Popular revolutions are always and inevitably messy in the short term, as citizens of the Arab Spring nations are discovering. But over the span of decades, rather than years, the true nature of what took place emerges, showing whether the uprising is of the American variety, giving birth to a robust democracy based on personal freedoms, or akin to Russia, which ushered in a political and economic system that eventually collapsed.
With today marking the 35th anniversary of the referendum result that confirmed Iran's status as an Islamic republic, it is an appropriate time to take stock of where Iran stands. Apart from the Iranian Green Movement, which was brutally suppressed after it arose through popular anger at the contentious 2009 election that re-elected president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there is now no credible alternative within the country to the system in which the Ayatollah retains ultimate control.
In 2014, Iran retains a powerful role within the region, demonstrated by its influence in Iraq, its backing of Hizbollah, its support for the Assad regime in Syria and its bolstering of Shia insurgents in Bahrain and Yemen. It harbours grandiose political ambitions for the region.
At the same time, Iran's economy remains a shambles, crippled by a combination of sanctions imposed in response to its nuclear programme and by its own inefficiencies. The paradox of Iran's vast oil reserves is that it has previously been able to pump its way out of trouble, allowing the regime to take politically appealing but economically disastrous short-term solutions such as increasing subsidies on fuel and food. If not for its petroleum revenue, Iran's economy would probably have collapsed years ago.
In that sense, sanctions have actually helped Iran by compelling the government to look at ways of improving its economic efficiency. But the balance of power remains split three ways between the elected government, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, better known as the Revolutionary Guard. These three forces often pull in different directions, making reform of the economy almost an impossibility.
Yet the current round of talks might present the Iranian economy with the kind of opportunity for progress its leaders have failed to provide, which raises the prospect of yet more Iranian meddling in the affairs of its neighbours. We shall not be wishing the revolution happy birthday.
