Iran has closed the book on its latest chapter

Alan Philps ponders the implications of the Iran nuclear deal on ISIL's prospects in the Middle East.

A pro-deal activist campaigns in Washington DC. Yuri Gripas / Reuters

The loudest voices criticising the deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme are coming from Washington, where contenders for the Republican presidential nomination compete to dismiss it as a flower-strewn pathway for Iran to develop a nuclear arsenal. There is no sign of this grandstanding calming down, as the US Congress has six weeks left to consider the deal, potentially voting against it and forcing President Barack Obama to use his veto.

Seen from a distance, the polarised politics of Washington is an unedifying spectacle. The opposition of the Right is even more surprising given that in 2006 the administration of George W Bush accepted that any agreement with Iran would, in the end, have to allow the country to enrich nuclear fuel. That is what has been agreed.

Can this be the country that has been the most powerful in the world since 1945 and presided over the founding of the UN 70 years ago? The American political set-up seems unfit for the purpose of guiding an increasingly complex world.

At the same time as the Republicans are predicting disaster, there are other voices, less shrill, who see the deal as not just a platform for 10 years of dialogue and verification but as a template for a whole new way of conducting policy in the Middle East. In its own way, this rosy scenario could be as misleading as the predictions of certain doom in Washington.

The chief booster of a new politics of the Middle East is Federica Mogherini, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, who has visited Tehran this week. Saying that “diplomacy can deliver”, she has indicated that the EU will be discussing how to use the same format to address the Israel-Palestine conflict. Briefings from her team have suggested that Europe could be the channel for discussing how Iran and the Gulf states could ease the tensions in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

The basis of this idea is that the process that led to the Iranian deal after more than a decade of negotiations was started by the European Union. Ms Mogherini and her predecessor, Catherine Ashton, were integral to the process. It also brought together the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – America, Britain, China, France and Russia – with Germany. So there was a considerable amount of European heft behind it.

But appearances can be misleading. Neither Iran nor the US was at ease with negotiating with the other. The other countries served initially as camouflage, a multinational screen behind which John Kerry and Mohammed Javad Zarif could thrash out the deal. But the unity of this group over long years of negotiations showed the Iranians that they could not divide the big powers.

The unity of this group – given that America and Russia are at loggerheads over Ukraine and Syria – is a rare diplomatic miracle. But the idea that this process can be scaled up to other, more complex problems is debatable.

It succeeded precisely because there was no grand bargain involved. Formally it was only about the nuclear issue. This is of overriding importance to the six countries negotiating with Iran, all of which (apart from Germany) are nuclear weapon states with an interest in preventing proliferation. Like chemical weapons – where the US accepted a proposal from the Russian president Vladimir Putin to disarm Syria of its chemical arsenal – this is a topic where the godfathers of the world can put aside their turf wars and reach a deal in the interests of preserving their positions.

It was clear also that there was a deal to be had: America has abandoned its war-first strategy and is no longer bent on regime change in Iran. It was a good time for Iran to put aside its nuclear weapons ambitions to crystallise the tactical gains it has achieved in the region – in Iraq especially – due to Mr Bush’s misguided wars and the rise of ISIL.

Finally, all the six countries – but the Russians and the Chinese most of all – have a powerful material interest in lifting sanctions on Iran, a lucrative market for arms and capital goods, especially for its oil and gas industries.

This is a unique line-up of interests behind the nuclear deal that would be hard to replicate. In fact, the next stage, with its tempting commercial prizes, is likely to provide Iran with opportunities to divide the six-country negotiating team: America will insist on the most scrupulous observance of the nuclear verification process, while the Russians and others will surely be more interested in getting some contracts signed and paid with Iran’s unblocked funds.

It is clear that the deal could pave the way for Iran to be elevated to the status of “co-dominant power” in the region with the US. This is unacceptable to the Gulf states and to the Americans, even as they acknowledge the need for Iranian help in the fight against ISIL. This is another reason why quick fixes are unlikely.

The Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has not shrugged off his suspicion of Washington: “We have nothing to talk to America about with regard to regional and global issues.”

European foreign ministers are queuing up to visit Tehran to talk of the “new chapter” that is opening. No doubt the sight of these westerners is unsettling to hardliners in Iran who see this as the advance party of American lobbyists looking for ways to undermine the Islamic Republic. They have much to lose from the ending of sanctions and the opening up of the economy. Sanctions always empower some sections of the ruling class, while impoverishing the masses.

But before that can happen, American politicians has to accept that an imperfect deal is all that is available in the nuclear sphere. They have 10 years to decide if it does indeed turn Iran into a good neighbour.

Alan Philps is a commentator on global affairs

On Twitter@aphilps