Middle powers grappling with US-China rivalry could follow Vietnam's example

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken treated to a performance at Binh Minh Jazz Club in Hanoi on April 15, 2023. AFP

“[We should pursue] long-term stability, future orientation, good-neighbourly friendship and comprehensive co-operation", declared Chinese leader Xi Jinping during his meeting with visiting Vietnamese dignitary Truong Thi Mai in Beijing in late April. China and Vietnam, Mr Xi added, should remain "good neighbours, good friends, good comrades and good partners” in a new brave world.

Truong Thi Mai was no ordinary guest. She is Vietnam’s first woman to become a permanent member of the all-powerful Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in almost half a century. What’s even more poignant, however, was the timing of her visit to Beijing.

It came barely a week after the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Hanoi to mark the 10th anniversary of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries as part of broader efforts to seal a de facto alliance with Vietnam. Back in 2021, Vietnam also made a similar manoeuvre, when Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh held a high-profile meeting with a special Chinese envoy, Xiong Bo, barely a day before hosting the US Vice President Kamala Harris in Hanoi. The message was unmistakable.

Time and again, the Southeast Asian nation has signalled its unwillingness to side with either of the two superpowers in the Indo-Pacific. To enhance its room for manoeuvre, Vietnam has actively pursued strategic co-operation with “middle powers” from Japan and South Korea to India, Russia and Europe in recent years. The upshot is the emergence of Vietnam as a global economic dynamo and a full-fledged regional power in Southeast Asia. Vietnam’s successful “multi-alignment” strategy holds valuable lessons for nations around the world, including in the Middle East, where regional powers are deftly navigating relations with multiple superpowers.

Chinese communism has deep roots in Vietnam, despite the two countries' complicated relations. AFP

The Southeast Asian nation has signalled its unwillingness to side with either of the two superpowers in the Indo-Pacific

The emergence of contemporary Vietnam, built on the ruins of multiple ancient kingdoms, has few parallels anywhere in the world. From its millennia-old struggle with imperial China, to its defeat of Mongol forces in the Middle Ages, a relentless struggle for autonomy has defined Vietnam’s strategic history. If anything, the 20th century proved even more traumatic, as the Southeast Asian nation had to fend off not one, but multiple empires, beginning with colonial France and, shortly after, the Americans.

Just as important to understanding Vietnam’s national psyche, however, is its rollercoaster relations with neighbouring China. Chinese revolutionary communist leader Mao Zedong not only dispatched his finest generals, but also personally oversaw China’s assistance to Vietnamese communist forces’ successful campaigns against colonial France. By 1951, the Vietnamese communists adopted Maoism as a pillar of “the basic theory” of their party.

It didn’t take long, however, before bilateral relations soured, especially as Beijing began to explore a detente with the West in order to confront the Soviet Union, a key patron of Vietnam at the time. The upshot was the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, as both Hanoi and Beijing backed competing forces in the broader Indo-China conflict in the twilight decades of the 20th century.

Just as relevant is also Hanoi’s fear of abandonment, which reached its apogee in the late-1970s and throughout the 1980s, when an increasingly enfeebled Soviet Union, then fully embroiled in the Afghan War, struggled to aid its Vietnamese allies. Embittered by such traumatic history, post-Cold War Vietnam embraced a self-consciously “non-aligned” foreign policy posture.

Under the so-called “Four No’s” doctrine, Hanoi shunned, first, siding with any superpower against the other; second, hosting any foreign troops; third, negotiating a mutual defence pact with any foreign power; and fourth, deploying force to achieve foreign policy goals. Meanwhile, Vietnam adopted post-war reforms to rebuild the country through expanded trade and investment with the world.

Over the past two decades, Vietnam has carefully sought to leverage relations with multiple powers to maintain its autonomy. Two of its modern challenges include growing trade dependence on China and festering maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

In response, Vietnam reached out to its former nemesis, the US. First came Hanoi’s decision to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) in late 2000s to diversify its trading partnerships. Then came the signing of a comprehensive strategic co-operation agreement with the Obama administration, followed by the Trump administration’s designation of Vietnam as a “co-operative maritime partner” in the Indo-Pacific.

Economically, Vietnam’s gambit paid off big time. Bilateral trade ballooned to $139 billion last year, making America the largest export destination for Vietnamese manufacturers. In 2022, Vietnam surpassed even the United Kingdom to become one of the US’s top seven trading partners in merchandise. Bilateral defence ties, however, have been hobbled by ideological differences, most notably disagreements with the Biden administration and the US Congress over human rights and democracy issues. The two sides are yet to secure a single major defence deal a decade after signing a comprehensive partnership pact.

Crucially, Vietnam’s communist leadership has also refused to overtly align with the US. If anything, Vietnam’s party chief, Nguyen Phu Trong, was the first foreign leader to visit Mr Xi following the latter’s successful bid for a third term in office. The high-profile visit culminated in 13 major agreements, which aim to enhance bilateral trade and more effectively manage maritime disputes.

Moreover, Vietnam has also refused to side with the West against Russia. By adopting a consciously neutral position on the conflict in Ukraine, it has sought to maintain robust defence ties with Moscow, though western sanctions have complicated this.

Thanks to its “multi-alignment” strategy, Vietnam also enjoys deep strategic and economic ties with a whole host of middle powers, including India (a potential source anti-ship cruise missiles as well as warships), Japan (a major source of maritime security aid), as well as the EU (which has a defence partnership pact with the Hanoi).

The lesson for mid-sized nations and regional powers in other parts of the world, especially in the Middle East, is unmistakable. Vietnam has proven the wisdom of seeking and preserving fruitful ties with multiple superpowers simultaneously. By all indications, Middle Eastern powers seem to be following a similar path, as they deftly cultivate and balance relations with the US, China, India and Russia in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment. In many ways, multi-alignment seems to be the name of the game.