Optics that count in an international crisis frequently revolve around summits, when the dynamics of the leading nations spill into the open. With UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer dealing with a changed world order, so too do his travel plans.
It is under this atmosphere that Mr Starmer huddled on Monday with EU officials and Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte. The informal meeting involving the UK leader and the EU’s top council had, in reality, just one focus – how to future-proof themselves for what is to come from US President Donald Trump.
The American President’s remarks on Sunday about trade tariffs with the Europeans provide an opportunity for Mr Starmer. Mr Trump warned that tariffs to reverse the “atrocity” of the EU trade surplus with America were on the way. He did add that the UK was “out of line” but then added that he thought something could be worked out with London. So there was something in the remarks for Mr Starmer’s team to work with, not so much for the Europeans.
French President Emmanuel Macron took a bold stand warning that Europe would have to respond to the Trump tariffs as a “true power”. But the question is if the EU is indeed a true power. Look beyond tariffs and ask if the region is psychologically prepared to go it alone. There are many who worry that if the tide of US security – which has been extended since the Second World War – goes out, European defence will be left exposed.
This makes it important for European officials to heal the Brexit divide with the UK. The British defence budget may be strained, but it remains a heavy hitter with a goal of boosting its spending to 2.5 per cent of its gross domestic product around the end of the decade.
Monday’s meeting was cued up as informal, because last week marked five years since the UK formally left the EU. Next year, it will be a decade since the referendum to leave the EU was organised as well as Mr Trump’s first presidential victory.
London may not be an EU capital, but it remains on the faultline of the European divide over rearmament. Mr Trump’s proposed talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin are not yet in the public domain. The concept of freezing the Ukraine conflict at current or similar frontlines to those today seems to be the only basis that would get Moscow to agree an armistice.
Europe would then be in a situation that closely parallels the division of Korea between 1945 and 1948. This would amount to an absence of war but the existence of a divide that dictates the security dynamics of the region.
With the US focused on its great-power rivalry with China, the onus would firmly shift to the EU countries to show that their defence capabilities were strong enough for their own integrity. For years, Ukraine’s security officials have been pressing the Europeans to show that they are willing to build up the arms factories and defence technology institutes that would expand the production of material. For example, Kyiv needs millions of artillery shells but cannot turn to the Europeans to make as many as Russia is churning out.
Dogmatic in the pursuit of self-reliance, Mr Macron is pushing for EU member states to expand their defence spending. A majority of European countries take a different view, and they are arguing that they need to log plenty of orders with US defence companies right now. This would have the effect of helping to ameliorate some of Mr Trump’s worst tariff instincts.
By narrowing the deficit and providing American factories with orders, the Europeans would hope to buy time to win over the Trump team. They could both say that they are boosting defence spending, as Mr Trump demands, and supporting American industry.
Those opposed to Mr Macron’s arguments for a homegrown solution also doubt that the Europeans can build a defence industry that rivals in depth and effectiveness what is on offer from the US. To this line of argument, the speed of dropping orders over to the UK is the most important thing.
For both sides, therefore, the UK is a test. This is because Mr Macron seems averse to the idea of including the UK in his “buy European” plan. Paris would prefer trade-offs with the UK over market access and other concessions in a process designed to sort out the worst aspects of Brexit.
On Monday, Charlie Falconer, a former Labour cabinet minister, asked if the Europeans would really fail to come together to defend the continent against Russia because of a side dispute over access to fishing rights post-Brexit. This is a serious question, and there are others.
The reality is that the UK’s defence industry is well integrated with its European partners, as well as its American ones. It has much to give, as the European leaders seek a quick study on how to boost defence.
To repeat the patterns of the past with arguments about how to retain European exclusivity is to fail the challenge unfolding in these early weeks of 2025.
