Without reforms, Egypt will plunge towards the unknown

The option to start building a new republic that is inclusive and equitable lies with those in power

On Saturday, Egypt’s interim president, Adli Mansour, announced the date for the referendum on the draft constitution as January 14 and 15. The constitution will likely pass, and the military-backed road map will be deemed a success on that basis. It is also likely that none of that will matter, and that the situation in Egypt will continue to deteriorate.

There is a deep concern within Egypt’s ruling establishment about the outcome of the referendum. They will ensure that this constitutional referendum is successful. The process will probably be free, in that ballot boxes will not be routinely stuffed, and the Egyptian authorities may very well allow international election observers to attend and verify the vote. It is not likely to be fair, however. Arguments for a “no” vote will hardly be given the same amount of exposure in national media. On the contrary, the “yes” vote is being portrayed as the solution to polarisation within Egypt. With the media narrative strongly in one direction, it will be difficult to muster that much of a “no” vote.

But that will not be the measure of success for the interim government. The authorities will consider the vote to be successful if turnout and the “yes” vote are higher than in 2012 under Mohammed Morsi’s rule. The authorities are hoping for a repeat of the March 2011 constitutional referendum, when turnout was high, and 78 per cent voted in favour. And measures are being entertained within Egypt to allow Egyptians to vote anywhere in the country, as opposed to only within their constituencies, which would be another factor in ensuring a high turnout.

The likelihood of the constitution passing, and the progression of the road map continuing, ought not to be taken as a sign that Egypt is actually on the way to recovery.

The first step to recovery is to admit that Egypt remains in a very difficult situation, and the most worrying aspects of that situation are not directly political. Politics has an effect, of course, but Egypt is currently heading towards an economic catastrophe, almost like a slow-motion train wreck, that outside observers should be concerned about.

For the last three years, the Egyptian establishment, regardless of political orientation, has failed to tackle this issue head-on. There were three chances to do so: the first was when Field Marshal Tantawi, the former head of the armed forces, removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011; the second was when Mohammed Morsi took office in 2012; and the third was when General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi removed Mr Morsi in July. At each of those junctures, had the effective political power centres developed a consensus-based approach to tackling this behemoth of an issue, they would have been able to gather sufficient public support behind them for the economic reforms that were required. Instead, they have done completely the opposite – such reforms have been left to be determined in the future. The problem is that Egypt cannot afford to wait that long.

Early this year, I wrote that Egypt was essentially a powder keg in an extremely flammable situation, and that all it would take was a spark for there to be widespread rioting and chaos that would result in a coup. I had in mind food riots that would lead to the army being deployed to restore order, and that they might simply remove Mr Morsi to institute a government that would redirect the country economically.

Indeed, I thought a particularly precarious time would be during Ramadan, as it is the most expensive month of the year, and it happened to coincide with July, which is the hottest (and therefore the most energy consuming) month of the year. It did not work out quite like that – the army intervened under different circumstances – but the “flammability” of December 2012 (after Mr Morsi’s disastrous decree and the passing of the 2012 constitution) to July 2013 did not simply disappear with the removal of Mr Morsi. On the contrary, that volatile situation remains.

Egypt is fortunate in that other regional partners, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are willing to help it financially. But reforms, while essential, are not even on the table. The financial support that Egypt may receive is not sustainable forever – and now, not later, is the time for the Egyptian authorities to tackle those structural problems.

Alongside those challenges, Egypt faces a larger security problem than it did before, particularly in Sinai but also elsewhere, and a security apparatus that is in desperate need of transformation. That also is not on the table. And in the absence of that, the rifts and wounds that Egypt suffers at present will only intensify.

None of this is surprising. Many have been arguing for years for a multilateral international plan to not only provide funds to Egypt’s struggling economy, but assist it in stimulating economic reform and investment. Such plans require reform in the security sector, as well as political consensus, to ensure that everyone has a stake in providing Egypt with a solid bedrock on which to build a democracy.

Unfortunately, for the last three years very few political forces in Egypt have engaged in anything other than a zero-sum game. That kind of approach cannot persist, given the challenges of Egypt. As unsustainable as the situation is at present, it is entirely possible that it becomes even more volatile.

The choice lies with those in power, to begin to build a new republic that is inclusive and equitable.

Dr HA Hellyer is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, and the Brookings Institution in Washington DC

On Twitter: @hahellyer