Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, is widely thought to have viewed Arabs as inferior to Turks. Whether this is true, and whether it’s the legacy of centuries of Ottoman rule over Arab lands, is hard to say. But it does help explain his decisions to drop the Arabic script, curb Islamic observances, ban the fez and embrace secular western ways.
Ataturk’s very conception of “the Turk", the prime pillar of Turkish nationalism, was largely about superiority and distrust of foreigners, which seems fitting since the root of the Turkish word for foreigner, yabanci, means “savage” or “wild”.
The Ottoman Empire was cosmopolitan; Ataturk’s Republic turned up its nose at outsiders.
Anti-Arab views were, as a result, baked into Turkish society, and many Turks came to see their compatriots as modern and their southern neighbours as “backwards”.
Founded in 2001, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP pivoted from Ataturk’s aggressive secularism to a more Ottomanesque vision – embracing Islamic identity and a measure of Middle Eastern integration. The party came to power in 2002 and seemed to double down on this approach after EU negotiators slowed Turkey's accession bid. When Syria's civil war began, Ankara took what many saw as the moral stance: like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali before him, Bashar Al Assad had to go.
This in turn led to an acceptance of Syrian refugees, who by 2012 were crossing into Turkey by the tens of thousands. Seeking to position Turkey as the champion of oppressed Muslims everywhere, Mr Erdogan offered a warm welcome to “our brothers” from war-torn Syria as the number of new arrivals hit 2 million, then 3 million, and finally 4 million.
Turkey began offering citizenship to Syrians as Mr Erdogan topped a number of polls as the most popular Muslim leader in the region. Living in Istanbul at the time, I argued that Turkey had the chance to become an immigrant-friendly state, boosting regional ties as well as its economy. A lengthy 2016 New York Times’ Magazine article asserted that the refugees had begun to make Turks “rethink how they viewed their country, their history and even themselves".
Yet now, with an election looming next year, reality seems to have caught up with the AKP. Inflation is at a 24-year high, the lira is near record lows and tens of millions of Turks can barely buy food or pay their bills. A poll last week showing 28 per cent support for Turkey’s executive presidential system – Mr Erdogan’s brainchild, approved in 2017 – pointed towards the level of support the country’s long-time leader might expect at the polls.
If Turks are not blaming the President for their economic troubles, they’re blaming Syrians. Thus, the recent uptick in incidents of violence against refugees and street scenes such as one that went viral last month, in which a crowd of Istanbul residents harass 17-year-old Syrian Ahmet Kanjo, urging him to return home. “I had to leave school because of racism,” he pleads. “You blame the Syrians for everything.”
The opposition has, as one might expect, leveraged these views. In 2019, despite a campaign that sought to counter populism with “radical love”, the main opposition CHP – the party of Ataturk – rode anti-refugee sentiment to major victories in several of Turkey’s largest cities, including Ankara, Istanbul, Antalya and Adana.
The xenophobic rhetoric has only increased since, with CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu repeatedly vowing to send all Syrians home should the party come to power next June. The latest from Turkey’s most virulent nativist politician, Umit Ozdag of the Victory Party, is that the government has granted citizenship to nearly 1.5 million Syrians – about five times the official figure.
The government, meanwhile, appears to have delayed another planned Syria offensive to instead focus on construction and security in the areas it controls just south of the border. As Ankara has opened the door to fleeing Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians, Mr Erdogan says Turkey expects to return at least a million more Syrian refugees, on top of the half million who have already gone back.
“They will want to go after we establish security there, and we will send them,” Turkey’s Family and Social Services Minister, Derya Yanik, said last week in Adana, vowing that after 2023 all the Syrian refugees will be gone. “But right now there is no place to send them.”
Some blame Ankara for that. A day after Turkish strikes killed several Syrian government troops near Kobane last week, a drone strike killed at least four teenage girls in north-eastern Syria’s Hasakah district, with Syrian Kurds blaming Turkey for the latter attack as well.
Still, Turkey has finished construction on more than 62,000 new homes in Idlib, with plans for some 200,000 across northern Syria. Yet, ensuring returnees’ safety will require a lasting peace and a green light from Damascus. “We have to somehow get the opposition and the regime to reconcile in Syria,” Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said this month.
The comment sparked angry protests across Turkish-controlled territories in northern Syria, as the Assad regime's opponents expressed frustrations with Turkey’s apparent policy flip – even though it’s been expected for some time. Mr Erdogan seemed to confirm the shift last week, saying Turkey does not seek Mr Al Assad’s removal and that engagement needs to be taken further.
Several reports point towards a high-level bilateral in the coming days, possibly facilitated by Russia. The potential benefits of normalisation are clear. Ankara will presumably be able to work with Damascus, Tehran and Moscow to apply greater pressure on Syrian Kurdish militants along the border – though such efforts will be limited by the US military presence. Plus, returning 1-2 million Syrians will surely curry favour with nationalist and Kemalist voters and may help alleviate economic pressure in the lead-up to next year’s vote.
But there is a trade-off: if you aim to simultaneously improve relations with Israel and some Arab countries – Syria possibly being the latest among them – while sending countless families into potential danger, you can no longer stake a claim to being the region’s great humanitarian and Muslim champion.
For a decade, Turkey’s ruling AKP convincingly portrayed itself as in solidarity with Arab peoples, ready and willing to provide aid and refuge to oppressed Muslims. But economic and electoral desperation have now encouraged a nationalist revival – a reprioritisation of the Turk that could also be seen as a betrayal of Syrian rebels and refugees, not to mention Palestinians and others.
Of course, easing opposition to Mr Al Assad and attacking Syrian Kurdish militants, the local partner in the anti-ISIS coalition, is unlikely to improve Turkey’s troubled ties with the US and EU. And the cherry on top is that, politically, the whole shift may well turn out to be too little, too late for Mr Erdogan and the AKP.
Who's who in Yemen conflict
Houthis: Iran-backed rebels who occupy Sanaa and run unrecognised government
Yemeni government: Exiled government in Aden led by eight-member Presidential Leadership Council
Southern Transitional Council: Faction in Yemeni government that seeks autonomy for the south
Habrish 'rebels': Tribal-backed forces feuding with STC over control of oil in government territory
Mercer, the investment consulting arm of US services company Marsh & McLennan, expects its wealth division to at least double its assets under management (AUM) in the Middle East as wealth in the region continues to grow despite economic headwinds, a company official said.
Mercer Wealth, which globally has $160 billion in AUM, plans to boost its AUM in the region to $2-$3bn in the next 2-3 years from the present $1bn, said Yasir AbuShaban, a Dubai-based principal with Mercer Wealth.
“Within the next two to three years, we are looking at reaching $2 to $3 billion as a conservative estimate and we do see an opportunity to do so,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Mercer does not directly make investments, but allocates clients’ money they have discretion to, to professional asset managers. They also provide advice to clients.
“We have buying power. We can negotiate on their (client’s) behalf with asset managers to provide them lower fees than they otherwise would have to get on their own,” he added.
Mercer Wealth’s clients include sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and insurance companies among others.
From its office in Dubai, Mercer also looks after Africa, India and Turkey, where they also see opportunity for growth.
Wealth creation in Middle East and Africa (MEA) grew 8.5 per cent to $8.1 trillion last year from $7.5tn in 2015, higher than last year’s global average of 6 per cent and the second-highest growth in a region after Asia-Pacific which grew 9.9 per cent, according to consultancy Boston Consulting Group (BCG). In the region, where wealth grew just 1.9 per cent in 2015 compared with 2014, a pickup in oil prices has helped in wealth generation.
BCG is forecasting MEA wealth will rise to $12tn by 2021, growing at an annual average of 8 per cent.
Drivers of wealth generation in the region will be split evenly between new wealth creation and growth of performance of existing assets, according to BCG.
Another general trend in the region is clients’ looking for a comprehensive approach to investing, according to Mr AbuShaban.
“Institutional investors or some of the families are seeing a slowdown in the available capital they have to invest and in that sense they are looking at optimizing the way they manage their portfolios and making sure they are not investing haphazardly and different parts of their investment are working together,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Some clients also have a higher appetite for risk, given the low interest-rate environment that does not provide enough yield for some institutional investors. These clients are keen to invest in illiquid assets, such as private equity and infrastructure.
“What we have seen is a desire for higher returns in what has been a low-return environment specifically in various fixed income or bonds,” he said.
“In this environment, we have seen a de facto increase in the risk that clients are taking in things like illiquid investments, private equity investments, infrastructure and private debt, those kind of investments were higher illiquidity results in incrementally higher returns.”
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of the largest sovereign wealth funds, said in its 2016 report that has gradually increased its exposure in direct private equity and private credit transactions, mainly in Asian markets and especially in China and India. The authority’s private equity department focused on structured equities owing to “their defensive characteristics.”
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Skewed figures
In the village of Mevagissey in southwest England the housing stock has doubled in the last century while the number of residents is half the historic high. The village's Neighbourhood Development Plan states that 26% of homes are holiday retreats. Prices are high, averaging around £300,000, £50,000 more than the Cornish average of £250,000. The local average wage is £15,458.
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