Attempting to parse the implications of the apparent rapprochement between the United States and Iran has, for understandable reasons, been a hot topic across the Middle East. Part of the intensity of the focus has been because the range of possible outcomes – and potential impacts on the GCC nations – differ so vastly and because it is impossible to say with any confidence how this will eventually play out.
Analysts who have adopted an optimistic approach see bringing Iran back into the economic bloc of the southern Gulf nations and the wider world economy as a boon to the UAE and one that would lead to the Islamic Republic adopting less confrontational and disruptive policies in the region. The contrary, more pessimistic analysis sees this as part of the US’s pivot towards Asia, where it distances itself from its traditional allies in the GCC and allows Iran to become more of a regional power in the hope that it will lead to stability. A healthier economy would also mean Tehran will feel much less financial pain from supporting groups like Hizbollah and regimes like Bashar Al Assad’s in Syria.
The response to this has to be one of cautious optimism, because the considerable benefits that could flow from this rapprochement justify the effort of trying to make it work. But the prudence implicit in this approach will require progress to occur incrementally rather than in one sudden push, allowing time for the real intentions of Iran to become clear through its actions, regardless of the sugar-coated words that have been emerging from Tehran.
The benefits could be profound for a nation like the UAE, which has a small population but an economy that looks outward, involving transport and trade with the region at large. Iran is a huge consumer market on the UAE’s doorstep, but that potential has been hamstrung by a combination of vacillating relations between the Islamic Republic and the GCC nations and, more recently, by the sanctions imposed by the international community in response to Iran’s nuclear programme.
All this raises difficult questions. How can Iran joining the regional economy sit alongside sanctions? Will a richer Iran empower it to interfere even more in Syria and Lebanon? These questions need answers, although the potential benefits justify at least trying to foster this rapprochement, but to do so slowly and methodically.
