Students wave the Pakistan flag while taking part in an anti-American demonstration in Peshawar several years ago. Pakistan and the US have had mixed relations in the recent past. Reuters
Students wave the Pakistan flag while taking part in an anti-American demonstration in Peshawar several years ago. Pakistan and the US have had mixed relations in the recent past. Reuters
Students wave the Pakistan flag while taking part in an anti-American demonstration in Peshawar several years ago. Pakistan and the US have had mixed relations in the recent past. Reuters
The arrival of a new administration in Washington is a moment when governments around the world must test the waters and prepare to recalibrate their expectations. If the Pakistani establishment’s foreign policy goals in the Trump years could be summarised in a single sentence, it was to stop making headlines for the wrong reasons while pursuing its interests. It largely succeeded in this regard.
Under US President Joe Biden, Pakistan's engagement with America is likely to intensify, but its potential will be determined by the administration’s dynamics with Afghanistan, India and China. These countries house Islamabad’s closest allies and most determined foes, but also some of Mr Biden’s top foreign policy priorities. They present difficult terrain to navigate, but Pakistan has a long track record of finding hidden opportunities within such geopolitical challenges.
Afghanistan is the first and most pressing of these challenges. The Biden team has already announced that former president Donald Trump's February 2020 agreement with the Taliban to withdraw all US forces by the end of April 2021 will undergo formal review. There is serious concern that the previous administration was so eager in its pursuit of newsworthy accomplishments ahead of the 2020 US presidential election that it ignored the concerns of Afghan and American officials who regard the treaty under current conditions as the virtual abandonment of Kabul, an irreplaceable ally against extremism.
Then US president Donald Trump greets Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan at the White House in 2019. The Pakistani establishment’s minimum goals in the Trump years was effectively to stop making headlines for the wrong reasons. Reuters
Mr Biden's national security team includes veterans of the Obama-era struggle to find an effective approach to the Taliban insurgency, which grew in strength before, during and after their previous stints in office. Despite this dismal record, the Biden administration is unlikely to abandon Kabul and it remains to be seen how the Pakistan Army, which is friendly with the Afghan Taliban and hoped to fill the void, will react to this setback.
It is likely that the Taliban will be furious and react violently to what will largelybe regarded as an American betrayal. Washington, in turn, will pressure Pakistan's military to restrain the Taliban and push it towards serious negotiations with the government in Kabul. Pakistan will have to weigh whether it fears displeasing the militants or the Americans more. In the past, it has preferred to split the difference, only to find itself pummelled from both sides.
On the other hand, Islamabad can also link its willingness to be helpful to US success in restraining an increasingly assertive use of rhetoric and force from India. Military action by the Modi government has steadily ratcheted up the pressure on Pakistan in recent years, even when the tactical results of "surgical strikes" have been limited.
The US has assisted with de-escalating India-Pakistan tensions at a number of dangerous moments in the past 40 years. This has depended on both America's unmatched technical intelligence capabilities to cut through the fog of war, and the willingness to use its leverage to cajole and push. Washington's leverage with New Delhi is currently at an all-time high, given their deepening strategic co-operation and strong levels of support in India's border disputes with China.
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's top political leader, second left, arrives with other members of the militant group for talks in Moscow, Russia. AP
China has been described by those close to Mr Biden's team as America's most important geopolitical challenge. While it is clear that they will not use Mr Trump's superheated, anti-China rhetoric, or attempt to scapegoat Beijing for American failures, it is also clear that the administration is prepared for a tough detente that combines competition with co-operation. They have already signalled that the US will continue to invest heavily in its allies and partners in Asia, including India, to restrain China. And certainly, it will occur to Washington that putting a lid on the India-Pakistan conflict will also free up India's heavily stretched military to that end.
Pakistan’s close military relationship with China potentially puts it in an awkward position. When the US under John F Kennedy and Lyndon B Johnson attempted to punish Pakistan for its ties with China, Islamabad doubled down on the Chinese connection. Fifty years later, it is likely to make the same choice, if forced. But President Biden and his team have established a reputation as pragmatists, and are unlikely to issue such a stark ultimatum, especially when American influence in Pakistan is far weaker than it has been in years.
Then Pakistan President Yahya Khan, right, seen with then US president Richard Nixon in 1971. Relations between the US and Pakistan have peaked and trough over the years. Getty Images
How might the US increase its influence? Given past experience, arms sales will not return to the levels seen in the Bush years, but close military-to-military contacts, including training and joint exercises, would be something that interest both governments. Support for political, social and economic development in Pakistan, including climate resilience and public health, is likely to continue and even grow.
It is clear that the Biden presidency will have to engage with South Asia, closely and consistently, to advance vital American interests in Afghanistan and China, and that requires bringing Pakistan along. But it is also clear that Pakistan will see far fewer benefits if the Taliban goes back to war against Coalition Forces.
The Pakistan Army in its dialogues with its American counterpart has often stressed that no military solution is possible in Afghanistan. But it is unclear if it has fully accepted that this applies just as surely to the Taliban.
The Army in the past has not only struggled to own its role in the conflict, but to recognise the crucial differences between the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the American presence. It should be clear by now, after 20-plus years, that America's interests are too enduring for it to simply surrender and go home, and that its regional engagement, unlike that of the Soviets, provides a form of security for Pakistan that is irreplaceable. The sooner that these facts are accepted, the sooner Pakistan will be able to build a strong and mutually beneficial relationship not only with Mr Biden, but whoever succeeds him.
Clinical psychologist, Dr Saliha Afridi at The Lighthouse Arabia suggests three easy things you can do every day to cut back on the time you spend online.
1. Put the social media app in a folder on the second or third screen of your phone so it has to remain a conscious decision to open, rather than something your fingers gravitate towards without consideration.
2. Schedule a time to use social media instead of consistently throughout the day. I recommend setting aside certain times of the day or week when you upload pictures or share information.
3. Take a mental snapshot rather than a photo on your phone. Instead of sharing it with your social world, try to absorb the moment, connect with your feeling, experience the moment with all five of your senses. You will have a memory of that moment more vividly and for far longer than if you take a picture of it.
Mercer, the investment consulting arm of US services company Marsh & McLennan, expects its wealth division to at least double its assets under management (AUM) in the Middle East as wealth in the region continues to grow despite economic headwinds, a company official said.
Mercer Wealth, which globally has $160 billion in AUM, plans to boost its AUM in the region to $2-$3bn in the next 2-3 years from the present $1bn, said Yasir AbuShaban, a Dubai-based principal with Mercer Wealth.
“Within the next two to three years, we are looking at reaching $2 to $3 billion as a conservative estimate and we do see an opportunity to do so,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Mercer does not directly make investments, but allocates clients’ money they have discretion to, to professional asset managers. They also provide advice to clients.
“We have buying power. We can negotiate on their (client’s) behalf with asset managers to provide them lower fees than they otherwise would have to get on their own,” he added.
Mercer Wealth’s clients include sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and insurance companies among others.
From its office in Dubai, Mercer also looks after Africa, India and Turkey, where they also see opportunity for growth.
Wealth creation in Middle East and Africa (MEA) grew 8.5 per cent to $8.1 trillion last year from $7.5tn in 2015, higher than last year’s global average of 6 per cent and the second-highest growth in a region after Asia-Pacific which grew 9.9 per cent, according to consultancy Boston Consulting Group (BCG). In the region, where wealth grew just 1.9 per cent in 2015 compared with 2014, a pickup in oil prices has helped in wealth generation.
BCG is forecasting MEA wealth will rise to $12tn by 2021, growing at an annual average of 8 per cent.
Drivers of wealth generation in the region will be split evenly between new wealth creation and growth of performance of existing assets, according to BCG.
Another general trend in the region is clients’ looking for a comprehensive approach to investing, according to Mr AbuShaban.
“Institutional investors or some of the families are seeing a slowdown in the available capital they have to invest and in that sense they are looking at optimizing the way they manage their portfolios and making sure they are not investing haphazardly and different parts of their investment are working together,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Some clients also have a higher appetite for risk, given the low interest-rate environment that does not provide enough yield for some institutional investors. These clients are keen to invest in illiquid assets, such as private equity and infrastructure.
“What we have seen is a desire for higher returns in what has been a low-return environment specifically in various fixed income or bonds,” he said.
“In this environment, we have seen a de facto increase in the risk that clients are taking in things like illiquid investments, private equity investments, infrastructure and private debt, those kind of investments were higher illiquidity results in incrementally higher returns.”
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of the largest sovereign wealth funds, said in its 2016 report that has gradually increased its exposure in direct private equity and private credit transactions, mainly in Asian markets and especially in China and India. The authority’s private equity department focused on structured equities owing to “their defensive characteristics.”
