Early last week, Hezbollah’s secretary general, Naim Qassem, made a staggering statement in a speech during a commemoration for assassinated party officials. He called on the Lebanese government to withdraw its decision to secure a monopoly over weapons, saying this only served Israel’s interests.
Last July, the government decreed that the Lebanese state would implement such a monopoly throughout the country, and asked the army to prepare a plan for this end. Hezbollah argues the ceasefire deal with Israel of November 2024 only imposed disarmament south of the Litani River, an interpretation with which virtually no one agrees.
Lebanon’s government is currently in phase two of its disarmament plan, which aims to collect weapons between the Litani and Awali rivers, in other words the area south of Sidon. Hezbollah has said it has no intention of co-operating in this process, arguing that Israel still occupies Lebanese territory and that “all occupations require resistance, and that the responsibility to resist is that of the state, the army and the people”.
What was interesting in the latter remark was that before Hezbollah’s defeat by Israel in 2024, the group had imposed a different formulation on Lebanese governments, that of “the army, the people and the resistance”. In that way, it had legitimised the existence of a military force outside the state, which it justified under the rubric of “resistance”.
Now, however, Mr Qassem seemed to accept that the previous formulation was no longer valid, since the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam didn’t adopt it in its cabinet statement. While this may have signalled more subtle messaging from Hezbollah, it didn’t alter the fact that the group continues to search for ways to protect its weapons, and has now asked the state to revoke a key dimension of its sovereignty.
The hardening in Hezbollah’s position can be tied to several factors. First, since the military debacle in September-November 2024, particularly the loss of much of its military leadership, its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, and his two probable successors, Hezbollah is much more directly controlled by Iran.
In light of this, Mr Qassem’s position is certainly an Iranian response to the growing military escalation by the administration of US President Donald Trump and Israel against Iran. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps want to show they have no intention of discussing Hezbollah’s disarmament, one demand of both the Americans and Israelis, who also want Iran to dismantle its ballistic missile programme.
However, Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm is creating a situation that is potentially very dangerous both for the group and Lebanon’s Shiite community. Hezbollah is isolated at home, with most political forces wanting to see the army alone control weapons. The past decade under Hezbollah’s hegemony has been catastrophic for Lebanon, and many Lebanese are fed up with the group’s continued stubbornness.
This situation is generating a very negative domestic mood, a sense of frustration that one party, and supposedly the community backing it, is holding up all progress in Lebanon that could lead to an exit from the country’s successive crises. This may be simplistic, but by and large reflects a perceptible disgust with Hezbollah’s refusal to accept a new reality.
The Lebanese government, and the state in general, is caught in a quandary. No official wants to engage in a military campaign against Hezbollah to disarm it by force. This reluctance is justified. A military solution would almost certainly bog down, create major destruction and very probably lead to an inconclusive outcome, while alienating the Shiite community and creating lethal rifts within society.
It’s unfortunate then, that for a number of Lebanese, speaking informally, the solution to this standoff may be a new conflict with Israel. In the same way that the all-out war in 2024 forced Hezbollah onto its back legs, making the group more flexible in accepting a president and prime minister it had opposed, the perception is that new military setbacks are necessary for Hezbollah to again accept compromises.
If the US and Israel embark on another war with Iran in the coming days, it seems highly probable the Israelis will try to exploit the opening to escalate their attacks in Lebanon. That’s unless the Trump administration prevents this from happening. However, the negative Israeli response to the first phase of the Lebanese disarmament plan strongly suggests Israel would exploit an opening to hit Hezbollah hard.
There have also been efforts by Israel’s supporters in Washington to sanction prominent Hezbollah allies, such as Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri. The only problem is that Mr Berri is the only Shiite interlocutor the Americans have who can negotiate Hezbollah. There is strong suspicion that by targeting him, Israel and its friends may want to avoid negotiations and facilitate a military solution to Hezbollah’s arms.
Those Lebanese who believe Israel is their silver bullet to resolve the Hezbollah problem should be careful. If Israel were to score a major victory, it would probably seek to impose a solution that ultimately integrates Lebanon into its sphere of influence, creating major problems in Lebanon’s relationship with other countries in the region that are rivals of Israel.
The possibility that Israel might seek to impose a Pax Israelica on Lebanon should also be a warning to Hezbollah and Iran. Hezbollah’s refusal to make any concession on its weapons is making a military option more likely. It is unclear how Iran's fighting Israel to the last Lebanese Shiite will advance its interests.
