Iraq’s religious divide opened door to ISIL

The Iraqi army in Mosul is composed mainly of Sunnis - who saw no reason to die for a Shia-led government.

To understand how and why a militant group has been able to reach so far into the heart of Iraq – fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are now just dozens of kilometres from the capital, Baghdad – it is instructive to look at the reaction of politicians from the two countries most ­involved, Iraq and the United States.

Despite the Iraqi prime minister Nouri Al Maliki warning that ISIL would need to be repelled “within hours”, not days, and asking in a speech last Tuesday for a state of emergency to be declared, when lawmakers met on Thursday enough of them boycotted the call and the measure did not pass.

In the US, there has been similar procrastination – the Obama administration has said that all options short of boots on the ground are on the table, but its has provided no concrete options nor a timetable. Meanwhile, ISIL fighters continue to mass along the borders of towns on the way to Baghdad.

On the other hand, a call from Iraq’s top Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, for Iraqi Shias to take up arms was immediately heeded. Hundreds, perhaps more, of young men have volunteered for a day’s training before heading north to confront ISIL.

The mobilisation of young men to confront the threat posed by ISIL is deeply worrying and highlights how deeply sectarian ideas have become rooted in Iraq’s society. The regular Iraqi army should be able to handle the threat without needing assistance from, in effect, civilians. Yet it is precisely because the regular army has been split along sectarian lines that the Iraqi army abandoned its positions when the brutal ISIL arrived.

Most of the young men serving in Sunni western regions are themselves Sunni, and few saw the point of dying for a Shia-led government. That is the fault of Mr Al Maliki, whose naked sectarianism in government has passed into the army.

Those policies will need reform, indeed an overhaul. The US and regional states must press Mr Al Maliki to make those reforms, in particular offering marginalised Sunnis a greater political say. Even Iran, which has substantial influence in the Iraqi government, must now see that a sectarian army is unable to resist such threats as that posed by ISIL. The stability of Iraq rests on its ability to forge a genuine national identity. It is now clear how important that is for Iraq to remain whole.