Grandstanding over Yemen may backfire on Iran

The Houthis’ assertiveness in Yemen is enough to arouse domestic and regional concern, but this is amplified by their association with Iran, writes Sharif Nashashibi

A supporter of the Shiite Houthi movement in Sana'a is a sign of a schism in Yemeni society. Photo: Yahya Arhab / EPA

Yemen’s Shiite Houthis may regret Tehran’s recent statements of support. Iranian MP Ali Reza Zakani, who is close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, boasted in late September that the Houthi capture of Sanaa meant that his country now controls four Arab capitals, alongside Baghdad, Beirut and Damascus.

Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior adviser to Mr Khamenei, said this month that Tehran supports the Houthis in their “rightful struggles”. Such statements are escalating the conflict in Yemen, and may jeopardise the gains made by the Houthis. As such, they may be wishing that Iran had kept quiet.

It is unclear from these statements what kind of support Tehran is providing. It may even be mainly posturing, and in the past such claims have been denied, downplayed or unverified.

However, Iran is increasingly vindicating those who have always believed that the Houthis are its proxy force in Yemen. Proponents of this view also point to the freeing of suspected members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and its Lebanese ally Hizbollah following the Houthi capture of Sanaa.

Tehran’s statements are encouraging and cementing a regional dimension to what should be a national issue.

Interior ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council issued a statement this month that they would not stand idly by in the face of foreign intervention, and that “Yemeni and GCC security is indivisible”.

In addition, Abdullah Al Askar, head of the foreign affairs committee on Saudi Arabia’s Shoura Council, which advises the government on policy, said: “Sanaa cannot be left in the hands of the Houthis and the Iranians. Iran should be under international pressure for this.”

As major donors to Yemen, the Gulf states can wield considerable influence there, and Saudi Arabia – which designates the Houthis as terrorists – has previously fought them directly.

Al Qaeda is taking full advantage by portraying itself as a Sunni defender against Shiite aggression and expansionism in Yemen. There has been intense fighting between Al Qaeda and the Houthis since the latter’s advances, and the former has carried out numerous deadly suicide bombings. In late September, Al Qaeda accused the Houthis of “completing the Persian project in Yemen” and urged Sunnis to take up arms.

Not only have Yemeni Sunni forces joined the fight against the Houthis, but Al Qaeda’s call raises the spectre of foreign participation. Since Al Qaeda has supported ISIL from the start of the US-led military campaign, ISIL – now a global jihadi brand that has arguably eclipsed Al Qaeda – may return the favour in Yemen.

The galvanising of Al Qaeda, and the possibility of foreign jihadists in Yemen are a security headache for Saudi Arabia, which is part of the US-led coalition against ISIL and is trying to stop some of its citizens going abroad to join jihadist groups. The long and unstable border will facilitate such movements into Yemen. This explains why Riyadh sees Iranian involvement as a serious and direct threat.

These developments pose a major challenge to the Houthis, and Iranian statements risk alienating them from an increasingly restive public. This is something that the Houthis, as a minority community in Yemen, cannot afford.

Their advances up to and including the capture of Sanaa were met with little resistance, to a considerable extent because their grievances – including high fuel prices and widespread corruption – are largely shared by other Yemenis. Now, however, they are engaged in intense fighting with various forces and facing protests in the capital and elsewhere by Yemenis calling for their withdrawal from captured territories.

The Houthis are refusing to leave Sanaa, despite a UN-brokered deal that includes giving them representation in government (they are now kingmakers in choosing a prime minister and filling other posts). The Houthis are also refusing to heed a call by the UN Security Council for all parties to turn over “all medium and heavy weapons to legitimate state security bodies”.

There are claims that their swift gains were enabled by an alliance with ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who is widely accused of trying to regain influence and power. While both parties deny such collaboration, senior Houthi official Ali Al Imad acknowledged this month that they shared “temporarily mutual interests”.

Furthermore, Reuters reported that “many so-called people’s committees, bodies formed by the Houthis to oversee the operations of the government, appear to be made up of Saleh loyalists rather than Houthi supporters”.

The Houthis’ new-found assertiveness is enough to arouse domestic and regional concern, and this is amplified by their association with Iran.

Tehran seems far more keen to highlight this than the Houthis, who are likely to be the ones who will feel the consequences of such grandstanding.

Sharif Nashashibi is a journalist and analyst on Arab affairs