As Nato members convene at the Ankara summit this year, defence spending among it members are is rising at its fastest pace in years.
Measured in US dollars, the increase looks significant. However, when viewed as defence spending as a share of GDP, which is Nato's preferred measure of whether countries are meeting their commitments, then the picture is slower and far more uneven.
Our closer look at Nato data shows Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Norway and Denmark have recorded some of the biggest increases in defence spending as a share of GDP over the past decade. Their military budgets have accelerated sharply since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with eastern and Nordic members leading Nato's rearmament.
Eleven years ago, most Nato members were spending closer to 1 per cent of GDP on defence than 2 per cent. Today, almost every ally has reached or exceeded the alliance's long-standing 2 per cent benchmark.
But at last year's summit in The Hague, Nato raised the bar.
Members agreed to increase defence-related spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035. The target is split between at least 3.5 per cent on core military spending and up to 1.5 per cent on broader security priorities, including cyber defence, infrastructure and civil resilience.
That makes today's figures look rather different. While most allies now comfortably exceed the old 2 per cent target, only a handful have already crossed the new 3.5 per cent threshold. The US, UK, France and Germany all remain well short of the alliance's new benchmark.
The United States also illustrates how the balance within Nato has shifted. It remains by far the alliance's biggest defence spender in absolute terms, but its military spending has fallen from 3.71 per cent of GDP in 2014 to about 3.2 per cent today, while several European allies have steadily increased their share.
A widening divide
The figures also reveal an increasingly divided alliance. Countries closest to Russia have raised defence spending far more aggressively than many of Nato's larger western economies, reflecting both geography and the perceived security threat.
That divide is becoming increasingly apparent in government spending plans. Nato's defence push is already straining European budgets, with Germany and many Nordic and eastern European countries finding fiscal room to increase spending rapidly, while larger economies, including the UK, France, Italy and Spain, are struggling to contribute a larger towards the alliance's new target.
Germany has exempted defence spending from its constitutional borrowing limits and plans to more than double its military budget to more than €200 billion ($228 billion) by 2030. By contrast, Britain's latest £15 billion ($20 billion) defence package still leaves a significant funding gap, France is aiming to reach about 2.5 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade, Italy is targeting 2.8 per cent next year, while Spain has ruled out increasing spending beyond 2.1 per cent.
The credibility of some countries' spending plans is also beginning to come under scrutiny. Nato has reportedly asked the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Albania to resubmit elements of their defence spending data after questions over whether they had genuinely met the alliance's existing 2 per cent benchmark.
Turkey's changing role
Turkey sits around the middle of Nato's rankings, spending 2.33 per cent of GDP on defence.
But its role within the alliance is increasingly about more than domestic spending. Since Nato's Istanbul summit in 2004, Turkey's defence and aerospace exports have grown from about $196 million to more than $10 billion in 2025, with 57 per cent destined for fellow Nato members.
As European governments expand their armed forces, Turkey is increasingly becoming a supplier to Nato's rearmament, rather than simply another country trying to reach spending targets.
The overall trend is clear. Defence spending across Nato has risen sharply over the past decade, particularly since Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
But while almost every member has now reached the alliance's old 2 per cent benchmark, the much tougher 3.5 per cent core defence target agreed for 2035 remains a distant prospect for most members. The data shows an alliance moving in the same direction, but at very different speeds.
