Faced with the largest street protests it had ever encountered, the Islamic Republic of Iran committed a massacre, killing – according to many estimates – thousands. More than a month later, it might appear as though it has survived that crisis.
The protests fizzled out quickly and the governing elites solidified behind the regime. No visible crack appeared in the security forces. The judiciary went on the offensive, arresting activists. The reformist president, Massoud Pezeshkian, went along with a ludicrous official narrative, which claimed the killings of protesters were done by gangs sponsored by America and Israel. Meanwhile, Mr Pezeshkian couldn’t even prevent the arrest of the leadership of the Iranian Reformist Front, which had helped him win the presidency.
But while the regime has not lost control of the country, it is far from restoring the equilibrium of the past. Iran’s civil society is not yet resigned; rather, it remains defiant. Having come out in four large waves of demonstrations since 2017, those who protested are unlikely to be cowed into submission without an improvement in their lot. And here, the regime has no easy way out. Even if it grants certain concessions, there is little it can do about the country’s dismal economy. Only serious changes in Iran’s domestic structures and in its relations with the world (which could hopefully lead to the lifting of western-imposed sanctions) could bring about economic improvement.
The regime also faces serious kinetic threats from the US and Israel. While the former has engaged in diplomatic talks with Iran, it has also placed a massive military force on Iran’s doorstep. Many believe strikes by the US are likely. Having fought an inconclusive war with Iran last year, Israel is also standing in the wings, ready to join attacks on Iran or to do whatever takes to neutralise potential threats from Tehran.
In other words, the Iranian regime remains under siege both from its own people and from the world. Its neighbours are wary of the consequences of a broad war in the region or any acute destabilisation of Iran; many have pushed back against the idea of US attacks. But the situation is inherently unstable in any case and other countries in the region would have some stake in finding a path to a more sustainable one.
Under such immense pressure and failing any catastrophic upheaval, the Islamic Republic is bound to change both its core structures and its core policies. This change could come in a variety of ways.
The Iranian opposition has long hoped for a repeat of 1979: a massive revolutionary movement from below that topples the ruling elite. Some hope for power to then pass on to the son of the Shah who was overthrown in 1979. From his exile in America, Reza Pahlavi has claimed the mantle of transitional leadership. Some in Iran support him and responded to his call to come out on the streets on January 8 and 9, as videos of protesters carrying his dynasty’s banner showed. But Mr Pahlavi and other oppositionists abroad lack the organising networks to bring about the change they desire. Even if the US and Israel were to attack Iran, as Mr Pahlavi and his aspiring co-revolutionaries have lobbied for, it is not clear that this would create a meaningful role for them in whatever comes next. The assumption of power by Mr Pahlavi and other members of the exiled opposition is not impossible, but it remains quite unlikely.
Iran also has a formidable opposition based within the country, though most of its leaders are behind bars. Mostafa Tajzadeh, a former interior minister who has spent more than 10 years in prison, and Narges Mohammadi, a Nobel peace laureate who is reportedly being held in draconian conditions, are two of its most notable figures. Mirhossein Mousavi, a former prime minister who has been under house arrest since 2011, is another. His calls for democratic transition have gathered much supporter. But, like its counterparts abroad, the domestic opposition also lacks the necessary organisation to seize power.
Given such conditions, it is quite likely that any process of change would be led by figures currently inside the regime. To preserve their privileges and power and to make governing more tenable, the regime elites could sideline the supreme leader, 87-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has proven completely obstinate to change, or simply wait for him to die naturally before bringing about fundamental change.
Three items are likely to be at the top of any change agenda. The first is getting a new deal with the US which ends the enmity between Tehran and Washington and builds diplomatic relations, even if that means concessions in the nuclear programme and other areas. The second is a non-aggression agreement with Israel, probably mediated by the US and regional countries. And the third is liberalisation (though probably not democratisation) of the regime. Such reforms would likely not satisfy the democratic demands of much of the population, but would probably still improve their economic lot and, at least for a period, earn their acquiescence.
There are many candidates who could be part of this change. In fact, most of the powerful factions in today’s Iran don’t share – either in whole or in part – Mr Khamenei’s vision, his insistence on Islamism and his crusade against Israel and the US that has brought the country to the present point. Many instead have a more pragmatic and technocratic bent. This includes figures such as former president Hassan Rouhani, who currently holds no position but has clear ambition for power, as well as some military figures currently in powerful positions, such as Ali Shamkhani, head of the Defence Council, and Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of Parliament.
Mr Shamkhani and Mr Ghalibaf are both ex-members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the regime’s military arm, and were important mid-level commanders in the force during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. They have something of a camaraderie and share an outlook. And they both sit atop massive financial empires and networks of power. What limits them is that they might be seen as too much like the men of yesteryear, not acceptable to a change-demanding population. Others in lower positions but with similar profiles and ambitions might fit the bill better.
The precise course of events is impossible to predict. However the diplomatic and military confrontation of the regime with the US ends, the nature of power in Iran and core policies of the country are likely to change.
