Earlier this month, the subject of “Muslim difference” in Europe was raised again, with the burqini having been banned on several beaches in France.
As the issue is debated, another discussion lurks in the background – that of ISIL, and whether or not the banning of the garment is a “gift” to the extremist organisation. Is it? And what, precisely, does that mean?
ISIL recruits join the organisation for a variety of reasons, and the presence or absence of a burqini ban in any one country is unlikely to have much of an effect. But it certainly does have an effect on a wider theme that ISIL recruiters do play on when recruiting westerners – and that is that the West in general, and certain European countries like France in particular, are impossible for observant, practicing Muslims to reside in with full religious freedom.
It is an interesting argument, and understanding the theme of personal Muslim autonomy in regards to ISIL and their fan-base is crucial in comprehending the organisation’s appeal to western recruits.
It is why, for example, ISIL fans have welcomed the rise of figures like Donald Trump in the United States, and other figures that promote wider anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment in the West. For ISIL, such political figures increase the likelihood of tension between Muslims and non-Muslims within the West, and thus make Muslims more susceptible to ISIL recruitment.
The general theme of ISIL goes something like this: Muslims are not simply the equivalent of westerners of other faiths. Rather, they are Muslim, and have religious duties that are quite specific. Islam, in this regard, is not simply different from Christianity or Judaism in its theology – rather, it entails commitments that are also public, and often, crucially, visible.
That sense of “visible Muslim-ness” has become increasingly problematic for sections of the West to accept. ISIL knows this – and plays on it accordingly. It is interesting that ISIL accounts often compare western liberalism to the paganism of 7th century Arabs who fought against Islam – their paganism could accept a variety of other types of religious beliefs, but never Islam.
As far as ISIL is concerned, western liberalism is precisely the same. The theme is repeated time and again in ISIL propaganda: the West will not accept Muslims being Muslim whenever they behave or think differently from the majority of westerners.
On the contrary – if one pays attention to ISIL fanboy accounts on social media, one sees France and other western countries referred to as “dar Al-Kufr” (abode of disbelief) where Muslims are unable to reside except by necessity.
Others point out the necessity of “hijra” (“migration” to a place where Islam can be practised). The only place they can be “fully” Muslim, thus, is the “Islamic State” – there, it is claimed, Muslims are free to fully manifest their religious beliefs, privately and publicly, and no one will stand in their way.
The final claim, of course, is preposterous. ISIL does not accept all manners and modes of being Muslim – it accepts only its own rigorously heterodox interpretation, which has been roundly rejected by the overwhelming majority of Muslims and Islamic scholarship. ISIL isn’t more authentically Islamic than the vast majority of Muslims and Muslim scholars – on the contrary, it diverges tremendously from critical points of Islamic thought in a variety of fields, which is why its fan-base still accounts for a tiny fraction of the 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide.
But the point around Muslim autonomy and Islam’s difference, nevertheless, does have currency among many Muslims in the West, even while they reject ISIL’s conclusion.
The burqini ban notwithstanding, the discomfort so many feel in the West around visible expressions of commitment to Islam is palpable. This is particularly the case when it comes to discussions around Muslim women, because even if Muslim women who wear the hijab do so adhering to the most western fashion, they are still very clearly identifiable as Muslim.
The discomfort of that kind of pseudo-liberalism, which seeks to curtail the personal freedom of Muslims to practise their faith, even though they are not impinging on anyone else’s freedom, is spreading.
In this faux liberalism, Muslims are free – but not when they are different. Their religion might be tolerated, but its practice must be forced to exist with as few differences as possible to post-Enlightenment western Christendom, at least in public. Hence, the burqini might be banned; the niqab can be banned; the hijab should be restricted; and so forth. The irony of restricting personal autonomy in the name of liberalism, of all ideologies, is lost on these advocates entirely.
Worse than that, the discomfort is often expressed in ways that associates such public expressions with allegiance to groups like ISIL anyway. As the head of Municipal Services in Cannes, where the burqini was banned, said: “[The ban is about] ostentatious clothing which refers to an allegiance to terrorist movements which are at war with us.”
For ISIL, that discomfort in general is indeed a gift. If Muslim westerners are convinced they can live as faithful Muslims in the West, they are immune to arguments they have to move from the West to live as faithful Muslims elsewhere. If, alternatively, they are led to believe it is impossible to live a genuine religious life in the West, Muslim westerners then become susceptible to arguments that they have to live elsewhere. Otherwise, they should “reform Islam” so that it fits the parameters of what kind of religion is “acceptable” in the West – the parameters of “acceptable”, of course, decided by actors outside of their faith.
That’s a much larger argument that goes far beyond ISIL. Hitherto it has been rejected by most Muslim westerners – few Muslim westerners leave the West to live elsewhere, let alone in ISIL territories. Moreover, the migration pattern has been that Muslims in Muslim majority countries are immigrating to western countries, if they are able, even if they live in economic prosperity.
But the “lack of Muslim autonomy” argument isn’t wise to ignore. The rise of anti-Muslim populism, manifested in the appeal to figures like Donald Trump in the USA, and a variety of right-wing and left-wing populists on the European continent, has resulted in many in Muslim western communities to conclude a permanent existence for Muslim westerners ought not to be taken for granted. Perhaps only semi-ironically, ISIL fanboy online accounts look forward to Trump’s success – because they foresee a great conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims which will be to ISIL’s benefit.
The burqini ban benefits two enemies to pluralism in the West – ISIL and anti-Muslim populists. For Muslims and non-Muslims more generally, however, it only makes a pluralistic public space that much more difficult to sustain. Moreover, it doesn’t help the cause of female autonomy in Muslim communities, in the West or elsewhere – it only narrows their autonomy altogether. At least in this regard, extremists in ISIL and pseudo-liberals have something in common.
Dr HA Hellyer is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London
On Twitter: @hahellyer
