Iran's total blockade of the Strait of Hormuz announced late on Wednesday, throws into jeopardy a quiet and orchestrated exodus known only by a few shipping insiders.
Two corridors have been used for weeks to cross the strait, replacing the internationally recognised traffic system established in 1968 and subject to the disruption caused by blockade enforcers.
The first, along the Iranian coast, follows that official route but a new toll system imposed by Tehran is considered illegal by the UN. The threat of Iranian attack or seizure on that path remains high.
The second is a secretive US naval course that crosses the channel from its southern flank, near Oman, where ships face the triple threat of Iranian sea mines, missile attacks or interception from small boats. It was established last month as an emergency evacuation measure for the hundreds of stranded ships.
Who comes in and out of the channel is now difficult to track, according to a maritime diplomat whose country has flags on more than a dozen stranded ships in the Gulf. It is believed some ship owners and governments were still making quiet agreements with Tehran to pass through the strait. “Whether they have good relations or are paying the toll, we don’t know,” the diplomat told The National.
Tehran's so-called Straits Authority warned on Thursday that the channel was closed following US strikes against Iran overnight. It asked ships that had been planning to cross the Strait in agreement with Tehran to "remain patient," in an online announcement. "Applicants who have already obtained transit permits are kindly requested to remain patient and await further notice by the PGSA," the authority said.
But the UN’s International Maritime Organisation has warned against an acceptance of the new status quo.
“I am increasingly concerned by reports that vessels continue to attempt to transit the Strait of Hormuz without any credible security guarantees, despite well‑established risks and the fact that seafarers have already been killed, injured and others detained in recent incidents,” the IMO secretary general Arsenio Dominguez said earlier this week.
He warned that seafarers alone will pay the price of any Iranian attack. “The current situation remains highly volatile, with no reliable security assurances in place. Under such circumstances, safe passage cannot be considered to exist.
“No commercial or operational consideration can justify exposing seafarers to such levels of danger. The protection of their lives must remain the overriding priority at all times.”
Route 1: Deal with Tehran
Any exit strategy in co-ordination with Tehran is uncertain. Two large container ships that attempted to cross the strait in late April, days after an initial ceasefire was announced, were attacked and remain detained by Iranian authorities.
The Panama-flagged MSC Francesca and Liberia-flagged Epaminondas are being held at an undisclosed location in Iranian waters, with armed Iranian forces on board. The crew of the Francesca have no contact with the outside world other than a 20-minute supervised call each day to their families. Even less is known about Epaminondas.
The ship’s flag states are leading negotiations to release the crews, with talks also involving the IMO and governments whose citizens are trapped on board.
Why the Iranians seized the ships, and what they want in exchange for their release is unclear, diplomats with knowledge of the talks for the Francesca told The National.
Officially, Iran has accused the ships of turning off their tracking systems as they crossed the strait. It also accuses the Francesca of having links with Israel, without giving details.
The Iranians have suggested in meetings that they seek more support at the UN in the form of condemnation of US and Israeli air strikes on its territories and the seizure of its own ship, according to the same diplomats.
Panama’s delegate at the IMO has repeatedly condemned Iran’s attack and the detention of the crew, demanding “recognition of the right to freedom of the crew of the MSC Francesca”.
They added: “This right has been arbitrarily denied to them by the Islamic Republic of Iran and there has been no response provided as yet as to when those crew members will be released.
“Attacks carried out against vessels in that area represent a grave threat to the safety of international shipping and constitute a flagrant violation of the principles of the UN Convention on the law of the sea.”
Others pursue a quiet diplomacy that seeks to reach an agreement with Tehran, rather making the pressure public. India says this model worked for the release in June of 11 of its seafarers arrested in Iran last year.
“That’s OK if you're not one of the poor guys stuck on the boat long period of time,” said Steve Vickers, an expert in kidnap and ransom negotiations in piracy cases. “It's a subpar situation.”
Things could deteriorate at any time, with crew members falling ill. “Hopefully the situation doesn’t go on much longer but it could. Then we’re going to have problems with sick people and feeding people, and all kinds of parallel issues,” he added.
Hostage-taking at sea is a common risk of which shipping companies and crews are aware – but it is largely down to piracy rather than state forces.
The first steps in piracy or kidnap negotiations, Mr Vickers said, is to establish what the hostage-taker wants. He speculates that this will be one of the key challenges in these negotiations, as Tehran’s demands are unclear and are muddied by the absence of centralised command.
“In this particular case, it's somewhat fractured,” he said. “The objectives are unclear, other than making use of these poor people to increase leverage. There’s nothing worse than having hostage-takers who don't know what they want.”
Tehran’s promise to supply food and water to detained crew members is fragile and demands for compensation could emerge further down the line. “At some point, someone's going to be asking for money for that,” Mr Vickers said.
Route 2: US quiet convoys
US naval commanders are assessing three threats as they escorts ships through the strait, said Captain Chris O’Flaherty, a naval mines expert. “We're watching the Americans at the moment doing some very careful risk-balancing across those three key threats,” he said.
While the risk of mines requires a ship to advance more slowly, this is tempered by the need to cross the channel as quickly as possible to avoid alerting Iranian forces of the vessel’s presence. “Driving through a minefield, you tend to want to do it quite slowly for safety reasons. Driving through a missile threat area, I would want to do it very quickly,” CPT O’Flaherty said.
Little is known about the American naval convoys, which have been deliberately kept secret. A US official told The New York Times that around 70 ships had been escorted so far. Up to 3,000 ships typically crossed the strait daily before the crisis.
The size of the convoy and distance between the ships is also a factor. When ships are closer together, they are easier for a naval escort to protect. But that also makes them more vulnerable to missile attacks.
“That’s deep water. If you’re going to transit a minefield, do it in the deepest part of the sea,” CPT O’Flaherty said. But moving northwards would mean sailing too close to Iran.
The ships will probably switch off all GPS and radio signals, and communicate using light and Morse code. Though commercial ship officers are required to read Morse code at four words a minute to be certified, many will have never put their skills to the test. “It’s a matter of how practised they are. That's the day of the exam,” he said.
Each convoy would involve days of preparation and conversations with owners, charterers, cargo owners, ship masters and insurers, as well as co-ordination with the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and the Omani Coastguard. “To pull this off is a big deal,” he added.
CPT O’Flaherty said it was essential for the US to conduct these operations quietly. “It doesn't surprise me in the slightest. Why advertise what you're doing? That is absolute standard military. It’s not deception.”
The naval convoys are likely to become more effective over time – but conducting them could become more dangerous as Iranians develop counter methods. “The more you do it, the more the enemy is watching you,” he said. “They'll be learning why they didn't hit [the ship] but in equal measure you're learning the lesson as to how you can make it better next time.”
Kidnap or arrest?
Either route has important insurance ramifications – with ships facing 4,000 times higher war-risk insurance costs when they attempt to cross the strait.
Most ships will be insured in the event of kidnap and piracy. But detention by a government makes kidnap a more difficult case to prove. “Insurers have to distinguish between a Somali pirate situation and a seizure by a government,” said Arabella Ramage, legal and regulatory director of Lloyd’s Market Association.
“State detention is only legitimate in very limited circumstances, such as where there are concerns about seaworthiness or illegality.”
The Iranian situation would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis, she added: “As far as UK insurers are concerned in the Iranian situation, they will have to consider any indemnity payments very carefully. There would have to be a consideration of the facts in each case.”
As with piracy cases, no indemnity payment will be made until it can be proven that kidnappers do not belong to a terrorist organisation. There will also be various policies at play, depending on whether the crew remain on board and whether there is a ransom, Ms Ramage added.
“No indemnity payment could be made if there was a risk that it would be in any way facilitating terrorism or a breach of applicable sanctions,” she said.
