The UAE’s decision to withdraw its remaining counter-terrorism teams from Yemen does not erase its footprint; it underscores an enduring legacy in the country.
Amid the swirl of accusations, it is worth pausing to ask a basic question: what role did the UAE actually play in Yemen, and what did it achieve?
Since the Saudi-led coalition began in 2015, the UAE focused on two main goals in Yemen: stopping the Iran-backed Houthis from advancing and breaking up extremist groups that grew during the country’s collapse. These priorities, more than political alliances, shaped its military actions.
When the war began, Emirati forces joined Saudi Arabia to stop the Houthis from reaching Aden and Yemen’s southern coast. This move was crucial. Taking back the city, which became the temporary capital in mid-2015, stopped the Houthis’ progress and kept them from controlling the south.
Later, operations along the Red Sea coast, such as capturing Mokha, limited Houthi supply lines and made international shipping safer. This was important not just for Gulf countries, but also for western partners who rely on safe sea trade. The campaign against the Houthis reached the edge of Hodeidah and almost took the port city before being stopped by pressure from these same countries.
However, the UAE’s most lasting impact was in counterterrorism, not in direct fighting on the front lines.
As Yemen broke apart, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula quickly took advantage. In 2015, AQAP took control of Mukalla, Yemen’s third-largest port, and used it to make tens of millions of dollars. The group, seen by Washington as one of Al Qaeda’s strongest branches, grew faster than ever before.
The UAE responded by sending special forces and, importantly, by creating local partner units that could keep control of territory. In April 2016, Yemeni forces backed by the UAE, with help from US intelligence, surveillance, and air refuelling, drove AQAP out of Mukalla in a coordinated operation. This took away the group’s most valuable base.
At the time, retired General Anthony Zinni, who once led US Central Command, called the UAE “a top military” in the region and said it was “exponentially more capable than its size might indicate”. He also noted the UAE’s willingness to fight with the US even when it suffered losses.
Mukalla was a turning point. AQAP lost both territory and its ability to act like a small state. Later campaigns in Abyan and Shabwa weakened the group even more, as local forces trained by the UAE, including the Security Belt, carried out raids and held ground while US strikes targeted top militants. US air operations in Yemen dropped sharply after 2017, which analysts say was due to the success of these local counter-terror units.
By 2018, AQAP was at its weakest in years. Its communications were disrupted, recruitment was down, and senior leaders were often on the run.
ISIS also tried to gain ground in Yemen but was pushed back by arrests and raids in Aden and other southern cities. These actions stopped the group from growing after it declared a so-called "Islamic State" in Iraq and carried out attacks in Europe and elsewhere. If ISIS had managed to take advantage of Yemen’s chaos, the results could have been much worse.
The thinking behind this strategy was simple and practical. Yemen’s divided national institutions could not stop extremists from coming back on their own. So, the UAE focused on building local security forces in each province, using local knowledge and quick action. US officials privately said this approach reduced the need for large-scale American involvement.
The UAE’s involvement in Yemen also came with a human cost. Emirati soldiers died during the early and most intense parts of the war, especially between 2015 and 2018, as they fought on the front lines.
Besides its military role, the UAE has been one of Yemen’s biggest humanitarian donors since 2015. Emirati aid has provided food, medical supplies, hospital repairs, power projects, water systems and help for displaced people in southern and eastern Yemen.
These actions shape the UAE’s legacy in Yemen. Some critics could claim that supporting local forces outside a single national command weakened the state and led to later political splits among anti-Houthi groups. But without the UAE’s early intervention, southern Yemen might have become a lasting safe haven for AQAP and ISIS, with effects reaching far beyond Yemen.
What is clear is that the UAE’s two main goals—stopping the Houthis’ advance in the south and weakening extremist groups – shaped its military role in Yemen. As the conflict moves into a new and uncertain stage, these counter-terrorism results are one of the few things US, Gulf, and regional experts agree on: AQAP is weaker than it was ten years ago, and the security gap it used to exploit is smaller.
In Yemen today, remembering what happened is important. So are the facts.
