It appears that America may be going to war against ISIL. I use the word “appears” advisedly, because appearances may be deceiving. It’s true that the US has already bombed almost 200 ISIL targets. And it’s true that President Barack Obama has declared his intention to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIL, with vice-president Joe Biden upping the rhetorical ante promising to “follow them to the gates of hell”. It’s also true that US Congress has appropriated significant sums to train and arm a select group of Syria opposition fighters. But even with all this, there are still too many pieces of this puzzle that don’t fit or are missing to be able to say where it will go.
I’m not one of those who scoffed at the president a few weeks ago when he said he had not yet developed a strategy to confront ISIL. Despite the rants of critics on the right – some of whom think that a good strategy consists of bombing first and asking questions later – I want my president to spend time developing a strategy.
I also don’t agree with those same hawks who argue that if only we hadn’t left Iraq or if only we had taken military action in Syria sooner, ISIL wouldn’t be the menace it is today. These critics forget that we left Iraq because the Bush Administration had negotiated an agreement with the Iraqi government that would have put US forces who remained in the country after 2011 at great risk. These critics also ignore the simple fact that any US engagement early in the Syrian conflict would not have doused the flames of the conflict, it would have given it additional fuel.
Increased American arms to the opposition would have resulted in increased Iranian and Russian support for their ally, Syrian president Bashar Al Assad. Direct US engagement would have created an even greater incentive for extremists to come to Syria. In any case, the president understood that the American people had little tolerance for getting into a new war.
What’s different today is that the grotesque behaviour of ISIL, coupled with its rapid advances on the ground, has created a sense of urgency and outrage provoking demands for an American response. And so the president has responded with: some initial steps designed to stop ISIL’s advance; an intensified effort to mobilise an international coalition; and the development of a strategy to degrade and destroy ISIL.
The painstaking work needed to build a coalition is the first order of business, and it will not be easy. Most of America’s Nato allies share its outrage over ISIL’s behaviour, but too many remain gun shy. Turkey, which has borders with Syria and Iraq, has been an enabler of some of the violent extremist groups now allied with ISIL. Turkey may feel threatened by the dangers posed by this now out-of-control creature that it helped nurture, but it has given no indication that it is ready to take military action to confront it. Arab allies in Jordan and the Gulf are conflicted. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been the most forthcoming in offering support to the coalition, but they have also asked important questions about strategy and have wanted assurances about the commitment of others to join the effort.
What about the strategy? ISIL has fed off of the deep grievances of Sunni Arabs in both Iraq and Syria. In the former they are a disenfranchised minority, in the latter a disenfranchised majority. In Iraq, one key component of the effort to defeat ISIL must include reforming the system of governance to provide for full Sunni partnership. The first step involved removing former prime minister Nouri Al Maliki, who had tormented Sunni Arabs while recklessly pursuing a sectarian agenda. His successor, Haider Al Abadi, has been inclined to create a more inclusive government, but efforts, to date, have been less than satisfactory. Key ministries have gone to sectarian figures and the main Iraqi armed forces fighting ISIL remain Shia militias many of whom maintain strong ties with Iran. Compounding this problem is the fact that the other main armed force waging war against ISIL is the Kurdish Peshmerga, whom many Iraqi Arabs fear harbour separatist ambitions.
Given this state of affairs, many Sunni Arab states will be cautious about the extent of their involvement if they fear that the result will be to consolidate Iran’s hold over Iraq. Despite ISIL’s barbaric actions, these Arab countries understand that if Sunni grievances have fuelled that movement, bombing Sunnis in order to allow Shia militias to take over will only fan the flames of sectarian hostility.
Syria presents an even more complicated situation. The outrage that fuelled the ISIL movement was the relentless brutality of Syrian government and its refusal to consider serious internal reforms. The external political coalition that represents the Syrian opposition is diverse and includes several thoughtful visionary leaders. But there are concerns that this external leadership’s ties to the armed elements on the ground in Syria are less than organic. The groups engaged in the fight against the regime are remarkably fragmented. They fight the regime and each other. There are indications that they may not support a US-led effort to oust ISIL if they feel that the beneficiary will be the regime.
Many in America oppose any US action. But given ISIL’s genocidal campaigns against minority groups in areas they have subdued, and the existential threat they pose to the entire region, doing nothing is as unacceptable as the hawks’ inclination to just do anything.
Finding the right course of action will be like threading a needle. It will require leadership, discipline, a long commitment and thoughtful diplomacy. That’s why I say it appears that the US may be going to war. This is one that’s worth fighting, but we’re not there yet.
Dr James Zogby is the president of the Arab American Institute
On Twitter: @aaiusa
