Support for El Sisi also means more work for Egypt’s military


H A Hellyer
  • English
  • Arabic

Three years ago, the Egyptian military met in Cairo without their formal commander-in-chief, then president Hosni Mubarak. The military were rattled and had been taken off guard by the revolutionary sentiment coursing through Cairo’s streets.

The military began to consider its options. Eventually, it made the choice to sacrifice its support for Mr Mubarak’s presidency for the good of the country.

Over the following 18 months, under Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi’s guidance, the military maintained their popularity among the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian population.

Shortly after Ahmad Shafiq, the military’s preferred candidate, lost to Mohammed Morsi in the 2012 presidential elections, Field Marshal Tantawi retired and Abdel Fatah El Sisi became the new head of the supreme council of the armed forces.

Mr Morsi was removed from office last year, with the claim by the military that it was responding to popular will. Reliable opinion poll data collected prior to that suggested that, even after its involvement in Mr Morsi’s removal, the popularity of the military would have remained high, although it would have lost the support of Mr Morsi’s followers.

With that support, the military was able to cultivate the impression among the public that while it guaranteed Egypt’s new post-Morsi political arrangement, it was not actually responsible for governing the country. As such, while there have been many complaints around security and the economy in the last six months, such complaints have been left at the prime minister’s door and the military has been largely let off the hook.

If responsibility for governance, at least in the majority of the Egyptian public’s perception, is not currently being laid to rest at the feet of the military, how will those opinions change if Field Marshal El Sisi runs for president?

Since the beginning of the revolution, and for plenty of time before that, the Egyptian military has not had to pay a substantial price for the support it receives from the public. This, however, may be about to change. In the past, the military has often been seen to guarantee political arrangements – but it has not been seen by most Egyptians as creating them.

This week’s events change that dynamic entirely. Field Marshal El Sisi was promoted to the highest possible rank and the military council openly endorsed the option of him running for president. Indeed, their statement almost indicated that not running could be interpreted as shirking a national responsibility.

If Field Marshal El Sisi does run, as most expect he will, it may be seen as a contest entered into by an entire institution rather than an individual.

It could be that the majority of the public begins to see the military as having a direct and open presence in Egypt’s political arena. Certainly, that would give Field Marshal El Sisi an advantage over any other candidate in presidential elections.

However, it is also a double-edged sword – for it means that should Field Marshal El Sisi fail to deliver on the expectations of the Egyptian public as president, his failures would be viewed as a failure of the entire military.

Egypt faces a number of critical challenges – political polarisation, security threats, economic instability and a population that demands to see other dividends from the political tumult of the past three years.

It may very well be that an El Sisi presidency, so openly backed and endorsed by the military establishment, could have sufficient political capital to address at least some of those issues, but even in that scenario there remains two key questions.

The first is: would such a presidency have the political wisdom to address those questions effectively and appropriately?

And the second: if it does not succeed, what will that then mean for the popular standing of the military institution itself? At this point, no one is quite sure. Not even the examples of history can help answer that question.

Dr HA Hellyer is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, and the Brookings Institution in Washington DC

On Twitter: @hahellyer

Ten tax points to be aware of in 2026

1. Domestic VAT refund amendments: request your refund within five years

If a business does not apply for the refund on time, they lose their credit.

2. E-invoicing in the UAE

Businesses should continue preparing for the implementation of e-invoicing in the UAE, with 2026 a preparation and transition period ahead of phased mandatory adoption. 

3. More tax audits

Tax authorities are increasingly using data already available across multiple filings to identify audit risks. 

4. More beneficial VAT and excise tax penalty regime

Tax disputes are expected to become more frequent and more structured, with clearer administrative objection and appeal processes. The UAE has adopted a new penalty regime for VAT and excise disputes, which now mirrors the penalty regime for corporate tax.

5. Greater emphasis on statutory audit

There is a greater need for the accuracy of financial statements. The International Financial Reporting Standards standards need to be strictly adhered to and, as a result, the quality of the audits will need to increase.

6. Further transfer pricing enforcement

Transfer pricing enforcement, which refers to the practice of establishing prices for internal transactions between related entities, is expected to broaden in scope. The UAE will shortly open the possibility to negotiate advance pricing agreements, or essentially rulings for transfer pricing purposes. 

7. Limited time periods for audits

Recent amendments also introduce a default five-year limitation period for tax audits and assessments, subject to specific statutory exceptions. While the standard audit and assessment period is five years, this may be extended to up to 15 years in cases involving fraud or tax evasion. 

8. Pillar 2 implementation 

Many multinational groups will begin to feel the practical effect of the Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (DMTT), the UAE's implementation of the OECD’s global minimum tax under Pillar 2. While the rules apply for financial years starting on or after January 1, 2025, it is 2026 that marks the transition to an operational phase.

9. Reduced compliance obligations for imported goods and services

Businesses that apply the reverse-charge mechanism for VAT purposes in the UAE may benefit from reduced compliance obligations. 

10. Substance and CbC reporting focus

Tax authorities are expected to continue strengthening the enforcement of economic substance and Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting frameworks. In the UAE, these regimes are increasingly being used as risk-assessment tools, providing tax authorities with a comprehensive view of multinational groups’ global footprints and enabling them to assess whether profits are aligned with real economic activity. 

Contributed by Thomas Vanhee and Hend Rashwan, Aurifer

If you go

The flights
There are various ways of getting to the southern Serengeti in Tanzania from the UAE. The exact route and airstrip depends on your overall trip itinerary and which camp you’re staying at. 
Flydubai flies direct from Dubai to Kilimanjaro International Airport from Dh1,350 return, including taxes; this can be followed by a short flight from Kilimanjaro to the Serengeti with Coastal Aviation from about US$700 (Dh2,500) return, including taxes. Kenya Airways, Emirates and Etihad offer flights via Nairobi or Dar es Salaam.