Hassan Rouhani wants to be the next Supreme Leader. Iran's hardliners won't have it

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani represents a pragmatic faction hoping to reset Iran’s relations with the West. EPA

Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s centrist president from 2013 to 2021, no longer holds any official position. Last year, he was even barred from running for the Assembly of Experts, the body that supervises Iran’s Supreme Leader, in which he had held a seat since 2000. But he has used the crisis-ridden past year, which saw a 12-day war with Israel and America and the return of UN sanctions, to revamp his political profile.

In recent speeches and interviews, Mr Rouhani has boldly defended his time in office, including negotiations with the US which led to inking of a nuclear deal in 2015, and offered criticism of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the militia Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC.) Audaciously, he said that during the 12-day war the people of Iran rallied for their country but not for the regime and its rulers, thus refuting a central piece of the regime’s mythology around the attack. Another former president, Mohammad Khatami, has since made a similar claim.

This gambit clearly speaks to political ambition. With Mr Khamenei having turned 86 this year, various regime figures are already flexing muscles in anticipation of a succession crisis. Mr Rouhani represents a pragmatic faction, hoping to reset Iran’s relations with the West and soften some of its domestic repressive policies.

Worried about his potential to transform the regime, other factions have come out guns blazing against Mr Rouhani in recent days. Tensions were raised earlier this month, when a leaked video emerged showing Ali Shamkhani, a political rival of Mr Rouhani who once served as his national security adviser, at his daughter’s wedding.

In the video, Mr Shamkhani poses with his daughter, who is wearing a low-cut, strapless wedding dress that would be considered wholly inappropriate by the regime’s standards. The sense of scandal is heightened by the fact that Mr Shamkhani, a veteran IRGC commander, currently sits in the Defence Council as Mr Khamenei’s representative. Mr Shamkhani’s defenders accuse the Rouhani camp of being behind the leak.

Several IRGC figures have come out against Mr Rouhani since. Mohammad Ali Jafari, a former top IRGC commander, accused Mr Rouhani of placing limits on IRGC’s budget during his time in office. Bagher Ghalibaf, another former commander who is now Iran’s parliamentary Speaker, attacked Mr Rouhani and his former foreign minister, Javad Zarif, for their criticism of Russia, one of Iran’s closest allies.

He was referring to a recent war of words between Mr Zarif and his erstwhile Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, after France and Britain successfully re-activated UN sanctions in Iran using a so-called “snapback mechanism” embedded in the 2015 deal. Mr Zarif said the mechanism was a replacement for a “very bad” proposal put forward by Russia and France. He went even further, suggesting Moscow thrives on Iran’s isolation.

A fluent English-speaker who spent years living in the US, Mr Zarif is a favourite target for the regime hardliners. But the attacks on Mr Rouhani are more severe and may be more consequential. On October 26, several MPs in the Iranian parliament shouted “Trial!” and even “Death to Feredyoon!”, using Mr Rouhani’s birth name.

Many of Rouhani’s loudest individual critics do not wield much political power by themselves. But with its massive control of wealth and power, the IRGC is a formidable presence, particularly if its commanders can band together

In the rowdy scene of Iranian politics, a war of words is nothing new. But as factional infighting heightens, it remains to be seen if any faction will take drastic action against its opponents. Many of Mr Rouhani’s loudest individual critics do not wield much political power by themselves. But with its massive control of wealth and power, the IRGC is a formidable presence, particularly if its commanders can band together.

At the same time, not everyone has been drawn into the fight. The judiciary, a power centre in its own right, once prosecuted Mr Rouhani’s brother and top aide, Hossein Fereydoon, but it is now led by Ghollamhosein Mohseni Ezhei, who is not a hardliner.

Mr Rouhani’s allies, moreover, have to come to his defence. Hesamoddin Ashna, perhaps his closest adviser, has spoken out against Mr Ghalibaf and IRGC leaders. He urged the Guard “not to open the Pandora’s box” and has threatened to reveal secrets about their financial dealings.

There would be much to reveal. A few years ago, a voice note leaked of Mr Jafari complaining to another senior IRGC commander about corruption in its elite Quds Force branch, as well as Tehran’s municipality offices and other bodies. This is thought to be the tip of the iceberg. As an old regime hand and son-in-law of a powerful former intelligence minister, Mr Ashna has the resources to make good on his threat.

In a recent speech, Ayatollah Khamenei called on regime factions to unite. So long as he is alive and in charge, the infighting remains relatively limited. But everyone is still preparing for the succession crisis that appears sure to arrive after his death.