Israel continues to bombard Gaza and Lebanon. It is launching strikes in Syria. But between Tel Aviv and Tehran, there’s an eerie silence. The latest round of attacks between the two came from Israel late last month, hitting military sites linked to Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Four soldiers and a civilian were killed, Iran said. Analysts believe Tehran's ballistic missile capabilities, drone production and air defences were seriously damaged.
This came in response to Iran launching its attack on Israel on October 1. With its response, the fear that Israel would hit back at Iran’s nuclear or oil centres has been put to rest, at least for now.
Israel’s strikes nevertheless prompted criticism from Arab states, including the GCC. The UAE strongly condemned them and expressed deep concern over the repercussions for security and stability in the region. Saudi Arabia called them a “violation of sovereignty” and international law, urging all parties to exercise maximum restraint.
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, has recently been on tour across the Middle East. He said that he received guarantees from regional neighbours that neither their soil nor air spaces would be used to allow any attacks on Iran.
But Tehran has vowed to respond again. A continuous cycle of strikes poses a serious risk to the region and the world at large, potentially dragging the US and Arab states into a conflict that none of them wants.
On this episode of Beyond the Headlines, host Nada AlTaher speaks to The National’s military affairs reporter Robert Tollast about the effect of Israel’s strikes on Iran. She also talks with Dr Hasan Alhasan from the International Institute for Strategic Studies to investigate Iran’s relationship with its Arab neighbours amid regional escalations.
Below is the full transcript of this episode:
Nada AlTaher: There is now an eerie silence between Iran and Israel, parallel to Israel's intense bombardment of Lebanon and Gaza and strikes on Syria.
In late October, Israel struck Iran, hitting military targets linked to its ballistic missiles programme. Four soldiers and a civilian were killed, Iran said, as it downplayed the damage caused. But some estimates say Israel struck with a wave of 100 attack aircraft, which analysts believe seriously damaged Iran's ballistic and drone production and its air defences. The fear that Israel would hit Iran's nuclear or oil facilities, however, was put to rest for the time being.
All this happened weeks after Iran's attacks on Israel in early October. Israeli authorities told the media and the public not to share the locations or details of any sites that were struck, keeping observers and analysts guessing as to how big the attack really was.
But satellite imagery later revealed some damage to Israel's most important airbase, Nevatim. Still, the damage appears to have been limited - two buildings hit out of more than 30 impact points.
Israel's attack prompted criticism from Arab states and the GCC. The UAE strongly condemned the strike and expressed deep concern over its repercussions on security and stability in the region. Saudi Arabia called it a “violation of sovereignty” and international law, urging all parties to exercise restraint, with the kingdom also calling on the international community to take action to push for de-escalation.
This, after Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had been on a tour of the Middle East, making stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Oman, Jordan and Egypt. He later said he received guarantees from regional neighbours that neither their soil nor their airspaces would be usedin any attacks on Iran.
He also said Iran did not want the war to escalate and wants to establish a ceasefire.
But since Israel's strike, Tehran has vowed to respond again, despite the US, the UK and others calling for an end to this tit-for-tat exchange of fire that may seem like it is contained, but actually has far-reaching ripple effects.
A continuous cycle of strikes poses a serious risk to the region and the world at large, potentially dragging the US and Arab states into a conflict that none of them want. This is Beyond the Headlines and I'm your host, Nada AlTaher. This week we assess the regional impact of Israel's first direct strike on Iran and anticipate what comes next. We also look at Iran's relationship with its Arab neighbours in the midst of this regional escalation.
There was a lot of guesswork ahead of Israel's attacks. When would it strike? What would it hit? How big would the attack be? And the big question, will the US be able to restrain it? To understand the military impact of the strike on Iran and the implications it could have for the US - Israel's strongest ally - I speak to The National's military affairs reporter, Robert Tollast.
Bob, Iran insists that the US was indirectly involved in the Israeli strike, but the US has indicated it was not. This comes despite weeks of the US advising Israel on the retaliation, exactly what to strike and where to strike. What do we know about the role of the US in this attack?
RT: The background support is obviously decades old. In terms of this specific operation, though, a lot of the capabilities that it looks like Israel uses, such as the Rocks missile, are indigenous capabilities essentially. Some electronic warfare equipment is used that Israel also developed.
The main thing would be intelligence support from the US. Israel only has two satellites that can provide high-resolution imagery, or very high resolution. The US probably has at least 24 - it might even have more we don't know about.
It also has something called Project Maven, which is AI analysis of satellite imagery. That would be very, very useful because it automatically detects any potential movement in Iranian air defence systems.
The really surprising thing is aerial refuelling tankers were not resupplied, because some of the existing tankers Israel has are 40-year-old Boeing 707s. There would be safety and maintenance issues with those, but it's clear Israel just decided to take the chance.
I think the raid on Hodeidah, in Yemen, is a good example. That was a 4,000km round trip, so it's a similar distance to the Iran strike and that really shows that Israel had thought about such a long-range operation. So I don't think the US were very directly involved in this particular attack.
NA: What can you tell us about the targets that were hit? Was this more of a performative stunt by Israel to show it was retaliating? Or was its actual intention to cause damage and escalation?
RT: I don't think it was performative, really. One of the aspects of this entire conflict is that a lot of observers think it's Israel against the Houthis, against Iran, against Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.
Israel, from pretty early on, has seen itself as going up against a unified front. I think that's been really clear since April, when Israel killed two Iranian generals in Damascus in a strike on the Iranian embassy compound. Israel was very, very keen to show it would go after any target, anywhere. That's why I think we've seen such massive escalation throughout the year.
But to Israel, I don't think it's escalation. I think this is essentially its plan from the beginning.
In terms of the Iranian ballistic missile attack, or the last one against Israel, again I don't think that was performative, because Iran went for Nevatim, one of the most important Israeli airbases, where they have F-35s.
That was clearly an attempt to damage Israeli capability. I think that's one of the worrying things, that this isn't performative any more. It's basically a regional war.
NA: The US has said this strike was an exercise in Israeli self-defence, but it also said this should be it for the tit-for-tat strikes between Israel and Iran. We also know the US has no interest in escalating a war that it could be directly and militarily dragged into. But if Iran strikes back, which it says it will, what will the US do? And will it protect Israel at all costs, even while running the risk of becoming directly involved?
RT: In terms of Iran intentionally or accidentally killing Americans, and then US President Joe Biden feeling pressure to do something and strike Iran, I think that's a very low risk at the moment.
But the important thing you mentioned there is “at all costs”. Because if Israel continues to refuse to listen to America in terms of the massive destruction in Gaza, the strangulation of aid, particularly in northern Gaza now, the extent of the damage in Lebanon and so on, I think it starts to look quite embarrassing for Washington to keep on laying out red lines.
And the missile defence, which is really what Israel needs from the US right now, which costs billions of dollars, at some point that's politically quite awkward. Because there has to be a line for the US somewhere. Literally, these big Iranian attacks cost about $1billion dollars a time to shoot down.
NA: Is there a concern by Israel’s western allies and the US’s Arab allies that Israel does not have a clear strategy in expanding wars that seem to have no tangible objective? What do you make of what's going on in terms of Israel's military objectives and how could you win a war with objectives that keep changing?
RT: I think there's two ways to look at the Israeli strategy. The first is that it essentially believes that it does have a strategy. It believes it can ultimately nearly destroy Hamas. It believes it can nearly destroy Hezbollah. And it probably believes it can essentially win against Iran.
All of those things are more or less correct. In the short term, all of those things are possible for Israel. In the long term, is it a viable or sustainable strategy for Israel? I think a lot of Israeli actions since the founding of the country have involved aggressive retaliation.
When you look at the history, I think that really answers the question about the strategy - essentially Israel hasn't become safer. So I think for the short term, it can perhaps see something that looks like a victory. In the long term, it's not a sustainable thing.
NA: Do you think both sides feel like they have no choice but to strike back?
RT: There's an argument to be made that both sides are trapped, or feel trapped, in this cycle of retaliation. Iran playing it down could be a way of finding an exit from this, saying, ‘We successfully defended ourselves, therefore, we're strong.’
There is still talk that Iran might retaliate somehow. And I think that ultimately, as news reports spread around the world that its air defences didn't perform very well, then yes, absolutely, I think Iran might feel stronger pressure to retaliate.
And then there is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu - essentially we're talking about very macho leaders on both sides - will also feel the need to retaliate. And Iran could still do some significant damage to Israel. They've still got a large arsenal of ballistic missiles.
NA: There are legitimate fears that further escalation between Israel and Iran carries a serious risk of spilling over. Gulf states have repeatedly called for diplomacy over military strategy, in an effort to avoid both short and long-term consequences.
Dr Hasan Alhasan is a senior fellow for Middle East policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He joins me to share his insights about the Gulf's position on Iran amid its rising tensions with Israel.
Hasan, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi toured the Middle East before Israel's strike, after Iran said Gulf countries should not let their airspace be used in an Israeli attack. Was an actual agreement reached? And did we see any manifestation of that agreement during the Israeli retaliation?
HA: I'm not sure we could call it an agreement, but I think there was an understanding, at the very least, that the Gulf states would stay neutral. That was the clear message that GCC Secretary General Jasem Albudaiwi conveyed, following the meeting between the Iranian President [Masoud Pezeshkian] and the Iranian Foreign Minister and the foreign ministers of the GCC states in Doha.
For Iran, it's important to ensure the neutrality of the Gulf states, because what that means is that operationally it restricts the US’s margin of manoeuvre, as the US has about 30,000 to 35,000 troops in the region.
And so for Iran to be able to make it more difficult for the US to operate out of those bases, out of these territories, is an understandable Iranian objective, even from a military perspective. From a diplomatic and political perspective, it also makes sense because it allows Iran to say that it is not isolated in its own region and that it has good relations with its neighbours. And so that goes counter to the US narrative.
NA: If a country says the Israeli response should not use its airspace, what is it effectively restricting? Because you mentioned the US bases. How does all of that factor in?
HA: The understanding here is that the Gulf states would not allow Israeli fighter planes to fly over their territories on the way to striking targets in Iran. The Gulf states have generally had a principled position of not allowing any parties to the conflict to use their airspaces.
The reason why the US comes into this equation is because there is a risk the Iranian-Israeli confrontation could escalate and could end up involving the US. If that happens, then the US would want to use its military assets in the Gulf, and its military assets elsewhere in Jordan and the Mediterranean and Diego Garcia, to launch attacks against Iran.
So the discussion around restricting the use of airspaces to the US is really thinking ahead about what happens if this escalates and the US gets involved.
NA: We spoke about Iran wanting to demonstrate it has close ties with the Arab states. We know that obviously everyone is concerned about an uncontained war coming to their backyards in the region. We heard strongly worded language from the Gulf countries, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, condemning the Israeli strike on Iran. What can we make of this stance by Arab states?
HA: These condemnations from all six GCC states are really significant. The reason why, I think, is that all of the six states are on board. So keep in mind, for example, that even Bahrain, which doesn't have a formal diplomatic relationship with Iran and that has traditionally been the most hawkish Gulf state on Iran, also condemned these attacks.
This reflects a common concern in the region of Israeli recklessness and how Israeli risk-taking could end up importing the war into the region, into their own neighbourhoods. I think that's the last thing that the Gulf States want to see. I think the broad regional consensus is on a position of neutrality.
It reflects a view in the Gulf that Iran is actually very difficult to deter, that even Israel and the US aren't able to fully deter Iran.
The other point is that the Gulf states realise they're more vulnerable to Iranian retaliation than Israel is. And so Israel has extremely sophisticated air and missile defence capabilities. It's geographically farther from Iran. It has exceptional western support. And so, in a sense, seeking neutrality and trying to de-escalate tensions with Iran is a big priority for them.
And I think the other point is that Gulf states see the West and the US as being a fickle partner. All you need to do is to look at the state of the debate in the West at the moment over support for Ukraine. If the West proves fickle on Ukraine, then you can imagine what lessons are being drawn in the Gulf vis-a-vis the reliability of the US. And they see the fact Iran is isolated and needs this relationship as well.
NA: There are historically long and credible US-allied Arab states. They have been calling for a ceasefire long before the US did and have condemned Israel's military strategy in Gaza, Lebanon, and now Iran - Yemen and Syria, of course, on the side - despite the obvious advantages to them of weakened Iranian proxies in the region.
Are we simply seeing diverging policies between the US and its Arab allies, or could there actually be a damage or an impact to that relationship?
HA: To my mind, an ally is a country with which there is a binding defence commitment, and the US doesn't have binding defence commitments with any Arab states. So I would say there are US-aligned or US-partnered states in the region.
Beyond that, I think we've been seeing divergence in US and regional priorities, geostrategic priorities, for quite some time. If you think back to the Arab uprisings, the way the US reacted, I think that was already divergent with the preference of its partners in the region.
If you think back to the Iranian nuclear accord that was signed in 2015, there was already a very significant gap in preferences. What we're seeing at the moment, again, is this gap materialising.
The Arab states obviously want to see Iran's partners in the region weakened. None of the Arab states are fans of Hezbollah or Hamas. But I think they are more concerned about the long-term effects that Israel's brazen, reckless war could generate for their immediate neighbourhood.
And so think about, not only Palestine and Lebanon, but the spillover effects for countries like Jordan and Egypt. And then, if the conflict with Iran escalates, what that could also mean for the Gulf.
Beyond the immediate war, we are poised to see divergences on a different front, which is a geo-economic front. We've seen the US policy in global oil markets, US technological protectionism on AI, on semiconductors, how the US has been pressing countries to implement western sanctions on Russia and so on. That has also contributed to this divergence and to this gap between the US and many of its partners in the Middle East.
NA: Iran is often called an expansionist regime with proxies all over the region. But Israel has now started fronts in Gaza, in the occupied West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria. Are there fears that Israel may become a bigger threat in the region than Iran or its proxies ever could?
HA: It's possible. Israel could be perceived as being a bigger threat, partly because it's very aggressive and is also expansionist in many ways. So it's obviously very expansionist when it comes to Palestinian territories. We've seen the pace of annexation in the West Bank and the building of illegal settlements.
There is a question of what Israel might end up doing to southern Lebanon and what southern Lebanon is going to look like after this war. There's a question as to the future of Gaza and whether Israel, under an extreme right-wing government, will try to annex Gaza.
It's quite clear that Israel is bringing about a permanent demographic, topographical change to its strategic environment. I think this is perceived as being very dangerous in the Gulf.
One of the main differences is that Israel has nuclear weapons already. I think that contributes to the threat perception. The trajectory of Israel's domestic politics is also extremely concerning, given how powerful the extreme right-wing government has been. It's not the kind of government that countries in the region can work with comfortably.
The fact Israel is rejecting outright the prospect of a Palestinian state puts everyone in the region, the Gulf states included, in a difficult position. Because the cornerstone of regional diplomacy on this issue is the two-state solution.
I don't want to draw comparisons with Iran, because it depends on how Iran's behaviour evolves as well. But I think the chances that Israel is perceived in a very negative light are real.
NA: That's it for Beyond the Headlines this week. Visit TheNationalNews.com for the latest developments on this story as they happen. This episode was produced by Ban Barkawi and audio engineered by Arthur Eddyson. Yasmeen Altaji is our assistant producer and Doaa Farid is our editor. And I'm your host Nada AlTaher.
