Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 powers (the US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) on the Iranian nuclear programme will recommence in Vienna this week. Although there are doubts that the talks will be wrapped up before the deadline at the end of this month, there are signs that an accord will be reached. An outline of an agreement is taking shape under which Iran will agree to pursue a limited nuclear programme under international supervision in return for the lifting of sanctions. Valid for 10 years, the proposed deal will hinge on Iranian readiness to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to nuclear research teams and restricted military bases.
While questions remain about the total enrichment capacity of Iran's installed centrifuges and precise verification arrangements, there is evidently a shared will to overcome the final obstacles to an agreement. A comprehensive settlement of this issue will, on the face of it, represent a diplomatic milestone and redefine the balance of power in the Middle East. Certainly, from the perspective of key players in Washington and Tehran, there are good reasons to laud a successful agreement. The White House is eager to secure a foreign-policy success, while Iranian president Hassan Rouhani is anxious to loosen economic shackles imposed by sanctions and compounded by the plunge in the price of oil.
Revolutionary Iran has defined itself by its distinctiveness and it has worn its isolation from the world as a badge of pride. For Tehran to break out from its psychological circling of the wagons, a major ideological and policy adjustment is needed. The persistence of anti-western, and particularly anti-US, attitudes was demonstrated last week when Iranian National Assembly members tabled a law that demanded the complete lifting of all international sanctions on the day that an agreement is signed, clear limits on inspectors’ rights to visit sensitive sites, and a blank cheque from the international community for Iran to pursue nuclear research and development "for peaceful purposes".
While the National Assembly’s gesture showed a lack of realism about the nature of the draft accord now emerging, Mr Rouhani has defended his conduct of the negotiations at a series of public rallies. He has made much of Iran’s diplomatic success, which holds out the promise of an end to sanctions, combined with international recognition of Iran’s right to civil nuclear power. He has also stressed the economic hardships suffered by ordinary Iranians as a response to conservative accusations that Mr Rouhani is too eager to make concessions to the US.
Unlike members of Iran’s National Assembly, however, Mr Rouhani is well aware that the process of lifting sanctions is likely to take months given the complexity of the proposed agreement. Also, the ultimate decision to accept a deal rests with the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has been reported as suffering from poor health after an operation for prostate cancer. Speculation about the successor to the 75-year-old Mr Khamenei is likely to effect on the nuclear issue. Mr Khamenei has already ensured that the Assembly of Experts, the body responsible for choosing the new Supreme Leader has been packed with loyal conservatives. Nevertheless, there is a risk that the succession issue could lead to intensified political factionalism in Iran and offer conservatives the option of sabotaging a nuclear agreement to prove their anti-western credentials.
In the US, both the White House and the State Department are under pressure to refuse a deal rather than sign up to a flawed agreement. Last week, the chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Bob Corker, wrote to Barack Obama to suggest that he either toughen the terms of a deal or walk away. He argued that the proposed accord was flawed in that it only promised better international supervision rather than a comprehensive dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Mr Corker’s intervention was significant in that he is seen as a pragmatic operator who has succeeded in building up effective bipartisan cooperation on this issue. He was also instrumental in gaining the reluctant assent of the White House last month to a bill that would permit Congress up to one month to review any deal if it is signed by July 9 or two months if an agreement is made thereafter. Although Mr Obama could still get his way through the use of a presidential veto if Congress rejects a deal, the US negotiators in Vienna are aware that an eventual deal will meet intense scrutiny at home.
The fear remains that while the White House will be happy to gather plaudits should an agreement be made, the hard work of implementation will be left to others. Continued Iranian reticence about past nuclear activities still raises suspicion that the Islamic Republic has something to hide. Any deal will be followed by the long process of setting up a viable IAEA inspection regime, while the P5+1 can only hope that their incipient rivalry over potential commercial contracts in Iran will not unduly complicate the process of lifting sanctions. Given the scepticism in Washington and Tehran, and doubts over exactly how a deal will be made to stick, it is evident that any agreement will mark the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end.
Stephen Blackwell is an international politics and security analyst
