With the Republican party facing an increasingly likely defeat in the November midterm elections, US President Donald Trump has gambled hugely at the great roulette wheel of fate by launching an avoidable war against Iran. It is a remarkable about-face, since he has identified the 2003 invasion of Iraq as the original sin of traditional Republican foreign policy. Striking echoes between now and that disaster are unmistakable, only emphasising the size of this wager.
Mr Trump campaigned as "the peace president" who would put "America first”. But he has also manifested belligerence towards Iran, which returned the favour, including by allegedly seeking to assassinate him.
Mr Trump is hoping to avoid the pitfalls of earlier adventures, most notably in Iraq, by avoiding placing boots on the ground and relying entirely on aerial bombardment. Nonetheless, six US soldiers have been killed, with the president warning of more to come. Still, the lack of any ground presence inside Iran will help the administration deny this is another "forever war”.
But there are grave difficulties with this strategy. There is nothing stopping the US and Israel from destroying anything inside Iran, including senior leaders (many having been killed in the initial strikes). But that’s all.
This strategy outsources the decisive elements of any outcome to an undefinable group of Iranians. It’s an equation wherein most crucial factors must be shaped by others. It goes like this: the US and Israel bomb and destroy assets. Then (fill in the blank) Iranians will secure (fill in the blank) political change that will achieve (fill in the blank) US war aims. By relying entirely on airpower, Mr Trump is also ceding the ability to decide what, if any, of those blank spaces will be filled, by whom and how.
Like the George W Bush administration during the Iraq war in 2003, the Trump administration has not provided a coherent and consistent strategic goal. The President has variously cited curbing Iran's nuclear programme (which last June he described as "totally obliterated"), destroying Iran's missile capabilities, annihilating its navy, preventing the regime from massacring protesters and prompting regime change.
The Iraq campaign was doomed to fail from the outset because the administration at the time did not agree on its goals. There was, therefore, no metric for success. How can a project be judged if it lacks a clear goal? It can't and wasn't. It was thus a failure by definition and in advance.
Without boots on the ground, Mr Trump may be avoiding the biggest risks in what looks unnervingly like a national neurotic repetition compulsion. But, as with the Iraq invasion, he has based the war on assertions of imminent threats that appear exaggerated, if not fabricated. Fewer Americans believe current claims about Iran than once bought false assertions about Iraq’s non-existent stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.
Mr Trump has executed a dizzying 180-degree spin on avoidable foreign adventures by initiating one. If it goes badly, or even is perceived as pointless, especially if the Iranian regime survives, he's likely to be haunted by comparisons with the Iraq debacle, which could well become increasingly compelling.
Already, the war is not popular. Surveys suggest that only about a quarter of the American public thinks this is a good idea. Former allies within his own party have already started saying "we didn't vote for this”. Such sentiments may intensify over time unless there is a quick and clean success.
Moreover, voices on both the left and the right are already saying that Mr Trump has gone to war for Israel, rather than putting "America first". The administration has played into this charge by claiming that the attack on Iran is defensive because Washington knew Israel was planning to attack Iran and the US anticipated being targeted in retaliation, so it's simply pre-empting Tehran. Not only is this exceptionally convoluted and illogical, as if the US had no voice in Israeli decision-making on such matters, but it also underscores the linkage between the US decision to go to war and Israeli national security strategy.
In addition to seeking to reduce his political exposure by avoiding the use of ground forces, Mr Trump may be viewing this incoherent, and at times even self-contradictory, hodgepodge of stated war aims as another crucial hedge. Without a single, clear goal, he may believe it will be easier to simply declare victory and stop the conflict whenever he decides there is nothing more to be gained. At a minimum, he can claim to have punished Iran for its misbehaviour, "restored deterrence" and enhanced US national security, even if the regime is left in power and without any agreement with Washington, formal or informal.
This campaign against Iran is the logical conclusion of a new trend in US foreign policy, the real "Trump doctrine". It's a sort of update to 19th-century gunboat diplomacy, featuring limited military actions designed to intimidate, demonstrate power and secure limited but tangible concessions from adversaries. The clearest example is, of course, Venezuela, where former president Nicholas Maduro and his wife were captured and taken to jail in Brooklyn, but the rest of the regime was left completely intact with the understanding that it would make oil concessions and allow the CIA to re-establish a presence in Venezuela, likely with an eye to securing future changes in Cuba.
A similar outcome in Iran, with elements from within the regime stepping forward, especially given the death of supreme leader Ali Khamenei, to trade ending the war while they remain in power for concessions on issues such as the nuclear programme, support for armed gangs in the Arab world and, perhaps now most challengingly, Iran's missile and drone arsenal. That would be a major vindication of Mr Trump's new strategy of seeking limited concessions through limited applications of force.
But if something like that doesn't happen in a public and demonstrable way, the regime does not fall and especially if the war seems to drag on, with increasing costs, the political damage could be enormous. Mr Trump may not care much, given that he may be virtually powerless after November and is ineligible to run for re-election a third time. But he and his party will have to live with the consequences into the foreseeable future.
It’s a huge gamble, and the political stakes are vast. Mr Trump is “all in”.
