As terror incidents rise, Ghani must loosen his grip

President Ashraf Ghani alone has to figure out how to balance Afghanistan’s domestic scene and the one that includes the Taliban in the political sphere, writes Shaukat Qadir

A man holds his son who was injured in a suicide bomb attack, outside a local hospital in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on Saturday. Ghulamullah Habibi / EPA

The Taliban’s activity in Afghanistan has picked up in the past month. A spring offensive was to be expected, but this seems to have Ashraf Ghani, the president, more worried than it should.

If a reminder that extremism continues to bubble away was needed, it was issued on Saturday in the most deadly circumstances, when extremists carried out a suicide attack on Jalalabad. ISIL has claimed responsibility for the chaos. Whether that is the case or not, the attack was timed, seemingly, to synchronise with Gen Sher Muhammed Karimi becoming the first foreign dignitary to preside over the passing out of cadets from the Pakistan Military Academy.

Of late, Mr Ghani has been worried about ISIL’s growing presence in Afghanistan. Whether this attack was carried out by them or by the Taliban, the threat is disturbing.

A few months ago, everything looked hopeful. Pakistan was gaining momentum in its war against terrorism. Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation was breaking fresh ground, the US had decided to stay on in Afghanistan and China had agreed to play a role. Afghans had also clearly rejected the Taliban in last year’s elections and Mr Ghani’s demeanour inspired confidence.

Suddenly that confidence is gone and there seems to be signs of desperation in official circles as they once again reach out to Pakistan for assistance. MK Bhadrakumar, the former Indian diplomat, concludes that Pakistan holds all the cards. I hope he is wrong, because that is far from good news. Afghanistan must find its own balance, with help, of course, from other parties.

That is why it is important to understand what might be going wrong.

Foremost is the fact that the Afghan government is too centralised. Mr Ghani’s predecessor, Hamid Karzai, was guilty of the same, but for different reasons. Mr Karzai was aware that his hold on government was increasingly tenuous, with decreasing support from Afghans.

It seems that, having struck a power-sharing compromise with Abdullah Abdullah over the elections, Mr Ghani cannot fully trust him. No government can be a one-man-show. Every leader must delegate. Failure to do so must end up in inefficiency and a lack of confidence, which results in an erosion of the support base.

Undoubtedly, this is the most important weakness of the current Afghan government. But there are numerous contributory factors.

The Afghan National Army’s weaknesses are also being exposed. While the army chief has a good reputation, as do some other senior officers, most others do not.

It seems that trainee officers during the Karzai era were selected less on the basis of ability and more on their likely loyalty. Apparently, the mutual mistrust between the US trainers and Afghan trainees has rubbed off on the present relations between officers and men.

They will improve but it will take time. Meantime, this situation, if it has been accurately described, breeds its own lack of confidence and a greater reliance on foreign military assistance. The latter will have after-effects, most of them negative. US military training is obviously based on high-tech equipment. Much of that is no longer as readily available as it used to be.

Afghanistan’s economy is highly dependent on commerce. The inclusion of Afghanistan in the Chinese “commercial corridor” is likely to bring huge benefits but these will take time to come through. Meanwhile, the economy remains weak.

However, while these and many other factors contribute, their eradication as well as the current lack of confidence is essentially a product of poor governance. I have been, and still am, of the view that Mr Ghani has everything going for him and that he has the ability to deliver.

In fact, Mr Ghani has a unique opportunity. Not only has the environment changed to offer him this opportunity, circumstances have created an opportunity for him to govern without interference from external parties. This is a set of circumstances that none of his predecessors was afforded.

For his own sake and, more importantly, for the sake of the future of Afghanistan and the region, he must not squander this opportunity.

He alone has to find how to balance Afghanistan’s domestic scene and the one that includes the Taliban in the political sphere.

But to do so, he must begin by delegating sufficient amounts of authority so that matters do not stand still even during his periods of absence. What, for instance, will have happened at home while Mr Ghani made his way to Tehran yesterday for his first official visit to Iran?

I gather that he, like most political leaders, has a small coterie of confidantes.

If that is so, perhaps he can delegate more power to these select few. Obviously, Mr Abdullah will be the final authority in his absence, but Mr Ghani’s select few can ensure his policies are adhered to in principle.

Brig Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistani infantry officer