How the Manchester synagogue security response played out

Government emergency handbook sets out advice to keep civilian casualties at a minimum

Armed police officers at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue where two people died in a suspected terror attack. PA Wire

A fast-moving anti-terror response played out for more than six minutes in Manchester on Thursday after a witness called in the car-ramming and stabbings at the Heaton Park mosque.

On Yom Kippur, when the Jewish community was gathered to observe together, the attacker appeared determined to break into the synagogue to cause mass casualties.

At 9.31am the first call to the emergency services reported a man had been stabbed. Firearms officers were posted at 9.34am, and the commanders declared a major incident at 9.37am.

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By then, it was known that a vehicle was used to ram the crowd, and shots were fired at 9.38am. Police reported one man was shot, believed to be the offender. Paramedics arrived at the scene at 9.41am.

Synagogue security support volunteers talk to police at the cordon. PA Wire

A video shared from across the street showed the attacker trying to use a knife to get through a security grill, while a padded belt raised suspicions of an explosive device.

By 11.30am the hospitals in the area had been locked down, and by 11.42am a bomb disposal van had arrived at the scene.

By 2.10pm, an explosion was heard as the police sought to break into the attacker's car.

Armed Forces bomb disposal experts at the scene. AFP

Plato is a set of laid-down rules for emergencies, including activating hospital major incident plans.

The advice given in the UK government manual titled Marauding Terrorist Attacks Supplementary Guidance, assumes internal security staff will be the primary force stopping or dealing with an assailant.

“If an attack starts within your site, consider how lockdown should operate. Should attackers be locked in a zone, potentially with victims, or should people be able to flee but terrorists allowed to maraud?” it asks.

Members of the Jewish community speak to a police officer near the attacked synagogue in Manchester. PA

Delay first

Key to keeping casualty numbers low is to delay the attackers’ progress “in finding and killing victims” or preventing people from inadvertently putting themselves into the path.

Protocols advise that a poorly implemented lockdown “can actually increase the risk” to the public and police.

It is also unlikely to help in situations where access is generally not restricted and there are no barriers to lock. It warns too that attacks that commence inside a building may be impeded by locked doors, which could restrict escape or cause a crush.

Zone lockdown

A simple zonal lockdown can be useful for example locking the perimeter of a building when all attackers are outside. With internal doors unlocked, people inside may move freely to safer locations such as higher floors.

At Heaton Park, the doors were sealed by the time the killer got on the grounds, and worshippers praised the role of Rabbi Daniel Walker as the crisis unfolded.

Rabbi Daniel Walker following the attack at the synagogue. AFP

The advice states that preventing lifts and escalators being used by attackers to progress through a building is ideal but usually difficult to implement. In practice, it is only feasible where the building management systems and security systems are integrated. Otherwise, it represents an additional task for security control room operators, who are likely to be overloaded.

Barriers and doors

The document highlights that door and security barriers “will delay the progress of an attack”. Introducing physical barriers such as turnstiles and security doors in combination with security walls provides the best protection.

But any makeshift barrier can be “valuable and may be used for lockdown, even those that are not designed for security use or are physically insubstantial”.

Public announcement systems are also vital, the report said. “Instigating lockdown may significantly alter the best course of action for personnel and members of the public. It is therefore crucial that people are aware that lockdown is in effect.”

Runners

Organisations also need to consider what appropriate action to take if a large crowd is running towards their site, where the cause is not clear. “Should the people be permitted to enter your site in order to seek shelter or should they be locked out?” it states.

Jewish worshippers after the attack at Heaton Park synagogue. AP

Early activation of a lockdown when a nearby attack is detected can “undoubtedly prevent [suspected] terrorists from entering your site”.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer leaves Copenhagen. AFP

Cobra committee

At 2.30pm, Prime Minister Keir Starmer arrived back in the UK after an early exit from a summit in Copenhagen to chair the government's top emergency meeting, Cobra, to direct the response to the Manchester attack.

Mr Starmer had already directed additional security arrangements for British synagogues, which did not go into lockdown but continued to allow all people to worship throughout the day.

Assistant Commissioner Laurence Taylor said the attack had been declared a “terrorist incident”, adding that two people have been arrested and a man was shot dead by armed police. Two people were killed and four more are seriously injured.

Police officers outside the London Central synagogue as Keir Starmer ordered up 'additional police assets'. PA Wire