The question confronting policymakers today is not simply how the war with Iran should end, but what kind of regional order will emerge when it does. A ceasefire, however necessary, will not be sufficient. The conflict has exposed deeper structural vulnerabilities in the Gulf and wider Middle East – from the weaponisation of energy and maritime routes to the growing role of missiles, drones and proxy networks. Any political and diplomatic settlement that fails to address these underlying dynamics will, at best, postpone the next round of escalation.
What is required, therefore, is not a narrow agreement to stop the fighting, but a broader effort to reset the rules of regional engagement.
The starting point must be a conditional and structured ceasefire. Past experience across the region shows that loosely defined truces rarely hold. A durable cessation of hostilities must include clear commitments: an end to strikes on sovereign territory, a halt to attacks on civilian infrastructure – particularly energy, electricity and water systems – and the removal of threats to maritime navigation. This matters not only because it would stop the violence, but because it would reverse one of the war’s most dangerous trends: the targeting of economic lifelines as instruments of coercion.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the Strait of Hormuz. The waterway is not simply a geographic chokepoint; it is the artery of the global energy system. Allowing it to remain a lever of political pressure would embed instability at the heart of the international economy. Any meaningful settlement must, therefore, guarantee its full and uninterrupted reopening, underpinned by clear mechanisms that ensure freedom of navigation and prevent its future politicisation. In effect, Hormuz must be treated not as a bargaining chip, but as a protected international passage.
Yet maritime security alone will not stabilise the region. The limitations of past diplomatic efforts, particularly the 2015 nuclear agreement, are now evident. While they addressed aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, they left other drivers of instability largely untouched. Today’s environment demands a more comprehensive framework – one that extends beyond enrichment levels and inspection regimes to include missile capabilities, drone warfare and the broader regional posture of the Iranian state.
This also means confronting the role of proxy networks. Iran’s influence has long been exercised not only through state institutions, but through a web of non-state actors capable of projecting power across multiple theatres. Any settlement that overlooks this dimension risks creating a dual reality: formal de-escalation at the state level, alongside continued instability through indirect channels. A sustainable agreement must therefore incorporate clear commitments to halt the arming, financing and operational direction of such groups.
At the same time, diplomacy cannot be built on coercion alone. Iran, like any state, will seek a pathway that preserves a degree of strategic dignity. This creates space for calibrated reciprocal assurances, including commitments that reduce the risk of direct confrontation and limit incentives for escalation. However, such assurances must not come at the expense of accountability. They must be anchored in verifiable mechanisms, not political declarations.
Another lesson from previous negotiations is the danger of overly narrow diplomatic formats. Security in the Gulf cannot be negotiated exclusively between Washington and Tehran while the states most directly affected remain on the margins. A credible settlement will require parallel tracks: one addressing strategic issues at the global level, and another rooted in direct Gulf-Iran dialogue focused on regional security, maritime stability and non-interference. This is not a matter of optics; it is essential to ensuring that any agreement reflects realities on the ground.
How incentives are structured matters just as much. Sweeping, front-loaded sanctions relief has historically weakened compliance over time. A more sustainable approach lies in gradual, conditional easing – tied to measurable actions and subject to reversal in the event of non-compliance. Such a framework does not aim to punish, but to build a process of incremental trust grounded in performance rather than intent.
Taken together, these elements point to a broader conclusion: the objective of diplomacy today is not merely to end a war, but to prevent its recurrence. This requires shifting from a model based on temporary balances of power to one anchored in clearer, enforceable rules of conduct.
For the Gulf states, this moment also represents an opportunity. Over recent years, the region has moved – quietly but decisively – towards a more interconnected and stability-oriented model, driven by economic diversification, trade corridors and strategic partnerships. Preserving and reinforcing this trajectory will depend on ensuring that security arrangements evolve in parallel with economic ambition.
In this sense, the stakes extend far beyond the immediate conflict. A weak settlement will entrench volatility, keeping the region locked in cycles of escalation and de-escalation. A stronger one – grounded in maritime security, expanded arms constraints, accountability for proxy activity and inclusive regional dialogue – could lay the foundations for a more durable equilibrium.
The challenge is not persuading Iran to stop fighting. It is ensuring that, when it does, the region is not left vulnerable to the same dynamics that made the war possible in the first place.
