In early 1956, at a time of heightened Cold War tensions, the then US secretary of state John Foster Dulles explained that the "the ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art". Dulles's reduction of East-West rivalry to a game of "chicken" has an echo in Russian president Vladimir Putin's current policy towards the West.
In response to the sanctions imposed after the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, Moscow has banned the import of a range of agricultural products from the US and its allies, and has signalled that it remains unwilling to accept mediation to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
Mr Putin's pursuit of brinkmanship over Ukraine reflects that country's geostrategic importance to the Russian Federation. The Kremlin's main foreign policy objective is the creation of a "Eurasian Union" that would place Russia in a dominant position in most of the former Soviet republics. Zbigniew Brzezinski, US president Jimmy Carter's former national security adviser, wrote in his book The Grand Chessboard that "without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire".
Fully aware of the strategic stakes, Mr Putin is determined to prevent Ukraine from being drawn into the western orbit. He justified his annexation of Crimea earlier this year on the basis of his duty to protect ethnic Russians. The US and European Union sanctions that resulted have led him to conclude that the West remains set on weakening Russia and reducing its influence.
The Russian president set out his stall in his address to Duma members and regional governors in the Kremlin on March 18, when he stated that the Western powers, led by the US, “prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun” and that Russia “has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected”.
Even in the aftermath of the MH17 disaster, Russian public opinion polls show soaring rates of approval for Mr Putin. If the tit-for-tat sanctions between Russia and the West result in rising living costs for the Russian people, their president can easily blame any hardships on the plotting of his foreign enemies. In any case, the sanctions imposed by the West will not have an immediate economic impact given Russia’s huge reserves of hard currency, so Mr Putin has time on his side for now.
There is no obvious sign that Russia’s new antagonistic policy towards the West will be moderated soon. If western leaders hoped that the MH17 disaster would prompt the Russian leader to reconsider, they have been disappointed. In Ukraine, Mr Putin will continue to intensify or ease the pressure as he sees fit, while keeping in reserve the ultimate option of a military invasion. Any new western diplomatic initiative would probably involve some form of international supervision in eastern Ukraine, leading to a political solution based on regional autonomy. Accepting any compromise over Ukraine’s future would reduce Russia’s freedom to interfere in the country, which would be unacceptable to the Kremlin.
Mr Putin’s readiness to indulge in brinkmanship offers him another opportunity for challenging the West that is directly related to Arabian Gulf security. An agreement signed by Russia and Iran last Wednesday would, in theory, give Tehran an opportunity to break out of the international sanctions regime, though the precise nature of the deal remains vague.
While Iran’s Fars News Agency triumphantly announced “Vladimir Putin soon to sign historic $20 billion (DH73.5bn) oil deal with Iran to bypass western sanctions”, a more low-key Russian announcement noted that that the two countries had signed a “memorandum of understanding” on future commercial ties. Such a memorandum would suggest an agreement in principle rather than a detailed accord.
The mooted Russia-Iran agreement could give Mr Putin the perfect riposte to the western powers, but is also a move fraught with difficulties. Although it could allow Iran to sell crude oil in exchange for equipment for the technology-starved Iranian energy sector, Tehran has been in recent years reluctant to deal with Russia after Mr Putin, under Western pressure, cancelled a contract to sell Iran advanced S-300 surface-to-air missiles systems in 2010. Nevertheless, Iran could use the vague threat of a bilateral deal in its next round of talks with the P5+1 powers (the US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) over its controversial nuclear programme. Hardliners in Tehran could use the option of a new treaty with the Russians as reinsurance should the P5+1 talks fail.
The US administration will do its best to warn Mr Putin off doing business with Iran and would doubtlessly sanction any Russian oil firm involved in a deal. So far, Russia has been opposed to Iran obtaining nuclear weapons and to this end has co-operated with the other powers in the P5+1 group. Despite this, if the nuclear negotiations fail, Russia could block new measures at the United Nations or make its future cooperation dependent on a relaxation of the western sanctions against Russia. Even if the West wished to re-engage the Russians in diplomacy, at present there is no one outside Mr Putin’s tightly bound circle of friends and associates to talk to.
The Russian president remains firmly in control and capable of springing some unsettling surprises in his quest to assert Russian nationalism and challenge the post-Cold War settlement.
Winston Churchill once famously described the Soviet Union as “a riddle wrapped inside an enigma within a mystery”. Unravelling the riddle will be essential to prevent hostility between Russia and the West affecting the Arabian Gulf.
Stephen Blackwell is an international politics and security analyst