In the weeks leading up to the election, it was almost impossible to find a government supporter in Yangon, the commercial capital of Myanmar. The popularity of the opposition National League for Democracy and the appeal of its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, was simply overwhelming.
And yet the scale of the NLD’s victory has taken many observers by surprise. In the space of a week, the conversation has shifted from a gloomy prognosis of partial democracy under the thumb of the military to genuine optimism about the country’s potential reforms.
Prior to the vote, there had been a common refrain in the international media that these elections might not matter so much. The 2008 constitution reserves 25 per cent of the Hluttaw (parliament) seats for unelected military officers. Meanwhile, Ms Suu Kyi is barred from the presidency and the military still holds exclusive power in three key ministries: home, defence and border affairs.
But the view that these elections might not be significant was myopic. As academic and activist Min Zin wrote in Foreign Policy this month, just the opportunity of free political expression was extraordinary.
The generals appear to have been caught flat-footed by the scope of NLD’s victory and the near-total rejection of the ruling military-backed United Solidarity and Development Party.
And yet, unlike in the 1990 elections, which the NLD also won but whose results were overturned, it appears that the military will abide by the results. Both the president, Thein Sein, and Gen Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the armed forces, congratulated Ms Suu Kyi last week.
For all of the euphoria in Yangon since the poll, the negotiations between NLD leaders and the military in the coming months will determine the future political order. The military’s 25 per cent parliamentary bloc practically assures veto power over legislation, while its lock on the three ministries essentially precludes a civilian government from actually governing in many capacities.
While Ms Suu Kyi has been criticised for relative passivity regarding the systematic persecution of Rohingya Muslims in the country, several days before the election she did promise to protect minorities isolated in “ethnic ghettoes”, which was widely interpreted as addressing Rohingya’s plight. Yet fulfilling the promise falls directly within the purview of the home ministry, which she will not control.
The continuing peace process with armed ethnic groups similarly depends on the home, defence and border affairs ministries. Mr Thein has launched a national ceasefire agreement initiative, including only eight of nearly 20 armed groups, even as the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) launches fresh offensives in Kachin and Shan states.
Ms Suu Kyi’s polled well in many ethnic minority constituencies. Her status as a national redeemer clearly carries weight among the marginalised. There can be few illusions at this point, however, that a civilian government will be able to effectively set defence policy.
In the short term, an NLD-led government is expected to have an impact on the economy, and in particular in curbing corruption and cronyism. Yet meaningful economic reforms will, inevitably, run counter to the entrenched elites with deep ties to the military, which is estimated to control as much as 75 per cent of the national economy.
For all of the formal limitations placed on a civilian government, perhaps more important is that the military remains the de facto economic and coercive power in the country. The privileges enshrined in the 2008 constitution provided the generals enough surety to allow the process of reform to commence since 2011. Triumphant NLD supporters, however, may have expectations that exceed the military’s willingness to reform.
Ms Suu Kyi brought an enormous moral standing into this election, buttressed by the landslide results. In the negotiations that precede government formation slated for February, she has a stronger hand than many might have expected, yet the NLD’s latitude to implement reforms is still sharply bounded in a political system that is a partial democracy at best. The decisions made in the coming months by Gen Min Aung Hlaing and other senior military leaders will have just as much consequence as the historic election.
It is important to remember, however, that the road map of political reform was initiated from the top. There appears to be a genuine recognition within the armed forces that the old system was untenable, and that the country must open both its political system and economy, even at the expense of their monopoly on power.
The ultimate goal for democracy advocates is to amend the constitution, in part to allow Ms Suu Kyi to assume the presidency that she so clearly has earned. Perhaps even more substantively, a real transition to democracy requires breaking the military’s lock on parliament and key ministries.
The military’s reserve in parliament can, for now, block any such amendments. But the election has shown that while the old elite can still control the pace of reforms, they stand in the way of an overwhelming national momentum for change.
Jeremy Walden-Schertz is a former comment editor of The National and a recent graduate of the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego
