Is Donald Trump taking a leaf out of Vladimir Putin’s playbook on Syria?

The downing by the US of a Syrian regime fighter jet was a new development in the long-running civil war. But, writes Sharif Nashashibi, contrary to speculation, it does not mark a new escalation in the conflict

A Russian jet fighter prepares to take off from an airbase in Syria. Russia has warned the US that it will consider coalition aircraft to be targets from now on –but stopped short of threatening to shoot them down. AP Photo / Russian Defense Ministry Press ServiceShow less

Although Monday saw the first downing by the United States of a Syrian regime warplane in the six-year conflict, it is the fourth incident in less than three months in which the US, or the coalition it leads, has targeted regime forces or those allied to them.

Earlier this month, the US shot down a regime drone after it fired at coalition forces near the Al-Tanf border crossing between Syria and Iraq. Last month, the coalition bombed pro-regime forces that were reportedly moving toward a coalition and rebel base in the same area. And in April, the US launched 59 cruise missiles at the regime’s Shayrat airbase after a chemical attack in a rebel-held town that was blamed on Damascus.

Before last year’s US presidential election, this more brazen approach – relative to Barack Obama, who was widely accused of impotence over Syria – would have been more widely expected of Donald Trump’s rival Hillary Clinton.

Indeed, in the last week of campaigning before November’s US election, amid Mr Trump’s repeatedly expressed wish to improve ties with Moscow, he accused Mrs Clinton of wanting “to start a shooting war in Syria in conflict with nuclear-armed Russia. Frankly, it could lead to World War III and she has no sense”.

He also said, before and just after the election, that America’s objective in Syria should be to help the regime fight ISIL, and that he was likely to end US support for rebels because “we have no idea who these people are”. And in September 2013, Mr Trump tweeted to Obama: “Do not attack Syria. There is no upside and tremendous downside.”

As such, upon Mr Trump’s election both sides in the conflict expected at least a hands-off approach, if not a convergence of interests – or even open partnership – between the US, the regime and Russia. This has not happened, but that does not mean, as supporters of Syrian president Bashar Al Assad claim or fear, that we are seeing the prelude to a direct US intervention against the regime.

Firstly, the Trump administration has flatly denied such an ambition. This could be quickly dismissed but for the fact that Mr Trump, who likes to talk big, has not shied away – as president and candidate – from sabre-rattling against governments worldwide, friend and foe alike.

There is no reason why the Assad regime would be exempt from that if Mr Trump set his sights on it. Its alliance with Russia, with which Trump wanted to make good? This has not stopped him expressing strong words against Moscow’s friends in Tehran and Beijing.

Furthermore, Washington’s denial of any campaign against the regime is supported by its military posture. Its increase in air strikes is still limited to ISIL-held areas, as it was under Mr Obama.

And the US has increased military support to groups fighting ISIL, not the regime. The primary beneficiary of this support is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose main Kurdish component is also backed by Moscow and is accused by rebel groups of colluding with the regime.

In addition, each of the four aforementioned incidents were reportedly preceded by warnings, suggesting that the aim was deterrence, not escalation. Indeed, the notice that preceded the bombing of Shayrat enabled Russian personnel to vacate the area, and a minimising of damage that allowed the base to resume bombing raids within hours of the US strike. This is hardly indicative of a desire to tangibly weaken Assad’s air force, let alone his regime.

These are isolated incidents with limited goals, but that does not mean they are unrelated. They serve as a warning to the regime and allied ground forces not to encroach on certain territories or engage certain US-backed forces. Though the regime and its allies still enjoy a wide playing field, the overall message is that the days of absolute military impunity are over, at least for now.

As the Pentagon said following Monday’s downing of the warplane, the coalition does “not seek to fight the Syrian regime, Russian or pro-regime forces partnered with them, but will not hesitate to defend coalition or partner forces from any threat”.

These incidents highlight how little room for manoeuvre Damascus and Moscow have in countering greater US assertiveness in Syria, short of direct combat with coalition forces, which is not a feasible option and, as such, not one being entertained. This is a mirror image of the constraints that Mr Obama faced over Russia’s direct intervention in the conflict.

The regime’s and Moscow’s limited options were displayed by their reactions to the downing of the warplane. The “dangerous repercussions” mentioned by the regime were in the context of “fighting terrorism”, not retaliating against the US or the coalition.

Moscow said it now considers coalition aircraft as potential targets, but stopped short of threatening to shoot them down. That nuance is important, because besides verbal condemnation and warnings, neither Russia nor the US would seriously entertain direct conflict.

As such, this is a hollow, face-saving warning from Moscow, one that seems to have fallen on deaf ears – the following day, a US jet downed another armed regime drone as it approached the base in Al-Tanf.

Russia has also suspended communications with Washington aimed at preventing collisions, accidents or dangerous incidents between their forces. But this is not the first time these communications have been cut, and it is in both parties’ interests to resume them.

The only feasible retaliatory option for Russia is to target Syrian rebel groups, but it has been doing this anyway since its direct intervention in September 2015. Besides, the ground force most closely allied to the US-led coalition – the SDF – is also backed by Moscow. As such, there is little, if anything, it can do to dissuade Washington from its present course.

There are four potential reasons for Mr Trump adopting a more hawkish Syria policy than his campaign statements suggested, and they largely go beyond the conflict itself. Firstly, it may deflect attention away from the many domestic crises and problems facing his presidency. In particular, being seen to stand up to one of Russia’s key regional allies may serve to counter allegations and investigations into his administration’s ties to Moscow.

Secondly, Syria may be the desired arena to check Iran’s expanding regional footprint, in the absence of any appetite or plan for direct conflict with Tehran, and in light of Mr Trump’s decision not to make good on his campaign promise to scrap the nuclear deal.

Thirdly, Mr Trump’s assertiveness over Syria plays well with US public opinion (perhaps taking a leaf out of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s book). Public opinion has shifted since Obama’s presidency, with polls over the last several months showing majority support for air strikes in Syria, including against the regime. This level of involvement has the upside of domestic support without the many military and political risks of a large ground force.

Lastly, one can never discount Mr Trump’s mercurial and impulsive nature, and his seemingly whimsical approach to policymaking. Given his domestic and foreign policy U-turns so early on in his presidency, not to mention the constantly shifting tides and alliances in Syria, one cannot assume that his current approach will be either tactical or consistent.

Sharif Nashashibi is a journalist and political analyst