The Vienna talks on Syria predictably didn’t yield any progress towards peace. Most groups involved in the fighting on the ground, whose cooperation would be required to end the conflict, weren’t included.
The logic of Vienna was that their international patrons, who supposedly have diplomatic legitimacy, can speak to and for the Syrian forces, at least enough to secure the international context for ending the carnage.
The strategic and diplomatic landscape regarding Syria can be conceptualised as three concentric circles – like shock waves emanating from the epicentre of an earthquake. The circle farthest from the Syrian epicentre involves the great powers, particularly Russia and the US, and some European countries. Closer in are regional players such as Iran, Hizbollah and Shiite Iraqi militias on the side of the regime, and Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar on the side of the rebels. At the centre are the Syrian groups fighting it out on the ground.
ISIL, Kurdish groups and some relatively small militias are all wild cards that, at times, can affect strategic calculations, but are ultimately not part of the basic confrontation between the Syrian government and the mainstream rebel groups.
The farther the players are from the domestic political realities of Syria, the more interested in peace, and flexible on terms, they tend to be. Yet there is a significant asymmetry. Moscow’s commitment to a negotiated arrangement is far weaker than Washington’s. Vladimir Putin correctly calculated that he could get away with a military intervention and thereby strengthen both the regime and Russia’s position.
Washington’s primary response to the Russian intervention was a decision not to cut off all relations with mainstream Syrian rebels, as some administration officials were proposing. Limited American involvement will continue. Russia, by contrast, now has about 4,000 military personnel in Syria.
Even though Russia has undertaken a major military commitment to preserving key aspects of the Syrian status quo, Moscow isn’t particularly committed to Bashar Al Assad.
If Russia could secure its fundamental interests – at a minimum securing the invaluable warm water port at Tartus, and at a maximum solidifying a regional alliance with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Hizbollah and others – without Mr Al Assad’s assistance, the Kremlin, which seems to dislike him both personally and politically, would probably jump at the chance.
Despite Russia’s own ambivalence, its policies are a model of clarity and commitment compared with the American position. Washington says Mr Al Assad must go because he has "lost all legitimacy", though not today but at some unspecified date to be determined by negotiations. The Obama administration frets about the sudden collapse of social and governance institutions, based on the American experience in Iraq.
However, Russia’s main regional partners – Iran and Hizbollah – are committed to Mr Al Assad personally and politically. It’s hard to imagine either of them voluntarily abandoning him. This divergence of interests has been the subject of continuing efforts to undermine the relative unity of the pro-Assad camp, so far without much success.
On the contrary, Washington’s decision to include Iran in the Vienna talks, without Tehran adjusting its policies one jot, represents a major American reversal. Previously, Iran faced clear conditions for being included, especially endorsing the 2012 Geneva communiqué. The US says this calls for Mr Al Assad to step down, while Russia says it does not. But Iran will not endorse it. Washington also appears increasingly amenable to the idea that Mr Al Assad could stay in power during a negotiated "transitional period".
The global powers are ready for a deal. While Russia might be ready to compromise on some issues, the US appears willing to compromise on about almost everything.
Their regional allies, however, are less interested. Iran was happy to join the talks, but remains committed to preserving the regime. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey remain committed to removing it. At the Vienna talks, Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif reportedly cited, without any apparent context, the 15 Saudi nationals involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks. Neither Tehran nor Riyadh appear interested in compromise at present.
Less interested still are the groups fighting on the ground. Neither the regime nor the rebels have an incentive to compromise on a political formula. The regime is bolstered by the Russian intervention, which was prompted by a string of dramatic rebel successes which in some cases seem to actually be continuing.
As it stands, both of the main sides in the conflict believe they can enhance their bargaining position through further fighting, despite being aware that they will ultimately have to settle for whatever they can get on the ground and at the negotiating table. Therefore, neither the global nor the regional patrons of these local forces can force them to make a deal at present.
It’s not hard to see the outlines of an agreed or de facto outcome in Syria based on the formal or informal division of the country into zones of influence, perhaps along Lebanese lines. But before such an endgame can emerge in practice, the main local parties will have to conclude that they have maximised what they can accomplish politically on the battlefield. Until then, the fighting in Syria will, alas, continue.
Hussein Ibish is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
On Twitter: @ibishblog
