September 11, 2001 was, for Americans, the day that started the “forever war” in Afghanistan. September 11, 2021 is the deadline their president, Joe Biden, has now set for an unconditional withdrawal from Afghan soil.
For Americans, the date is rife with symbolism – 9/11 can become a day of both catharsis as well as tragedy. For most Afghans, who fear a coming vacuum soon to be filled by an even more violent and complex war, it will be an insult. The insinuation will be that 9/11 was the day Afghanistan brought war to the US, and so it must also be the day the US consigned Afghanistan to another spiral of bloodshed.
Afghans have seen their country scarred by conflict for 40 years. They are likely to see more of that in the years to come. “Forever” is so much longer for them.
Washington will seek to compensate for this bleak future by intensifying peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. But the damage is done. Withdrawing without conditions will allow the Taliban to wait things out. The militant group is winning the war. If it rejects peace between now and in September, it could feasibly attempt a takeover of Afghanistan afterwards. Its chances of success will be even higher.
This approach would still bear a cost. Looking self-interested and cynical could lose the Taliban what little respect it has gained as a legitimate voice in future Afghan politics. It could lose its political office in Doha.
And, although the group remains dangerous, strategically it is fractured. This week, it announced, to the surprise of many, that it may not even attend a peace summit hosted by Turkey later this month, because internal discussions are still incomplete. Hours after the US decision, a Qatar-based Taliban spokesman said the group will not turn up for talks until the withdrawal is complete.
The US paints the war as one between the government and the Taliban, but it is increasingly multidimensional. In parts of the country, the Taliban now vies with ISIS, and its links with Al Qaeda remain. And these terrorist groups are only the start.
The Turkey peace conference, should it take place, will include world powers as well as Afghanistan’s neighbours. Some of these countries have invested, financially or militarily (or both), in the Afghan war and, unlike the US, they are in no hurry to leave. And that will shape the battle to come.
One neighbour, Iran, has a record of funding competing sides across the border. Some Taliban factions openly claim ties with Tehran, being supplied with weapons and money for operations against America. Meanwhile, Iran has long supported majority-Shia political parties, despite the fact that they are in the Taliban’s crosshairs after Americans.
In December, Mohamed Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, alarmed Kabul when he boasted in an interview with an Afghan journalist that his country’s military supports a brigade of thousands of Afghan citizens who have been fighting, essentially as mercenaries, in the Syrian civil war. Far beyond mere “support” from Tehran, the Fatemiyoun Brigade, as the force is known, is suspected of operating directly under the command of the Iranian military. Many of its members were recruited forcibly from Iran’s Afghan refugee camps. When Mr Zarif, in the interview, offered their services to the Afghan government to fight ISIS (but, notably, not the Taliban), it was interpreted in Afghanistan as a veiled threat regarding the kind of force Iran could project in the Afghan war if it wanted to.
Afghan Army soldiers secure a military base that was previously in use by the US soldiers, in Haska Meyna district of Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, on April 14, 2021. EPA
This Janus-faced approach is a staple policy for Afghanistan’s other large neighbour, Pakistan. It has supported the Taliban financially and militarily since the militant group’s infancy in the 1990s, all the while participating as an ostensible ally in the US war on terror and claiming to be a security partner of the Afghan government.
The duplicity extends even further, all the way to the would-be host of the peace conference, Turkey. Ankara was chosen as the venue because Turkey is seen to command respect from most of Afghanistan’s political class. The country has strong cultural links to Afghanistan, is a Muslim Nato member and is geographically distant enough that it has no political or territorial disputes with Kabul. But even it has Afghan blood on its hands. Since the 1990s, Turkey has been a primary financial sponsor of Abdul Rashid Dostum, a notorious Afghan militia leader-turned-Field Marshal who commands significant support in Afghanistan’s Turkic northern areas. He has been investigated for multiple instances of murder and rape, in addition to being suspected of war crimes. In 2016, while serving as Afghanistan’s vice president, he was accused of ordering the kidnapping of a provincial governor, and of building a private militia to challenge the central government. When the government opened a criminal inquiry, Dostum fled, as he has done many times in the past, to Turkey, where he remained in exile for two years.
Last week, Dostum reportedly gave a speech to lawmakers and students while he was in Turkey on a visit, in which he stated he was ready to fight once again in the event that peace talks fail.
Like Afghanistan’s neighbours, Dostum uses the language of anti-terrorism, citing the dangers of Al Qaeda and ISIS, to threaten the Afghan government with more chaos and disunity. Meanwhile, across Afghanistan, other militia groups have arisen independently to fight those enemies, as well as the Taliban, in earnest, particularly in places where the national army has been unable to do so. But now they are becoming unwieldy, and also threaten Afghanistan’s broader national security. Last month, one of them, a vigilante militia force in Wardak province led by Abdul Ghani Alipour, a former lorry driver, shot down a government helicopter. A standoff between Kabul and Alipour’s men has only escalated since then.
Peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government is a necessary step to prevent a total breakdown of the situation in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the US’s impending withdrawal. But it is not the only step towards which diplomats must target their efforts. A kaleidoscope of deadly forces is already positioning itself for a renewed conflict. That war could explode on September 11. If it does, for Afghans, “forever” continues.
Notable salonnières of the Middle East through history
Al Khasan (Okaz, Saudi Arabia)
Tamadir bint Amr Al Harith, known simply as Al Khasan, was a poet from Najd famed for elegies, earning great renown for the eulogy of her brothers Mu’awiyah and Sakhr, both killed in tribal wars. Although not a salonnière, this prestigious 7th century poet fostered a culture of literary criticism and could be found standing in the souq of Okaz and reciting her poetry, publicly pronouncing her views and inviting others to join in the debate on scholarship. She later converted to Islam.
Maryana Marrash (Aleppo)
A poet and writer, Marrash helped revive the tradition of the salon and was an active part of the Nadha movement, or Arab Renaissance. Born to an established family in Aleppo in Ottoman Syria in 1848, Marrash was educated at missionary schools in Aleppo and Beirut at a time when many women did not receive an education. After touring Europe, she began to host salons where writers played chess and cards, competed in the art of poetry, and discussed literature and politics. An accomplished singer and canon player, music and dancing were a part of these evenings.
Princess Nazil Fadil (Cairo)
Princess Nazil Fadil gathered religious, literary and political elite together at her Cairo palace, although she stopped short of inviting women. The princess, a niece of Khedive Ismail, believed that Egypt’s situation could only be solved through education and she donated her own property to help fund the first modern Egyptian University in Cairo.
Mayy Ziyadah (Cairo)
Ziyadah was the first to entertain both men and women at her Cairo salon, founded in 1913. The writer, poet, public speaker and critic, her writing explored language, religious identity, language, nationalism and hierarchy. Born in Nazareth, Palestine, to a Lebanese father and Palestinian mother, her salon was open to different social classes and earned comparisons with souq of where Al Khansa herself once recited.
1. Domestic VAT refund amendments: request your refund within five years
If a business does not apply for the refund on time, they lose their credit.
2. E-invoicing in the UAE
Businesses should continue preparing for the implementation of e-invoicing in the UAE, with 2026 a preparation and transition period ahead of phased mandatory adoption.
3. More tax audits
Tax authorities are increasingly using data already available across multiple filings to identify audit risks.
4. More beneficial VAT and excise tax penalty regime
Tax disputes are expected to become more frequent and more structured, with clearer administrative objection and appeal processes. The UAE has adopted a new penalty regime for VAT and excise disputes, which now mirrors the penalty regime for corporate tax.
5. Greater emphasis on statutory audit
There is a greater need for the accuracy of financial statements. The International Financial Reporting Standards standards need to be strictly adhered to and, as a result, the quality of the audits will need to increase.
6. Further transfer pricing enforcement
Transfer pricing enforcement, which refers to the practice of establishing prices for internal transactions between related entities, is expected to broaden in scope. The UAE will shortly open the possibility to negotiate advance pricing agreements, or essentially rulings for transfer pricing purposes.
7. Limited time periods for audits
Recent amendments also introduce a default five-year limitation period for tax audits and assessments, subject to specific statutory exceptions. While the standard audit and assessment period is five years, this may be extended to up to 15 years in cases involving fraud or tax evasion.
8. Pillar 2 implementation
Many multinational groups will begin to feel the practical effect of the Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (DMTT), the UAE's implementation of the OECD’s global minimum tax under Pillar 2. While the rules apply for financial years starting on or after January 1, 2025, it is 2026 that marks the transition to an operational phase.
9. Reduced compliance obligations for imported goods and services
Businesses that apply the reverse-charge mechanism for VAT purposes in the UAE may benefit from reduced compliance obligations.
10. Substance and CbC reporting focus
Tax authorities are expected to continue strengthening the enforcement of economic substance and Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting frameworks. In the UAE, these regimes are increasingly being used as risk-assessment tools, providing tax authorities with a comprehensive view of multinational groups’ global footprints and enabling them to assess whether profits are aligned with real economic activity.
Contributed by Thomas Vanhee and Hend Rashwan, Aurifer
More than 2.2 million Indian tourists arrived in UAE in 2023 More than 3.5 million Indians reside in UAE Indian tourists can make purchases in UAE using rupee accounts in India through QR-code-based UPI real-time payment systems Indian residents in UAE can use their non-resident NRO and NRE accounts held in Indian banks linked to a UAE mobile number for UPI transactions
FA Cup quarter-final draw
The matches will be played across the weekend of 21 and 22 March
What vitamins do we know are beneficial for living in the UAE
Vitamin D: Highly relevant in the UAE due to limited sun exposure; supports bone health, immunity and mood. Vitamin B12: Important for nerve health and energy production, especially for vegetarians, vegans and individuals with absorption issues. Iron: Useful only when deficiency or anaemia is confirmed; helps reduce fatigue and support immunity. Omega-3 (EPA/DHA): Supports heart health and reduces inflammation, especially for those who consume little fish.
