Central banks need lessons on risk after Lehman collapse

The sudden bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers has far more serious implications for the world's financial system, with possible consequences to the Gulf, than did the demise of Bear Stearns. The Lehman collapse has changed the game of how regulators now deal with financial institutions, and potential bailouts are no longer an option. The accelerated momentum of securitisation of mortgage loans in 2005 caused the subprime crisis, not the low interest rates when the Fed reduced Fed funds to 1 per cent. The sale of securities from credit pools had never reached such a level before. When US investment banks discovered the appetite of foreign institutions, commercial banks sped up their loans to uninformed borrowers to meet the soaring investor demand.

Banks transferred to their trading books what cost too much on their credit books (8 per cent of their assets in equity) even though the so-called "securities" were for the most part illiquid private placements. This trend to structure credit in the cheapest way possible by avoiding capital requirements was blatant regulatory arbitrage on a massive scale. But this was caused by the central banks themselves who insisted on a higher and costly capitalisation on banks, who in turn tried to minimise such costs by moving assets off-balance sheet.

Second, the investor demand for this structured paper was not triggered by the "excess liquidity" created in the low interest rates since 2001, but it instead represented the most massive transfer of wealth ever recorded in history. Two billion individuals moved in a matter of only a few years from a state-controlled economy to semi-capitalist private systems, and the productivity gains across both western economies and emerging market economies unleashed a virtual flood of financial wealth and savings, with the world capital stock nearly trebling from US$60 trillion (Dh220.4trn) to $160trn. One only has to observe these phenomena in the Gulf over the past few years to see the effect on new wealth creation for many classes of citizens.

These same citizens must now be wondering what happens next and the news is not looking good, given the inter-linkages of counter obligations among financial institutions. It will take months to unwind Lehman's complex deals and obligations with other banks, and given the company's high-profile presence in the Gulf, it would be a brave soul to state that Gulf institutions will not be affected this time around. Tighter credit and higher margins will be the order of the day as banks seek quality clients, and investors, in turn, seek quality financial institutions whose numbers seem to diminish by the day.

Until the collapse of Lehman, the assumption had been that any financial institution operating at the centre of the international financial system, be it a commercial or investment bank, is simply too big and too interconnected to be allowed to fail or to be wound down quickly for fear of a systemic breakdown. This assumption has now been shaken. This raises the issue of fiduciary risk. Two thirds of the capital flows today go through fiduciaries, those who act as managers, custodians, broker-dealers, administrators or trustees, while credit banks, the dominating power of finance until the 1980s, have become marginalised. The whole texture of finance shifted from a classic loan industry to one of securities trading, warehousing, arbitrage and valuation. Institutions don't lend cash anymore: they lend securities and exchange credit swaps and interest rates.

The shift was so sudden and reached so deeply in a structural sense that it heightened the fragility of the whole system. No wonder regulatory tools based on a credit model have proven to be so ineffective. As long as the industry was dominated by credit and an obligation to generate and protect the "results", one could reinforce the walls and limits of a regulated system. But when the industry is overtaken by institutions acting as fiduciaries rather than creditors, the obligation is only of the "means" (ie "best practice") not of the ends, or the result of their imprudence, so how do you effectively regulate that? What is worrying is that more and more Gulf institutions have been following the fiduciary route with traditional credit-related commercial banking taking a secondary role.

A move to enlarge the supervisory role of a central bank is likely to create an unprecedented concentration of powers with no corresponding real and effective means to intervene and contain market excesses save for "bailing out" creditors who make the asset bubbles possible. What's more, by guaranteeing impaired assets, central banks are exposed to capital losses, however over-collateralised the central bank is in its term lending through its new liquidity facilities. As the current crisis itself has shown, when all the financial institutions - rather than just one or two in trouble - face funding risks at the same time, there is not much value in the collateral you are holding unless you can hold it for a long, long time. This is what made Barclays decide to pull out of the Lehman rescue effort.

The Lehman collapse raises the question whether central banks could go under in the wake of their market intervention during a financial crisis. The Fed's total equity stands at $40 billion versus the $29bn needed to guarantee Bear Stearns alone, and this is without Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae support. A central bank can never go "broke" per se, of course, since a government will always replenish its capital base if the losses due occur. But that would also entail, in effect, printing money at a time when inflation is an issue. Concerning Lehman, the Fed has declined to pump in money to bail it out and some, including Alan Greenspan, are now calling for a new model of financial supervision that does not automatically bail out failed banks. Some have put forward drastic solutions given the potential capital adequacy problems of central banks to support a total collapse in the financial system.

One suggestion is that we need to limit the size of financial institutions. We should limit their size instead of facing the unavoidable option of having to save them. In short, once an institution grows too big, it should be split as AT&T once was in the late 1970s, and IT companies in this century. The argument was one of the social and economic needs to break a cartel, whereas today it is the size itself that becomes so unmanageable relative to the means of containing a systemic risk.

In both cases, the goal is to improve market efficiency. Should we move back to restore the strict division between commercial and investment banking and put an end to such a massive regulatory leakage? The answer may lie in the transition of the industry itself. The "old" Fed had regulatory responsibilities over a traditional commercial banking industry that is mostly a relic from textbooks, while the "new" Fed must consider the financial industry in whole. It is possible that the new regulatory fabric that arises will produce clear lines of responsibilities, dividing the new credit and fiduciary roles within the finance industry, as both sides are not subjected to the same performance obligations.

Given the explosion of commercial and investment banking in the Gulf, this issue will also be an important one for GCC regulators. The trend in the region was for larger banks and mergers to face the big boys from outside. This will cause the same dilemma for Gulf regulators in case one major financial institution faces trouble, but given the state of fragility of banking confidence due to recent fraud and scandals the likely option in the Gulf is to discreetly bail out. In the final analysis, let us hope that in trying to fix this current mess, the regulators do not lay the seeds of a future financial meltdown. Dr Mohamed Ramady is a former banker and Visiting Associate Professor, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.