More than 1,000 soldiers are being killed and maimed daily in a war that is about to enter its fifth year.
The total Russian and Ukrainian casualties are approaching two million dead and wounded since Moscow's tanks rolled across the border on February 24, 2022.
Peace talks have been taking place, but how might the bloodshed and misery of a conflict that appears to be both frozen and febrile actually end?
After speaking to a range of military, economic and political experts, three broad pathways have emerged on how 2026 might develop if the recent Abu Dhabi and Geneva peace talks fail to bring about a ceasefire.
- There could be a change in Ukraine’s firepower from its home-grown missiles or those indirectly supplied by the US, such as Tomahawks that can strike deep into Russia
- There is a chance that Moscow’s woeful economic circumstances, combined with low oil prices, could tip it into deep recession, forcing President Vladimir Putin into concessions
- Or Ukraine, denied of US intelligence and missile interceptors, along with its worryingly low recruitment rate and strikes on its energy infrastructure, finally throws in the towel.
Note that two of those three pathways are dependent on the will and whim of US President Donald Trump. So far, he has flip-flopped between continuing the support for Volodymyr Zelenskyy shown by his predecessor Joe Biden, and showing admiration for his old acquaintance in the Kremlin and the business that could be done after the guns are silenced.
All three scenarios could possibly come to pass. Yet there is also the grim reality that the war drags on and on, becoming even tougher and more entrenched.
Tomahawk attack
Specifically designed to penetrate Russia’s once mighty air defence, with a range of 1,500km and carrying a 450kg warhead, the Tomahawk cruise missile could prove a game-changer for Ukraine.
While there have been many weapons deemed to be “silver bullets” for Kyiv, from western tanks to F-16 fighters, none have proved decisive. Yet the Tomahawk, combined with Ukraine’s own cruise missiles including the Flamingo, could tip the balance.
“Just the threat of having Tomahawks would clearly change Russia’s calculus,” said Orysia Lutsevych of the Chatham House think tank. “It would be a game-changer.”
The missiles could strike drone launch pads, and penetrate command and control centres forcing Russia to move its air defences inland and away from the battlefield.
As a method for the Trump administration to increase pressure on the Kremlin in peace talks, “it’s certainly one way to go”, said Doug Barrie of the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank.
Lynette Nusbacher, a former British military intelligence officer, agreed that if the US could “slide a couple of dozen over to the Ukrainians”, that might assist Moscow’s approach to peace talks. “After all, the Tomahawk was first designed to penetrate Russian airspace at low altitude and get deep inside to blow up economic targets very precisely,” she added.
Others are more sceptical about their impact. Frank Ledwidge, also a former military intelligence officer, said that if the US did supply them it would be in small numbers and “won’t make much of a difference", as their warheads are only 100kg bigger than Ukraine’s Flamingos.
Dr Olga Vlasova, a political scientist at King’s College London, regarded the Tomahawks as more of a “bargaining chip” in negotiations. But they would also reinforce the Kremlin stance that “the West is the side that escalates everything”, especially as they can be nuclear tipped.
Keir Giles, a Chatham House Russia specialist, warned that timing mattered as much as capability. “The delay, the obfuscation, the timidity and the general principle of giving Ukraine just enough to survive and not to win means that all of these different weapon systems have their effectiveness greatly attenuated by the time they finally arrive.”
Squeeze the economy
Imposed sanctions were meant to cripple Russia’s ability to finance the war but it has proved surprisingly resilient, much due to Moscow’s “secret weapon” – the highly competent head of its central bank, Elvira Nabiullina, who manages the finances.
But Charles Hecker, author of Zero Sum: The Arc of International Business in Russia and an analyst at the Royal United Services Institute think tank, described an economy under “crushing pressure”, which is now at a turning point. “Most forecasts anticipate that GDP growth in the coming year will turn negative,” he said. “The anticipation is that the economy will fully go into recession.”
The aim of sanctions, Mr Hecker stressed, “has been to choke off its [Russia's] ability to finance the war, and that is proving increasingly successful.”
But he cautioned that the West does not want the Russian economy to completely collapse due to the “geopolitical instability that that could cause … we just want Russia to stop financing the war.”
Ms Lutsevych spoke of mounting fiscal strain. Oil revenue is at “five-year historic lows, inflation is rising and liquidity is tight”. Moscow has leant more heavily on gold, mined domestically and in Africa, to settle its accounts.
In a war of attrition, she said, that pressure mattered. “It will actually decrease the manpower on the battlefield unless Putin does a general mobilisation, which increases pressure on his regime.” Most Russians, she said, “want a peace agreement and they don’t want war with Ukraine because they see it’s going nowhere".
But the link between economic pain and political decision-making is not straightforward, said Mr Hecker. “One of the mistakes that the West is making is thinking Putin will come to the negotiating table because of how horrible the economy is doing. But I don’t think that that’s a primary driver.”
While Russia was in “deep, serious economic trouble", Mr Giles said, “it won’t stop the war” as it outweighs long-term damage. He also did not accept that a recession meant a retreat. “Soldiers can keep on fighting for quite a long time after they stop getting paid.”
Dr Vlasova said stagnation was happening slowly so people “are literally getting used to it”, with the war economy becoming normalised.
“The Russian economy has been retooled to be a permanent wartime economy, so we can’t look for indicators of strength and weakness the way we can with other economies,” said Dr Nusbacher.
Even if a recession hit Russia, sheer scale matters, she added. “Its economy is big, its capability for production and generating forces is big, and that means you cannot press one button and make it collapse.”
Therefore there are questions over whether the economic pathway to peace compels the Kremlin to negotiate in earnest.
Intelligence lifeline
A key point of influence that Washington has over Kyiv is the immense amount of intelligence it shares, which is crucial for choosing battlefield targets.
That for Ukraine, argued Mr Ledwidge, is existential. “The US dominates space-based reconnaissance and if you remove that domain they’re blind.”
Dr Nusbacher agreed that if it stopped, “Ukraine will no longer be able to achieve precision strike” and the immense battlefield advantage is “would go up in smoke”.
But European powers, led by France, are striving to build a decent intelligence picture for Ukraine if America withdraws support, including commercial satellite imagery.
Ms Lutsevych also argued that Ukraine was “not going to be capitulating the moment that US withdrawal happens", and that the surveillance serves American interests, too. “They are getting the battlefield information. That’s priceless so they also have skin in the game.”
The greatest vulnerability would be Washington shutting down the vital supply of Patriot missile interceptors given the barrage of Russian attacks on its cities. “Ukraine will suffer much, much more and that could have a serious impact,” she said.
Indeed, that could lead to ending the war on Moscow’s terms, contended Mr Giles, with Russia “making life in Ukraine’s cities unsustainable through its destruction of critical infrastructure”.
Five years of war
There was consensus that the war was unlikely to be decided purely on the front line. It is “more a function of the fact that the coalitions supporting each side have decided not to intervene decisively", argued Mr Giles.
Mr Ledwidge predicted the enduring slogging match of “continuing murderous status, with the attrition rate favouring Russia”. While both sides were taking heavy casualties only “one side can afford them”.
But Mr Barrie, who admitted he thought Ukraine would be defeated in 2022, said its resilience had been underestimated. “They have sustained the fight for far, far longer than a lot of people expected and inflicted extraordinary casualties.”
But he questioned what it would take for Russia to “start to seriously back off its maximalist claims” of taking all the Donbas region and having an acquiescent government in Kyiv.
“As long as Vladimir Putin remains in power and healthy,” said Dr Nusbacher. “Russia will continue as a state built on permanent warfare and a permanent enemy.”
Ms Lutsevych contended that Ukraine would continue its “fierce defences” with its advantage in the technological race in drones and missiles blunting Russia’s manpower advantage.
Ultimately, Mr Giles reduced the endgame to two possibilities: either Russia made Ukraine’s urban life unsustainable, or “some other party is willing and able to put pressure on it” that was sufficient to persuade Moscow to suspend the war.
Sadly, as year five of the war begins, it appears that the promise is the tragedy of more death and destruction on both sides with the risk of the war intensifying and economic decline deepening. That is unless Mr Trump or others can find a way to enforce peace in the coming months.
