti-Israel rally in Tehran after Iran launched the attack. EPA
People hold Iranian and Palestinian flags at Palestine Square in Tehran. EPA
US President Joe Biden meets members of his national security team about the attack on Israel by Iran. The White House / AP
Both Iran and Israel seek a price – a reward for de-escalating – from the West
The other losers include the countries that have become arenas for Iran’s proxy wars, namely Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Major powers such as Iran, Israel and those in the West are all exploiting these countries as a pretext to avoid a direct Iran-Israel confrontation.
This level of strategic shamelessness, as I call it, is unparalleled.
Previously, when the administration of former US president Barack Obama and its European allies agreed to a nuclear deal with Iran in 2015, there was an understanding that they would acquiesce to Tehran’s condition not to interfere in its regional policies. Today, that strategic shamelessness has reached a troubling level under the guise of saving the Middle East from devastating regional wars.
But no major regional war will break out as long as Iran and Israel continue to have a tacit agreement with each other. There will be no more than occasional skirmishes, such as the one we witnessed over the past month, as the two adversaries maintain a shadow war that is within their regulated rules of engagement.
The Iranian regime’s most significant gain from its strikes on Israel is the domestic support it has rallied for itself. This has served to contain domestic discontent and dissent by dispelling the notion that the regime had become weak.
It has also imposed its priorities on the US and European powers to safeguard its own interests, particularly in preventing Israel from targeting its nuclear facilities. Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme, meanwhile, has made significant strides towards acquiring a bomb.
I am given to understand that the Biden administration had warned Israel against any unilateral actions to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, making it clear that it would stand alone in such a scenario and would not receive the necessary air cover from Washington. This was a clear message conveyed not only by the US to Israel but also by key European powers involved in deterring Iranian missile attacks against Israel.
In exchange, Israel may have extracted an approval from the West to carry out its long-intended invasion of Rafah. If true, this presents a dangerous trade-off with significant implications. Among these is Tehran’s willingness to sacrifice not only the Palestinian cause, which it claims to champion for the sake of shoring up domestic support, but also Hamas, which has apparently outlived its usefulness.
This brings us to Iran’s third achievement, which is sending a message to other powers in the Middle East that after demonstrating its capability and readiness to launch missiles at Israel, it is an even stronger regional force to be reckoned with.
While it’s true that Tehran has initiated a new phase in its relations with Saudi Arabia, there are no indications that it intends to revise its doctrine to cease using proxies across the Arab world.
It’s also true that while Israel seeks to establish relations with Riyadh, it has so far refused to meet the necessary conditions, notably recognising the inherent Palestinian rights to statehood. Instead, it adheres to its fundamental doctrine of forcibly displacing Palestinians, and seizing their homes and land to complete, once and for all, its occupation and then remove that word from existence.
In other words, Iran and Israel have once again converged in a tactical manoeuvring that is aimed at diminishing Arab influence in the grand scheme of things.
How do the roles of Iran’s partners and proxy groups figure in the equation of appeasement and carefully calculated escalations?
The Houthis will remain essential as a tool for Tehran to use to coerce and intimidate the US, Europe and Israel – even as the Yemeni people remain hostage to Iran. Hezbollah will persist in what it perceives to be a war of attrition against Israel, but the reality is that the attrition is mutual – with the people living in Lebanon’s south paying the price for Hezbollah’s decision to serve Iran’s interests.
The Iranian regime will continue to dominate Iraqi politics through its affiliated factions. And Syria will remain an open arena for Israel to send messages to Tehran, sniping at the regime while avoiding Iranian territory.
It is possible, therefore, that Iran and Israel will settle for their so-far limited responses and move on.
For now, both parties seek a price – a reward for de-escalating – from the West. For Israel it is weapons and ammunition, which it is due to receive after the US Congress approved military aid on Saturday. For Iran it is the preservation of its nuclear weapons programme with promises from the West to lift sanctions against it.
The two countries, meanwhile, will continue to adhere to extremist ideologies that – counterintuitively – serve both their interests.
A widely accepted definition was made by the All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims in 2019: “Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness.” It further defines it as “inciting hatred or violence against Muslims”.
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IF YOU GO The flights: FlyDubai offers direct flights to Catania Airport from Dubai International Terminal 2 daily with return fares starting from Dh1,895. The details: Access to the 2,900-metre elevation point at Mount Etna by cable car and 4x4 transport vehicle cost around €57.50 (Dh248) per adult. Entry into Teatro Greco costs €10 (Dh43). For more go to www.visitsicily.info
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Mercer, the investment consulting arm of US services company Marsh & McLennan, expects its wealth division to at least double its assets under management (AUM) in the Middle East as wealth in the region continues to grow despite economic headwinds, a company official said.
Mercer Wealth, which globally has $160 billion in AUM, plans to boost its AUM in the region to $2-$3bn in the next 2-3 years from the present $1bn, said Yasir AbuShaban, a Dubai-based principal with Mercer Wealth.
“Within the next two to three years, we are looking at reaching $2 to $3 billion as a conservative estimate and we do see an opportunity to do so,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Mercer does not directly make investments, but allocates clients’ money they have discretion to, to professional asset managers. They also provide advice to clients.
“We have buying power. We can negotiate on their (client’s) behalf with asset managers to provide them lower fees than they otherwise would have to get on their own,” he added.
Mercer Wealth’s clients include sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and insurance companies among others.
From its office in Dubai, Mercer also looks after Africa, India and Turkey, where they also see opportunity for growth.
Wealth creation in Middle East and Africa (MEA) grew 8.5 per cent to $8.1 trillion last year from $7.5tn in 2015, higher than last year’s global average of 6 per cent and the second-highest growth in a region after Asia-Pacific which grew 9.9 per cent, according to consultancy Boston Consulting Group (BCG). In the region, where wealth grew just 1.9 per cent in 2015 compared with 2014, a pickup in oil prices has helped in wealth generation.
BCG is forecasting MEA wealth will rise to $12tn by 2021, growing at an annual average of 8 per cent.
Drivers of wealth generation in the region will be split evenly between new wealth creation and growth of performance of existing assets, according to BCG.
Another general trend in the region is clients’ looking for a comprehensive approach to investing, according to Mr AbuShaban.
“Institutional investors or some of the families are seeing a slowdown in the available capital they have to invest and in that sense they are looking at optimizing the way they manage their portfolios and making sure they are not investing haphazardly and different parts of their investment are working together,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Some clients also have a higher appetite for risk, given the low interest-rate environment that does not provide enough yield for some institutional investors. These clients are keen to invest in illiquid assets, such as private equity and infrastructure.
“What we have seen is a desire for higher returns in what has been a low-return environment specifically in various fixed income or bonds,” he said.
“In this environment, we have seen a de facto increase in the risk that clients are taking in things like illiquid investments, private equity investments, infrastructure and private debt, those kind of investments were higher illiquidity results in incrementally higher returns.”
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of the largest sovereign wealth funds, said in its 2016 report that has gradually increased its exposure in direct private equity and private credit transactions, mainly in Asian markets and especially in China and India. The authority’s private equity department focused on structured equities owing to “their defensive characteristics.”
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Education: Mr Al Bahar was born in 1979 and graduated in 2008 from the Judicial Institute. He took after his father, who was one of the first Emirati lawyers
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Why it pays to compare
A comparison of sending Dh20,000 from the UAE using two different routes at the same time - the first direct from a UAE bank to a bank in Germany, and the second from the same UAE bank via an online platform to Germany - found key differences in cost and speed. The transfers were both initiated on January 30.
Route 1: bank transfer
The UAE bank charged Dh152.25 for the Dh20,000 transfer. On top of that, their exchange rate margin added a difference of around Dh415, compared with the mid-market rate.
Total cost: Dh567.25 - around 2.9 per cent of the total amount
Total received: €4,670.30
Route 2: online platform
The UAE bank’s charge for sending Dh20,000 to a UK dirham-denominated account was Dh2.10. The exchange rate margin cost was Dh60, plus a Dh12 fee.
Total cost: Dh74.10, around 0.4 per cent of the transaction
Total received: €4,756
The UAE bank transfer was far quicker – around two to three working days, while the online platform took around four to five days, but was considerably cheaper. In the online platform transfer, the funds were also exposed to currency risk during the period it took for them to arrive.
Our family matters legal consultant
Name: Hassan Mohsen Elhais
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Countries recognising Palestine
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