On November 25, Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg released a report titled Nato 2030, meant to reveal the 30-nation security alliance's strategic orientations. The last time such a report was issued was in 2010, titled "Strategic Concept". It is essentially a Nato equivalent of the US National Security Strategy.
The document details many security challenges that have emerged during the past decade, including social unrest and terrorist threats in the Middle East, and, as Nato sees it, Russia's assertive agenda in its neighbouring states.
But its most remarkable feature is the description of China as a "systemic rival" of Nato, on par with Russia. The report repeatedly talks of challenges posed by Beijing to Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region.
This is the first time a Nato document has portrayed China in such manner. In contrast, the 2010 Strategic Concept did not even mention Beijing. This reflects how much the discussion on China between the US and its European allies has evolved over the past 10 years. In April 2019, US Vice President Mike Pence used the celebrations of Nato's 70th anniversary to call on its member states to play a greater role in the Indo-Pacific region vis-a-vis China. Mr Pence's words demonstrated growing tensions between Washington and Beijing during the Trump administration – be they over tariffs, Chinese naval activities in the South China Sea or 5G competition.
The new focus on China could have implications on how Nato views the Arab world. The document depicts the Middle East primarily as a theatre of power plays between the West, Russia and China – reminiscent of the Cold War era. But this is a skewed vision of the region, one that could narrow Nato's partnerships with Arab countries as a means to balance China.
It is worth asking whether Nato today should consider Vladimir Putin's Russia or Xi Jinping's China as enemies or as partners against a common threat. AP Photo
That worldview is unlikely to fade away under a Biden administration. In fact, at the moment, China might be one of the few international issues rallying bipartisan support in the US. However, President-elect Joe Biden may differ from President Donald Trump in his expectations of allies when addressing it. It is, therefore, no coincidence that Nato felt the need to acknowledge the issue of China on its own terms.
The Chinese question did not surface suddenly in Nato discussions in 2020. For years, the alliance has been speculating about the impact of China's strategic rise, and more broadly the new primacy of Asia in international politics.
In 2019, Fabrice Pothier, formerly the head of Nato's Policy Planning Unit, wrote that "if Nato did not go to the Asia-Pacific, the region would come to Nato". European countries also began re-orienting their foreign policies towards Asia. France released its own Indo-Pacific strategy in 2019, denouncing what it perceived to be China's gunboat diplomacy vis-a-vis its South-East Asian neighbours, in tandem with cementing new political ties with India and Australia. Meanwhile, the UK also revived its partnerships with Asian allies, amid mounting speculation over the potential forward deployment of British naval assets in East Asia.
These developments indicate a certain degree of alignment between the US and some of its European allies on the nature of the Chinese challenge. But putting China explicitly on the agenda of Nato is a major new step that will generate more geopolitical uncertainty, rather than clarity. There is no consensus in Europe on how it should define its relations with China. Whereas the views in France may echo those in Washington, other countries maintain a distinct position. For instance, Italy embraced China's Belt and Road Initiative. Last August, Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio talked of building a "strategic partnership" with Beijing.
Nato leaders at the highest level have agreed to assemble the 19-nation armada during the Covid-19 outbreak. AFP
In the current context, adding China to the Nato agenda is likely to exacerbate the disputes among western allies. Until recently, this internal debate was driven by two competing views. On the one hand, those in eastern Europe argued that Russia, particularly after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, was the obvious priority that required Nato's full attention and resources. On the other, those in southern Europe argued that the major threat to the alliance was instability in North Africa and the Middle East, with its consequences in terms of terrorist attacks and illegal migration.
Nato has always trodden a fine line between the different priorities of its member states, but in the past few years the political environment in Brussels has deteriorated, in light of Mr Trump's overt contempt for the politics of the alliance and the escalating dispute between France and Turkey, two of its key members. That particular rift has also altered perceptions of the strength of the Nato alliance in places like the Middle East, where France and Turkey have publicly competed to solidify their own alliances.
Furthermore, Nato appears ill-prepared to play a role in a hypothetical US-China confrontation. As a military alliance, it devotes most of its time and resources to defending Nato territories. It is in fit shape for a Cold War scenario of a conflict with Russia. But so far the competition between Washington and Beijing is of a different nature, given that it primarily focuses on economics, a domain outside Nato's scope. Even if tensions were to flare up in East Asia, a military crisis would not automatically lead to an engagement of the alliance, whose original mission remains the defence of the territories of its members.
Michael Pompeo, US Secretary of State, left, speaks to Toshimitsu Motegi, Japan's Foreign Minister, right, during a meeting of the 'Quad' in Tokyo in October. Bloomberg
The mention of China in the new Nato strategic document clearly signals the desire in the West to reframe the trans-Atlantic partnership vis-a-vis the rise of Beijing
Also, while Nato may aspire to a greater role in the Indo-Pacific, its diplomatic reach in the area is limited. Nato partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, or Asian partners such as Japan, are modest. Significantly, the Nato 2030 report recommends stronger ties with India, a move designed to reign in China but which merely rehashes old American strategies. To this day, Delhi maintains a cautious distance from Nato as a result of two main factors: India's enduring non-alignment foreign policy and its general scepticism of multilateral organisations.
The mention of China in the new Nato strategic document clearly signals the desire in the West to reframe the trans-Atlantic partnership vis-a-vis the rise of Beijing. However, it cannot simply be described as just a policy shift. Rather, it is the manifestation of major political battles to come in Brussels.
Jean-Loup Samaan is an Abu Dhabi-based researcher in strategic affairs
Who has lived at The Bishops Avenue?
George Sainsbury of the supermarket dynasty, sugar magnate William Park Lyle and actress Dame Gracie Fields were residents in the 1930s when the street was only known as ‘Millionaires’ Row’.
Then came the international super rich, including the last king of Greece, Constantine II, the Sultan of Brunei and Indian steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal who was at one point ranked the third richest person in the world.
Turkish tycoon Halis Torprak sold his mansion for £50m in 2008 after spending just two days there. The House of Saud sold 10 properties on the road in 2013 for almost £80m.
Other residents have included Iraqi businessman Nemir Kirdar, singer Ariana Grande, holiday camp impresario Sir Billy Butlin, businessman Asil Nadir, Paul McCartney’s former wife Heather Mills.
Hunting park to luxury living
Land was originally the Bishop of London's hunting park, hence the name
The road was laid out in the mid 19th Century, meandering through woodland and farmland
Its earliest houses at the turn of the 20th Century were substantial detached properties with extensive grounds
The design
The protective shell is covered in solar panels to make use of light and produce energy. This will drastically reduce energy loss.
More than 80 per cent of the energy consumed by the French pavilion will be produced by the sun.
The architecture will control light sources to provide a highly insulated and airtight building.
The forecourt is protected from the sun and the plants will refresh the inner spaces.
A micro water treatment plant will recycle used water to supply the irrigation for the plants and to flush the toilets. This will reduce the pavilion’s need for fresh water by 30 per cent.
Energy-saving equipment will be used for all lighting and projections.
Beyond its use for the expo, the pavilion will be easy to dismantle and reuse the material.
Some elements of the metal frame can be prefabricated in a factory.
From architects to sound technicians and construction companies, a group of experts from 10 companies have created the pavilion.
Work will begin in May; the first stone will be laid in Dubai in the second quarter of 2019.
Construction of the pavilion will take 17 months from May 2019 to September 2020.
1. Domestic VAT refund amendments: request your refund within five years
If a business does not apply for the refund on time, they lose their credit.
2. E-invoicing in the UAE
Businesses should continue preparing for the implementation of e-invoicing in the UAE, with 2026 a preparation and transition period ahead of phased mandatory adoption.
3. More tax audits
Tax authorities are increasingly using data already available across multiple filings to identify audit risks.
4. More beneficial VAT and excise tax penalty regime
Tax disputes are expected to become more frequent and more structured, with clearer administrative objection and appeal processes. The UAE has adopted a new penalty regime for VAT and excise disputes, which now mirrors the penalty regime for corporate tax.
5. Greater emphasis on statutory audit
There is a greater need for the accuracy of financial statements. The International Financial Reporting Standards standards need to be strictly adhered to and, as a result, the quality of the audits will need to increase.
6. Further transfer pricing enforcement
Transfer pricing enforcement, which refers to the practice of establishing prices for internal transactions between related entities, is expected to broaden in scope. The UAE will shortly open the possibility to negotiate advance pricing agreements, or essentially rulings for transfer pricing purposes.
7. Limited time periods for audits
Recent amendments also introduce a default five-year limitation period for tax audits and assessments, subject to specific statutory exceptions. While the standard audit and assessment period is five years, this may be extended to up to 15 years in cases involving fraud or tax evasion.
8. Pillar 2 implementation
Many multinational groups will begin to feel the practical effect of the Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (DMTT), the UAE's implementation of the OECD’s global minimum tax under Pillar 2. While the rules apply for financial years starting on or after January 1, 2025, it is 2026 that marks the transition to an operational phase.
9. Reduced compliance obligations for imported goods and services
Businesses that apply the reverse-charge mechanism for VAT purposes in the UAE may benefit from reduced compliance obligations.
10. Substance and CbC reporting focus
Tax authorities are expected to continue strengthening the enforcement of economic substance and Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting frameworks. In the UAE, these regimes are increasingly being used as risk-assessment tools, providing tax authorities with a comprehensive view of multinational groups’ global footprints and enabling them to assess whether profits are aligned with real economic activity.
Contributed by Thomas Vanhee and Hend Rashwan, Aurifer
