Two pressing matters have emerged on the eve of US president-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration. Both developments are undeniably important, but the incoming president will be expected to deal with them in his unique style once his second term gets under way tomorrow.
One is the ceasefire deal, with all its complications, in Gaza. The other, the primary focus of this article, is the signing of a strategic pact between Russia and Iran in Moscow on Friday.
The agreement, signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, is the first big step taken by the two powers to deepen their relationship since their collective influence was eroded in the Middle East by the fall of the Bashar Al Assad government in Syria last month.
To that extent, the 20-year strategic partnership – focused on strengthening co-operation in security, defence and trade – can be seen as an attempt by the two countries to restore their status as active players in the region’s balance of power.
There was a time not too long ago when an informal three-way partnership involving Iran, Russia and China was considered to have considerable heft. But recent setbacks in the Levant, along with domestic challenges for the Iranian government, have reduced some of that weight.
It is instructive that China refrained from intervening in the region at key moments over more than a year. This includes when Israel launched strikes inside Iran, with which Beijing has its own strategic partnership, as well as against Tehran’s allies in Lebanon and Syria. China remained on the sidelines, as did most other powers, during the overthrow of the Assad government – despite its support and pledges for Damascus in recent years.
Beijing’s strategic pact with Tehran – which encompasses economic, military and security agreements – was once heralded as a treaty between two strong regional poles. Today, one of the poles, Iran, has been considerably weakened. The pact, therefore, is one between a global superpower that is currently focused on its competitive priorities with the US, its closest rival, and a fragile regional player struggling to regain its strength.
The timing of the Iran-Russia agreement is interesting.
I am given to understand that there was a sense of urgency on Iran’s part to sign the deal, owing to its current, insecure position. Moscow’s desire to sign on the dotted lines stemmed from a number of compulsions: co-ordination on oil prices; technological co-operation; the coming transit corridor between Russia and India through Iran; and Tehran’s influence in the South Caucasus, including its ties to both Azerbaijan and Armenia (particularly as the latter signed a strategic treaty with the US last week).
The economic benefits of the new Iran-Russia agreement are significant for both sides, as is the political leverage each country gains.
Furthermore, Moscow’s reading of the current geopolitical situation is that a deal between Russia and the US – which extends beyond Ukraine to also include disarmament issues – will not come easily, and a swift resolution is unlikely. Hence, from the Russian perspective, there was little benefit in delaying the announcement.
While Mr Trump has said that a meeting with Mr Putin is on the cards at some point this year, the groundwork has to be laid. Meanwhile, Kremlin insiders will wait to gauge the tone and substance of the phone conversation expected to be had between the two leaders following Mr Trump’s inauguration.
Dealing with Iran, particularly its nuclear weapons programme, is clearly on the list of Mr Trump’s foreign policy priorities. The elevation in Russian-Iranian relations to the level of a strategic pact, therefore, means that Moscow could be expected to support Tehran if the administration in Washington decides to take military action against Iran.
Which brings us to a set of important questions: what kind of Iran will emerge in 2025? Will its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, decide to finally elevate his country to that of a nuclear state? Or, with Dr Pezeshkian and likeminded reformists running the administration, will Iran change its direction of travel?
The US-Iran relationship necessarily intersects with the US-Israel relationship, but Mr Trump doesn’t appear to be sitting at a crossroads waiting for the yellow light to turn green to launch military strikes on Iran (with Israeli assistance). Rather, he may prefer that the light stay red and that a military confrontation with Iran is averted, believing that the onus is on Tehran to keep it that way.
The Gaza ceasefire deal has clarified to everyone that Mr Trump will not simply take a back seat and let the Israeli government do what it wants. He sent his special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, to assist incumbent US President Joe Biden’s team in securing an agreement.
This is not incidental or trivial, even if there is a very real concern that provocations from either Israel or Hamas could shatter a deal born fragile. One can only hope for the best.
