Washington’s complex interest in the Qatar crisis

Despite its central role in any potential outcome for the GCC crisis, the US seems torn between its counterterrorism prerogative and the unity of its allies

US secretary of state Rex Tillerson called on the Arab countries to urgently resolve their differences. Brendan Smialowski / AFP

Over the course of the past week, Washington’s position regarding the standoff between Qatar and the coalition of Arab countries confronting Doha became simultaneously more complicated and clearer. Given the central role the Americans are likely to play in shaping the outcome, they should have also developed a stronger sense of what they are, and are not, likely to accomplish.

Shortly after the crisis developed a few weeks ago, Donald Trump expressed strong support for the Arab coalition and seemed to take credit for the campaign to pressure Doha, which he called “a hard but necessary action”.

He accused Qatar of historically funding terrorism “at a very high level” due to its “extremist ideology”.

US secretary of state Rex Tillerson struck a more nuanced tone, calling on the Arab countries to urgently resolve their differences. While he asked the coalition to “ease the blockade against Qatar”, he also said that Doha “must do more … and more quickly” to end funding and support for terrorism and extremists.

The difference in style and emphasis between the president and the secretary of state was so great that many erroneously concluded that they had contradicted or at least undermined each other. But, in fact, they had essentially called for the same things, demanding that Qatar change its policies and conduct while expecting all other parties to simply return to the previous status quo.

On June 20, however, a state department spokesperson radically reconfigured the way Washington is positioning itself regarding the crisis.

Because “it’s been more than two weeks since the embargo started”, she said, “we are mystified that the Gulf states have not released to the public, nor to the Qataris, the details about the claims that they are making toward Qatar.”

Even more bluntly, she continued “we are left with one simple question: were the actions really about their concerns regarding Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism, or were they about the long simmering grievances between and among the GCC countries?”

Not only did this unusually harsh rhetoric by Washington question the veracity and motives of several of its key allies, it shifted the onus from Qatar to the countries confronting it.

The statement, including its unexpected and jarringly bitter tone, and the contrast it presented with the earlier comments by Mr Trump and Mr Tillerson served as a stark reminder that Washington’s interests in the crisis are both intense and highly complex.

As the Trump and Tillerson statements suggested, many of the primary coalition accusations against Qatar resonate strongly with the key American policy of counter-terrorism, and specifically opposing terrorism financing and the harbouring of radicals.

Yet the crisis, by its very nature, also flies in the face of the American imperative of unity among its Arab and Muslim allies, especially in the Gulf region.

The need for unity was the overarching theme of Mr Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in May. And, given that Washington has dispersed its military assets in the Gulf in several different countries, many of which are involved in the present confrontation, if it persists the crisis threatens to pose serious challenges to the American ability to fulfil its strategic objectives. The notion that the isolation of Qatar could go on “for years”, as some Gulf officials have suggested, is unacceptable to Washington.

Given the intensity of the American rebuke, it’s not surprising that the coalition moved quickly to issue its 13 demands for Qatar to resolve the impasse. Yet many of them are strikingly maximalist in both tone and substance, and, presumably, represent an opening gambit rather than a final offer.

Mr Tillerson welcomed news that the demands had been drafted and would be presented to Qatar, but added that he hoped that they would also be “reasonable and actionable”. It remains to be seen whether Washington believes that all 13 items meet that standard.

Moreover, since Doha is almost certain to reject the list as it reportedly now reads, and one item holds that it will only be valid for ten days, while the presentation of the demands fulfils Washington’s request that it be composed and issued, it is unlikely to bring the confrontation to a quick conclusion.

The United States is torn between the twin imperatives of counterterrorism and unity, both of which are important to American calculations and neither of which can be discarded. Washington’s policy will therefore probably seek to split the difference between them by pressing for a speedy resolution to the crisis, but not without securing some meaningful and enforceable concessions from Qatar on support for extremists and radical ideologies.

Whether either side to the intra-Arab confrontation will prove receptive to this likely American approach is another matter entirely.

Hussein Ibish is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States ­Institute in Washington

On Twitter: @ibishblog