Syrian President Ahmad Al Shara’s foreign travel has become one of the most visible features of Syria’s post-Assad transition. To supporters, it signals Syria’s return from isolation. To critics, it risks giving the impression of a president more comfortable on red carpets abroad than in the hard terrain of national recovery. From a domestic lens, the question is whether his international engagement is being translated into a domestic strategy Syrians can see and trust. From an international lens, Syria must play a delicate balancing act in a fast-changing geopolitical order.
It is worth saying that in recent weeks, at home, Mr Al Shara has been anything but absent. In late May, he travelled to flood-stricken Deir Ezzor with several of his ministers to assess the damage from a surging Euphrates and review humanitarian needs, in a province his government had only recently brought back under central control. Earlier in the month, he removed his elder brother Maher from the powerful post of Secretary General of the Presidency, a move widely read as an effort to dispel the perception of nepotism that clung to the Assad years. These acts are calculated to convince ordinary Syrians that the emerging state will answer to them.
But Syria’s domestic situation cannot be separated from its external environment. In this respect, Syria resembles Lebanon. Domestic recovery is shaped not only by local compromises but also by regional balances, sanctions regimes, foreign investment, border security and the policies of neighbouring states. No Syrian leader can rebuild Aleppo, stabilise the north-east, reassure minorities, integrate armed groups, secure borders, attract foreign investment and restore basic services through domestic decisions alone. The country’s reconstruction bill is vast, its institutions are depleted, and its sovereignty remains affected by foreign actors. Mr Al Shara’s diplomacy is therefore not a distraction from domestic priorities; it is one instrument needed to achieve them.
The clearest example is the legal and financial architecture around Syria. The US has removed much of its Syria sanctions programme, but the country remains burdened by counter-terrorism designations and compliance risks that deter banks, investors and aid actors. Syria’s listing as a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the US affects credit, investment, export controls and the willingness of companies to enter the market. Mr Al Shara’s engagement with Washington and Western capitals is necessary because domestic economic recovery depends on unblocking these constraints.
The same applies to Gulf investment. There has been a flurry of activity in Syria in this regard, such as the recent establishment of the Higher Council of Business Councils. Syria cannot reconstruct through aid alone. Mr Al Shara has rightly framed reconstruction as an investment opportunity rather than a charity file. Gulf capital can help rehabilitate airports, energy systems, telecommunications, housing and transport infrastructure. But money will not flow at scale if Syria looks unstable or internationally toxic. Investors want security, enforceable contracts and reassurance that the country will not slide back into conflict. External investment requires internal stability, while internal stability requires economic dividends.
Recent engagement with Europe shows the same dynamic. The EU’s move to restore the full application of the EU-Syria Cooperation Agreement reconnects Syria to trade mechanisms, economic co-operation and a broader framework for reintegration after years of suspension following Assad-era repression. The EU has also linked engagement to an inclusive Syrian-led transition, human rights and recovery.
The UK example is similarly important. Mr Al Shara’s meeting with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Downing Street in March 2026 covered counter-terrorism, migration, border security, people smuggling, infrastructure and opportunities for British businesses. These are domestic Syrian issues as much as bilateral ones.
Then there are the larger issues of the Iran war and Israel. Mr Al Shara’s anticipated second visit to Washington underlines the importance of Syrian alignment with US priorities for Syria’s diplomatic positioning, without which Syria will not be able to put its past international isolation behind it. The US is also crucial since it is the only country able to give Syria security guarantees as it navigates its future relationship with Israel.
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An inundated area in Syria's Deir Ezzor province following flooding after the Euphrates' water levels rose. Sana / AFP -
As a measure to curb the flooding, water is released from the Euphrates Dam in Tabqa, Raqqa province. Sana / AFP -
Floodwater swept away parts of the earth bridge at Al Siyasiya crossing in Deir Ezzor, forcing residents to rely on river ferries to cross the Euphrates. Sana -
People in Deir Ezzor are packed on to a ferry to reach the other side of the city. Sana -
The river's water levels are expected to subside in the coming days but the situation remains delicate. Sana -
People living in affected areas have called for emergency aid and help in relocating to higher ground. Sana -
Surging floodwater in Deir Ezzor, Syria. Sana
Here Mr Al Shara faces a domestic challenge. Syria’s fractures are deep: between centre and periphery, Arabs and Kurds, Sunni communities and minorities, former regime areas and former opposition areas. International legitimacy can open doors, but it cannot substitute for a domestic compact. If external engagement becomes detached from local inclusion, it may feed suspicions that Mr Al Shara is securing foreign endorsement while postponing hard conversations at home.
But diplomacy is directly linked to a visible domestic roadmap. Gulf investment is tied to transparent reconstruction priorities. European engagement is linked to local governance, inclusion and justice mechanisms. UK co-operation on migration is framed around voluntary, safe and dignified returns, not only border control. And the relationship with the US is directly linked to Syria’s role in regional geopolitics. After all, the fall of the Assad regime was the key inflection point in breaking Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance”. Syria’s domestic security is intimately connected to countering Iran’s attempts at destabilising Syria.
Mr Al Shara is negotiating two challenges. He needs to persuade foreign leaders that Syria has changed, and in this regard the president has, with US and Gulf support, made important forward strides that are opening up opportunities for Syria’s economy. Mr Al Shara also needs to persuade Syrians that international engagement will produce a state that belongs to them. In Syria, as in Lebanon, the domestic and the international are inseparable. The task is not to choose between them, but to make diplomacy serve domestic recovery rather than replace it.
